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731.
ABSTRACTNovichok agents are a class of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In light of the use of a Novichok agent in Salisbury in March 2018, two sets of proposals to amend Schedule 1 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been put forth, one jointly by the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, and the other by Russia. Both sets of proposals will be discussed and voted upon at the next Conference of States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in November 2019. If either set of proposals is approved, it will be the first time that the list of chemicals subject to verification under the CWC will have been modified. This viewpoint will discuss these proposals, and argue that, if adopted, the joint proposal and the portions of the Russian proposal upon which consensus can be reached would significantly strengthen the CWC by considerably expanding the coverage of its Schedule 1 and bringing Novichok agents firmly within the CWC’s verification system. We also argue that, since the OPCW Technical Secretariat did not deem the fifth group of chemicals proposed by Russia to meet the criteria for inclusion in Schedule 1, Russia should withdraw this part of its proposal from consideration. The proposals have also served an important purpose in clarifying the identity of the chemical agent used in the Salisbury incident, squarely placing it within one of the two families of Novichok agents described by the Russian chemical-weapons scientist and whistleblower Vil Mirzayanov. If either proposal is approved in November, it will be important to conduct a thorough assessment of key precursors for the synthesis of Novichok agents and assess the need to amend CWC schedules and national and multinational export-control lists accordingly. 相似文献
732.
Gregory D. Koblentz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):575-598
ABSTRACTInternational efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished. 相似文献
733.
ABSTRACTIn recent years, an upward trend in terrorist attacks has mirrored an increase in suicide attacks. According to our preliminary analysis, the events of September 11th marked a sea change in the number of terrorist attacks. While a rich literature has evaluated why terrorists participate in suicide attacks, none have considered the uptick in volume after 9/11, and fewer yet have considered how female fighters may be contributing to this. We evaluate how both structural and female-specific factors affect the likelihood of female fighter suicide attacks. Recent literature discovered a trend in terrorist groups using females as suicide bombers due to cultural norms that permit them to get closer to targets. We test our theory using data from the Chicago Project on Security and Threats Suicide Attack Database (CPOST-SAD) and various datasets from the Quality of Government (QOG) compendium for the 1986–2016 time period. We construct a series of models that consider both female-specific and structural factors that could explain variation in the number of female suicide attacks. Our results indicate that our models encompass relatively stable patterns. Female political empowerment, female educational attainment, and female employment rates are significant and positive in our post-9/11 models, indicating that they may increase female suicide attacks. Democracy is a relevant structural factor and generally yields a positive effect on female suicide attacks across both time periods and multiple models. Ethnic fractionalization is significant in both time periods but yields a negative effect before 9/11 and a positive effect in the later period. 相似文献