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161.
This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy. 相似文献
162.
Bettina Renz 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):55-77
The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated the massive expansion of drug use and trade in Russia. The country now has one of the largest populations of injecting drug users in the world and has become the largest single-country market for Afghan heroin. In 2003 the Federal Service for the Control of the Drugs Trade was created to coordinate a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy appropriate to the scale of this threat. The service continues to face a number of challenges in its early stages of development. However, it has made considerable advances in improving responses to large-scale organised crime and in building international cooperation. 相似文献
163.
Nori Katagiri 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):170-195
The strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial part of the strategy, victory would be impossible without it. Yet when the strategy is implemented through the group, it compromises the policy it serves. I show how this dilemma undermined British political control during the Malayan Emergency. 相似文献
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Counterinsurgency is often characterized by large numbers of small fire-fights interspersed with a few larger battles. Heavy firepower contributes to the outcome of the larger battles but the smaller contacts are often fought by infantry without heavy weapons support. Infantry combat performance in these fire-fights is therefore a key concern. It has been fashionable to discuss soldier combat performance in terms of ‘firers’, ‘non-firers’, and ‘posturers’, but we argue that other factors have a greater impact. We provide a detailed statistical analysis of a selection of combat factors, using combat data collected by the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) during the Vietnam War. An accepted measure of soldier lethality is the ‘shots per casualty’ ratio. Using this measure we are now able to describe the combat performance of the Australian infantry section in Vietnam in much greater detail than has hitherto been possible. 相似文献
166.
J. N.C. Hill 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):4-31
The aim of this article is to consider how Algeria's most prized achievement and treasured memory – the FLN's victory over the French in the war of liberation – has helped stimulate and sustain the violence that has blighted the country since independence. It argues that successive governments have propagated a legend of the war that encourages and legitimises rebellion and armed resistance. By celebrating the actions and achievements of a committed band of revolutionaries they have established a precedent whereby it is every citizen's duty to oppose and resist an unjust government. Time and again therefore, insurgent groups like the FFS, MIA, and AIS have justified their actions and won popular support by portraying themselves as the early FLN's natural heir. 相似文献
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W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(4):573-587
After decades of fighting, the secessionist war between the government of Sri Lanka and the secessionist movement known as the Tamil Tigers of Eelam continues. Military operations have failed to achieve a decisive victory over the other side. This article aims to prove that the Sri Lankan civil war should be regarded as a war of attrition, as military actions have failed, and possibly will continue to fail, to produce a victor. 相似文献
168.
Charles W. Mahoney 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5-6):916-940
ABSTRACTIn May 2018, the Basque insurgent group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) officially disbanded after a 60-year struggle. This inquiry assesses ETA’s violent campaigns using recent conceptual and theoretical advancements from the field of terrorism studies. Three conclusions concerning the group’s strategies of terrorism are advanced. First, ETA regularly targeted civilians to achieve goals other than coercing the Government of Spain; these objectives included outbidding rival separatist groups and spoiling negotiation processes. Second, ETA’s most rapid period of organizational growth occurred as the result of an aggressive terrorist campaign, demonstrating that civilian targeting can serve as a stimulus to rebel group recruitment. Finally, while terrorism did not advance ETA’s primary political objective of creating an independent Basque state, it did enable the group to assume a leading position within the radical Basque separatist movement, helping extend ETA’s lifespan and making the group an embedded actor within the contentious political processes surrounding the question of Basque self-determination. Collectively, these conclusions support recent theoretical findings arguing that non-state terrorism often enables insurgent groups to prolong their lifespans while paradoxically making it more difficult for them to advance their long-term political objectives. 相似文献
169.
Phil Reynolds 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):446-458
Personal cognitive processes inform how individuals understand their environment. Cultural variation, fundamental attribution error, causal attribution, and durability bias create obstacles to Western understanding of irregular war and have created a significant institutional bias in how the US military perceives its enemies- a perception only somewhat softened after a decade of irregular war. United Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is in a better position to overcome these problems through persistent engagement. In the event of major conflict, environmentally sensitized military planners will be better able to achieve military and policy objectives. 相似文献
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