对提高思想教育实效性的思考

提高思想教育的实效是思想教育的终极目标。要增强思想教育的实效,必须提高思想教育者素质,增强思想教育的感召力;把握官兵接受心理,增强思想教育的接受力;创新思想教育方法,增强思想教育的助推力。     

试析世博安保中的军事“软实力”运用

世博会的圆满召开,不仅需要强大的军事“硬实力”作后盾,也需要军事“软实力”作支撑。本文从军事“软实力”的基本概念入手,将其分解为感化认同力、形象吸引力、心理威慑力等三个子要素;从各要素出发,以完成世博安保任务为着眼点,提出加强军事“软实力”的具体思路。     

基于支持向量机的功率变换器开关管开路故障诊断

提出一种基于支持向量机的功率变换器开关管开路故障诊断方法。利用支持向量机建立分类模型,模型以相电流功率谱为输入量,7种故障状态为输出量,选用高斯核,使用基于二叉树分类器的分类算法。将诊断结果与基于BP神经网络的诊断结果进行比较,结果表明基于支持向量机的分类器在功率变换器开关管开路故障诊断中具有更高的准确率和更好的泛化能力。     

基于金属膜电阻的大功率低电感负载

利用金属膜电阻设计并制作了用于陡化前沿Marx发生器调试的大功率低电感负载.其阻值约为90Ω,电感约为55nH,基本不具备分散电容.该负载采用线性渐变的圆锥外型结构,有利于减小信号在负载上的反射,配合电容分压器使用能够很好地完成对前沿约为几ns的快前沿高压脉冲的测量.理论估算了该负载的功率容量,并利用PSpice软件模拟了对其进行脉冲方波加载的情况.该负载用于调试陡化前沿的Marx发生器的实验中,获得了幅值约210kV,脉宽近40ns,前沿为5ns的快前沿高压脉冲.多次实验结果表明该负载性能稳定,适用于陡化前沿Marx发生器的调试工作.     

Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

通用武器装备供应系统设计中的硬、软系统方法整合研究

分析了硬、软系统方法应用的异同点,研究了将硬、软系统方法整合起来处理通用装备供应系统设计的问题,最后提出了系统设计的框架。     

装备物资供应保障中的装卸优化方法

装备物资装卸作为供应保障的一个重要环节 ,对装备物资保障效能的发挥有着极大的影响。综述了装备物资装卸过程中应遵循的原则和装卸搬运作业方法 ,提出了装备物资装卸的优化方法。