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Dan Kovenock 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):507-515
The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken's 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases. 相似文献
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在场地球类视频中,球门常常会伴随着精彩片段而出现。因此,球门探测是体育视频的基础,同时也是视频高层语义概念探测的研究热点。目前,利用机器学习方法进行视频中的对象探测是非常有前途的研究领域。基于此,提出一种基于模糊决策树的球门探测算法,用来探测场地球类视频中球门帧的出现,为了提高分类准确性,在模糊决策树训练的过程中加入了平衡处理。实验结果表明,与基于阈值和决策树的算法相比,该算法可以得到更好的分类结果(F-measure>95%),并且我们可以从所建立的树中推导出模糊规则来解释分类模型。 相似文献
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用于器官移植的肾脏处于严重的短缺状态。为缓解这一问题,越来越多的国家开始实施各种形式的肾脏调换计划。肾脏调换问题一般被建模为一个合作博弈(KE)。其中的局中人为病人及与其配型失败的捐赠者所构成的二元组。现实中不乏拥有多个配型失败捐赠者的病人。定义了多捐赠者肾脏调换博弈(MDKE),分析了其可行解及稳定解的结构,证明了捐赠多颗肾脏无益于参与稳定调换,将TTC算法、KE稳定解的NP难解性以及最大覆盖稳定解的不可近似性拓展到MDKE。实验表明引入MDKE效果显著。 相似文献
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Ryusuke Hohzaki 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(1):46-58
This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
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Kyle Y. Lin 《海军后勤学研究》2014,61(1):56-65
Two forces engage in a duel, with each force initially consisting of several heterogeneous units. Each unit can be assigned to fire at any opposing unit, but the kill rate depends on the assignment. As the duel proceeds, each force—knowing which units are still alive in real time—decides dynamically how to assign its fire, in order to maximize the probability of wiping out the opposing force before getting wiped out. It has been shown in the literature that an optimal pure strategy exists for this two‐person zero‐sum game, but computing the optimal strategy remained cumbersome because of the game's huge payoff matrix. This article gives an iterative algorithm to compute the optimal strategy without having to enumerate the entire payoff matrix, and offers some insights into the special case, where one force has only one unit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 56–65, 2014 相似文献
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We deal with dynamic revenue management (RM) under competition using the nonatomic‐game approach. Here, a continuum of heterogeneous sellers try to sell the same product over a given time horizon. Each seller can lower his price once at the time of his own choosing, and faces Poisson demand arrival with a rate that is the product of a price‐sensitive term and a market‐dependent term. Different types of sellers interact, and their respective prices help shape the overall market in which they operate, thereby influencing the behavior of all sellers. Using the infinite‐seller approximation, which deprives any individual seller of his influence over the entire market, we show the existence of a certain pattern of seller behaviors that collectively produce an environment to which the behavior pattern forms a best response. Such equilibrium behaviors point to the suitability of threshold‐like pricing policies. Our computational study yields insights to RM under competition, such as profound ways in which consumer and competitor types influence seller behaviors and market conditions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 365–385, 2014 相似文献