后勤保障指挥决策系统结构设计研究

军队后勤保障指挥决策系统是高技术局部战争后勤保障的中枢,科学合理构 建系统的结构是提高决策系统质量的关键,针对该系统大范围多领域的分布式特征,引入了 化学抽象机对系统结构进行形式化、规范化描述,可以清楚的反映系统的静态和动态特征, 对后勤"可视化"研究具有一定的指导意义。     

某型制导炸弹实时仿真系统设计

采用训练仿真系统进行武器装备的维修和操作训练是当今装备的发展趋势。某型制导炸弹是我军即将装备部队的精确制导武器,为了提高训练质量、节约训练经费和延长装备寿命,迫切需要研制该型弹训练仿真系统。介绍了基于PC/104总线的该型制导炸弹实时仿真系统的软硬件设计与实现。该系统具有操作简单,模拟控制信号精确,检测迅速准确,可扩展性强等特点,满足了部队训练和院校实验室教学的要求。     

Fixed‐interval joint‐replenishment policies for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand

We consider a distribution system consisting of a central warehouse and a group of retailers facing independent stochastic demand. The retailers replenish from the warehouse, and the warehouse from an outside supplier with ample supply. Time is continuous. Most previous studies on inventory control policies for this system have considered stock‐based batch‐ordering policies. We develop a time‐based joint‐replenishment policy in this study. Let the warehouse set up a basic replenishment interval. The retailers are replenished through the warehouse in intervals that are integer multiples of the basic replenishment interval. No inventory is carried at the warehouse. We provide an exact evaluation of the long‐term average system costs under the assumption that stock can be balanced among the retailers. The structural properties of the inventory system are characterized. We show that, although it is well known that stock‐based inventory control policies dominate time‐based inventory control policies at a single facility, this dominance does not hold for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand. This is because the latter can provide a more efficient mechanism to streamline inventory flow and pool retailer demand, even though the former may be able to use more updated stock information to optimize system performance. The findings of the study provide insights about the key factors that drive the performance of a multiechelon inventory control system. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 637–651, 2013     

The Dutch COIN approach: three years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009

Rarely has a military commitment led to such intense discussion in the Netherlands as the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. In February 2010, the Netherlands' coalition government even collapsed after the two largest parties failed to agree on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan later this year. This article deals first of all with the difficult discussion over the Afghanistan mission of the TFU. The authors then subject three ISAF operations to close scrutiny. The authors provide some suggestions to help understand better this pivotal point in the execution of the whole operation and thus give a fuller picture of the Dutch counterinsurgency approach in Uruzgan.     

The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.     

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Nonproliferation policies to prevent biological and chemical weapons use are important, but insufficient, particularly in view of the rise of global terrorism. Given the history of developing and using these weapons, it is crucial that governments properly prepare for biological and chemical threats, whether naturally occurring or man-made, such as by developing and managing effective healthcare infrastructure to mitigate widespread illness and injuries resulting from pandemics or terrorist attacks. Although the Middle East is one of the most sensitive and complex areas in the world—especially regarding regional arms control efforts and prevention—coordinating preparedness strategies among states in the region may be possible. Cooperatively addressing biological and chemical threats could lead to constructive progress towards the otherwise elusive goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.     

HOW THE UNITED STATES HELPED IRAN BUILD A LASER ENRICHMENT LABORATORY

In the spring of 1975, Iran became one of the first states to begin comprehensive research into using lasers for uranium isotope separation. As part of that research, the government sought the expertise of Jeff Eerkens, a leading American specialist in the field. This investigative article tells the story of their relationship: how it began, how it developed, and how it ended, drawing extensively from the authors' personal interviews with Eerkens as well as numerous publications and other interviews.     

HARNESSING GLOBAL TRADE DATA FOR BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL

Unlike treaties dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks formal verification measures, 31 years after entering into force. Here we propose a global export-import monitoring system of biological dual-use items as an additional measure for a web of biological arms controls that could complement traditional export controls. We suggest that such a measure may help to guide consultation or verification processes in the biological area.     

“GOOD COP/BAD COP” AS A MODEL FOR NONPROLIFERATION DIPLOMACY TOWARD NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

Scholarly and popular literature in the recent past has framed nonproliferation diplomacy toward both Iran and North Korea as an example of “good cop/bad cop,” a social-psychological strategy borrowed from law enforcement to describe a process for forcing a confession by subjecting a target to stressful emotional contrast. This article examines those two cases, roughly covering the period since 2003, when the most recent attempts to deal with the Iranian and North Korean proliferation threats began, in light of criteria for employment of the good cop/bad cop strategy. There is some evidence that within the framework of the six-party talks with North Korea and within the framework of the EU-3-U.S. diplomacy toward Iran, the players seeking nonproliferation have adopted good cop/bad cop roles to that end. The article concludes, however, that while there are similarities to the interrogation room technique, the complexity of the international political environment as compared to the interrogation room has prevented the states involved from successfully adopting or effectively exploiting good and bad cop roles. Substantial and exploitable differences of interest among them, and the availability of alternative “escape routes” for the target state, raise serious questions about the applicability of the good cop/bad cop strategy to these two nonproliferation cases, and even about its applicability in future nonproliferation challenges.     

THE ROLLBACK OF LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi agreed to eliminate his country's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and long-range Scud missiles under strict verification by U.S. and British experts and international inspectors. This article examines the negotiation and implementation of Libya's WMD rollback, with a primary focus on its chemical weapons program, and draws some lessons for the future. Although the Libyan case was unique in many ways, some aspects have relevance for other countries, including the critical role played by multilateral nonproliferation organizations, the utility of economic sanctions and export controls, the importance of a flexible U.S. disarmament funding mechanism, the value of rotating technical assistance teams in and out of the country that is disarming, and the desirability of remaining politically engaged with a former proliferator after rollback is complete.