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41.
搜索路径给定时的最优搜索方案问题,也可以理解为是关于搜索者和目标的二人对策问题,主要讨论了当搜索路径给定时的单个搜索者和单个目标的搜索对策问题。首先根据问题的特点,利用动态规划和迭代的方法,确定关于目标逃逸路径混合策略的最优分区,证明该分区是多面体凸集;针对目标不同逃逸路径的分区,求出搜索者的最大期望收益,再将问题转化为二人有限零和对策,计算出搜索者的支付矩阵,确定最优搜索策略。最后结合海军护航行动,对我舰载直升机搜索小型海盗船进行分析和计算,说明搜索路径给定时的最优搜索对策对于双方的资源分配和提高搜索效率具有一定的应用价值。  相似文献   
42.
谷鑫  郑绍钰  张文鹏 《国防科技》2017,38(5):065-074
在军民融合发展战略与创新驱动发展战略深入推进进程中,军民融合产业创新集群成为军民融合产业发展的重要创新形式,其形成问题研究更是对其发展与演化具有重要影响。以军民融合产业创新集群的内涵着手,通过刺激—反应模型与演化博弈模型,分析其形成过程与促进措施。研究表明,军民融合产业创新集群作为复杂适应系统,创新主体的适应性能力及其内在关系是集群形成的关键所在;为使合作创新行为成为演化博弈的稳定策略,从合作创新能力系数和合作创新成本、拥有的创新资源以及政府资金支持三个方面剖析集群形成的促进作用,对军民融合产业创新集群的发展与演化研究奠定基础。  相似文献   
43.
Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.  相似文献   
44.
This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.  相似文献   
45.
This article examines a problem faced by a firm procuring a material input or good from a set of suppliers. The cost to procure the material from any given supplier is concave in the amount ordered from the supplier, up to a supplier‐specific capacity limit. This NP‐hard problem is further complicated by the observation that capacities are often uncertain in practice, due for instance to production shortages at the suppliers, or competition from other firms. We accommodate this uncertainty in a worst‐case (robust) fashion by modeling an adversarial entity (which we call the “follower”) with a limited procurement budget. The follower reduces supplier capacity to maximize the minimum cost required for our firm to procure its required goods. To guard against uncertainty, the firm can “protect” any supplier at a cost (e.g., by signing a contract with the supplier that guarantees supply availability, or investing in machine upgrades that guarantee the supplier's ability to produce goods at a desired level), ensuring that the anticipated capacity of that supplier will indeed be available. The problem we consider is thus a three‐stage game in which the firm first chooses which suppliers' capacities to protect, the follower acts next to reduce capacity from unprotected suppliers, and the firm then satisfies its demand using the remaining capacity. We formulate a three‐stage mixed‐integer program that is well‐suited to decomposition techniques and develop an effective cutting‐plane algorithm for its solution. The corresponding algorithmic approach solves a sequence of scaled and relaxed problem instances, which enables solving problems having much larger data values when compared to standard techniques. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013  相似文献   
46.
In this article, we explore when firms have an incentive to hide (or reveal) their capacity information. We consider two firms that aim to maximize profits over time and face limited capacity. One or both of the firms have private information on their own capacity levels, and they update their beliefs about their rival's capacity based on their observation of the other firm's output. We focus on credible revelation mechanisms—a firm may signal its capacity through overproduction, compared to its myopic production levels. We characterize conditions when high‐capacity firms may have the incentive and capability to signal their capacity levels by overproduction. We show that prior beliefs about capacity play a crucial, and surprisingly complex, role on whether the firm would prefer to reveal its capacity or not. A surprising result is that, despite the fact that it may be best for the high‐capacity firm to overproduce to reveal its capacity when capacity information is private, it may end up with more profits than if all capacity information were public knowledge in the first place. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013  相似文献   
47.
A rule that constrains decision‐makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources—inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game‐theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two‐inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms‐control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.  相似文献   
48.
网络游戏产业快速发展的同时,赌博现象混迹其中。网络游戏赌博与传统赌博只是形式上的不同,其实质就是一种赌博行为。只有从教育、法制、监督、自律四方面综合治理,才能使这个行业健康发展。  相似文献   
49.
通过对比军用认知无线功率控制博弈模型与一些经典的功率控制博弈算法,提出了一种认知无线电网络中的功率控制的博弈算法。通过仿真结果性能分析,证明算法具有一定的优越性,并且能够为军事无线通信提供一定的理论依据和现实作用。  相似文献   
50.
In the last decade, there has been much progress in understanding scheduling problems in which selfish jobs aim to minimize their individual completion time. Most of this work has focused on makespan minimization as social objective. In contrast, we consider as social cost the total weighted completion time, that is, the sum of the agent costs, a standard definition of welfare in economics. In our setting, jobs are processed on restricted uniform parallel machines, where each machine has a speed and is only capable of processing a subset of jobs; a job's cost is its weighted completion time; and each machine sequences its jobs in weighted shortest processing time (WSPT) order. Whereas for the makespan social cost the price of anarchy is not bounded by a constant in most environments, we show that for our minsum social objective the price of anarchy is bounded above by a small constant, independent of the instance. Specifically, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 2 for the class of unit jobs, unit speed instances where the finite processing time values define the edge set of a forest with the machines as nodes. For the general case of mixed job strategies and restricted uniform machines, we prove that the price of anarchy equals 4. From a classical machine scheduling perspective, our results establish the same constant performance guarantees for WSPT list scheduling. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012  相似文献   
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