基于模糊多目标对策的雷达反干扰策略优化

考虑到单部雷达反干扰效能评估指标多样化、模糊且存在不同权重的情况,在对策论基础上提出了一种雷达反干扰策略优化模型,并在考虑局中人偏好情况下,设计了一种模糊多目标对策最优混合策略求解算法,为找出较优化的雷达反干扰策略以及为战场决策提供参考。     

航天器轨道追逃动力学与控制问题研究综述

随着航天器交会与接近操作技术的快速发展,轨道追逃问题逐渐成为航天领域的研究热点。从动力学与控制视角,对航天器轨道追逃问题的研究现状进行综述。给出了基于定量微分对策的轨道追逃问题模型的一般形式,系统梳理了各种类型的轨道追逃问题;对于追逃策略求解,分别针对闭环策略和开环策略,分析了各种方法的优缺点;围绕人工智能算法与轨道追逃问题的结合,阐述了基于深度神经网络和强化学习的轨道追逃策略的研究现状。关于未来展望,提出了追逃博弈态势分析、多航天器博弈控制、三体条件下博弈动力学与控制等发展方向。     

Inventory control under substitutable demand: A stochastic game application

Substitutable product inventory problem is analyzed using the concepts of stochastic game theory. It is assumed that there are two substitutable products that are sold by different retailers and the demand for each product is random. Game theoretic nature of this problem is the result of substitution between products. Since retailers compete for the substitutable demand, ordering decision of each retailer depends on the ordering decision of the other retailer. Under the discounted payoff criterion, this problem is formulated as a two‐person nonzero‐sum stochastic game. In the case of linear ordering cost, it is shown that there exists a Nash equilibrium characterized by a pair of stationary base stock strategies for the infinite horizon problem. This is the unique Nash equilibrium within the class of stationary base stock strategies. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 359–375, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10018     

Delivery‐date and capacity management in a decentralized internal market

We study competitive due‐date and capacity management between the marketing and engineering divisions within an engineer‐to‐order (ETO) firm. Marketing interacts directly with the customers and quotes due‐dates for their orders. Engineering is primarily concerned with the efficient utilization of resources and is willing to increase capacity if the cost is compensated. The two divisions share the responsibility for timely delivery of the jobs. We model the interaction between marketing and engineering as a Nash game and investigate the effect of internal competition on the equilibrium decisions. We observe that the internal competition not only degrades the firm's overall profitability but also the serviceability. Finally, we extend our analysis to multiple‐job settings that consider both flexible and inflexible capacity. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

游戏：走向教学对话的本真

教学对话是教师、学生与文本之间实现的智识共享、双向理解和意义创生,达成多重视界的融合。教学中教师的独白、预设的问答以及片面的对话向我们展现的是遮蔽的教学对话。游戏与教学对话有着某种契合,游戏与教学对话的相融,教师、学生和文本之间达成智识共享、共同在场、意义的创生、全面的对话直至多重的视界相融,使教学对话真正走向本真之境。     

Continuous accumulation games on discrete locations

In an accumulation game, a HIDER attempts to accumulate a certain number of objects or a certain quantity of material before a certain time, and a SEEKER attempts to prevent this. In a continuous accumulation game the HIDER can pile material either at locations $1, 2, …, n, or over a region in space. The HIDER will win (payoff 1) it if accumulates N units of material before a given time, and the goal of the SEEKER will win (payoff 0) otherwise. We assume the HIDER can place continuous material such as fuel at discrete locations i = 1, 2, …, n, and the game is played in discrete time. At each time k > 0 the HIDER acquires h units of material and can distribute it among all of the locations. At the same time, k, the SEEKER can search a certain number s < n of the locations, and will confiscate (or destroy) all material found. After explicitly describing what we mean by a continuous accumulation game on discrete locations, we prove a theorem that gives a condition under which the HIDER can always win by using a uniform distribution at each stage of the game. When this condition does not hold, special cases and examples show that the resulting game becomes complicated even when played only for a single stage. We reduce the single stage game to an optimization problem, and also obtain some partial results on its solution. We also consider accumulation games where the locations are arranged in either a circle or in a line segment and the SEEKER must search a series of adjacent locations. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 60–77, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1048     

2019年水下无人系统发展综述

对2019年世界各主要国家和地区水下无人系统的发展情况进行了综合梳理分析。首先研究了美国和日本发布的水下无人系统相关战略规划,之后整理了世界主要国家和地区水下无人系统装备发展情况,并对水下无人系统的关键技术(水下光学通信技术,水下导航技术,能源动力技术,协同作战技术)发展情况进行了总结。综述表明世界各主要军事强国从战略规划、装备研制和技术攻关等维度不断推进水下无人系统能力建设,全面提升水下无人自主作战和跨域协同作战能力水平。     

基于多阶段博弈模拟的作战飞机零部件备用分析

从决策优化的角度出发,提出了一种利用多阶段博弈模拟来分析和解算作战飞机零部件备用的方法.该方法首先分析了多阶段博弈模拟在作战飞机零部件备用的应用,给出了最优化问题的总的目标函数一般形式.然后转换和简化所得到的最优化问题目标函数形式,从而有利于零部件备用的最优化解算.最后,给出了多阶段博弈模拟分析算法的主要步骤.仿真结果表明,这种方法解决了零部件使用模型问题求解的不精确的分析方法.将零部件使用周期作战飞机零部件备用看成一个整体来分析,符合未来网络中心战作战飞机零部件使用备份追求整体效能最大的思想.     

How not to pay for the war

As a result of allied subsidy and the influence of sunk costs, the marginal cost of the Gulf War to the US was reduced to negligible size. This result is at variance with the Olson‐Zeckhauser thesis that in an alliance “the small exploit the large.” A game theoretic alternative explanation suggests that the relation between allies resembles the game of Chicken, successfully played by the US. The ability to shift the marginal costs of war in the short term raises questions about the possible underestimation of long term effects.     

Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds

This article discusses a two‐player noncooperative nonzero‐sum inspection game. There are multiple sites that are subject to potential inspection by the first player (an inspector). The second player (potentially a violator) has to choose a vector of violation probabilities over the sites, so that the sum of these probabilities do not exceed one. An efficient method is introduced to compute all Nash equilibria parametrically in the amount of resource that is available to the inspector. Sensitivity analysis reveals nonmonotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; a phenomenon which is a variant of the well‐known Braess paradox. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013