微分对策界栅理论在舰艇作战能力评估中的应用

作战能力是表征战斗舰艇战术技术性能的一项重要指标,如何正确评价舰艇的作战能力一直是军事运筹研究的热点.利用定性微分对策的界栅理论研究了一类作战问题,通过构造捕获区面积和咽喉区域面积,并以此作为动态评估舰艇作战能力的衡量指标.研究结果可为综合评价舰艇作战能力提供一条新途径.     

基于非合作博弈的栅栏信息覆盖虚拟节点组合算法

邻近节点通过协作感知和信息融合组成虚拟节点,能够增加信息覆盖栅栏长度.基于非合作博弈模型,设计了一种完全分布式的虚拟节点组合算法DVSF算法.DVSF算法面向栅栏信息覆盖应用,以尽量增加整个网络的信息覆盖栅栏长度为目标,将合适的邻近节点组合成虚拟节点,提升了整个网络的栅栏信息覆盖性能.仿真实验验证了DVSF算法的有效性...     

混合对策无人战机空战决策

在混合对策理论的基础上,将空战过程看作是由一系列离散的状态组成的离散事件动态系统,建立了空战过程的离散状态子模型,利用空战态势指数和战机空战能力指数构造了战术评估函数,以完成对战术动作的筛选工作,并结合3DOF质点模型设计了机动指令生成器,实现对无人机运动状态的控制,并在Matlab环境下对机动实例进行了仿真.     

对抗仿真中防空导弹微分对策模型研究

针对防空导弹与目标的空间对抗,建立了防空导弹微分对策空间对抗模型,并推算得到了最优策略,运用自适应神经网络评判方法对模型进行求解,通过给定条件下的仿真证明了该算法的有效性,显示了该模型可应用于防空导弹与目标的空间对抗问题。     

Lateral capacity exchange and its impact on capacity investment decisions

We study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

双机空战的仿真与分析

用矩阵博弈理论、计算机仿真的方法研究了空战过程,使双机的空中格斗阶段─目标的跟踪、射击、弹道计算及射击效果的评定连续化,并用ＦＯＲＴＲＡＮ─７７语言编程在计算机上进行了Ｆ＿Ａ、Ｆ＿Ｂ两种飞行的空战,仿真结果与实际情况基本一致。本程序具有通用性,可对不同种类的飞机及武器系统的性能作出定性和定量的分析和评估。     

搜索路径给定时的搜索对策问题及其应用

搜索路径给定时的最优搜索方案问题,也可以理解为是关于搜索者和目标的二人对策问题,主要讨论了当搜索路径给定时的单个搜索者和单个目标的搜索对策问题。首先根据问题的特点,利用动态规划和迭代的方法,确定关于目标逃逸路径混合策略的最优分区,证明该分区是多面体凸集;针对目标不同逃逸路径的分区,求出搜索者的最大期望收益,再将问题转化为二人有限零和对策,计算出搜索者的支付矩阵,确定最优搜索策略。最后结合海军护航行动,对我舰载直升机搜索小型海盗船进行分析和计算,说明搜索路径给定时的最优搜索对策对于双方的资源分配和提高搜索效率具有一定的应用价值。     

军民融合产业创新集群的形成

在军民融合发展战略与创新驱动发展战略深入推进进程中,军民融合产业创新集群成为军民融合产业发展的重要创新形式,其形成问题研究更是对其发展与演化具有重要影响。以军民融合产业创新集群的内涵着手,通过刺激—反应模型与演化博弈模型,分析其形成过程与促进措施。研究表明,军民融合产业创新集群作为复杂适应系统,创新主体的适应性能力及其内在关系是集群形成的关键所在;为使合作创新行为成为演化博弈的稳定策略,从合作创新能力系数和合作创新成本、拥有的创新资源以及政府资金支持三个方面剖析集群形成的促进作用,对军民融合产业创新集群的发展与演化研究奠定基础。     

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.