An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

Investigating optimal replacement of aging air force systems

An availability‐oriented approach has been developed to decide when to replace an aging system. For an existing system, it is optimal to operate another year if and only if the incremental cost per available year is less than the lifetime average cost per available year of a new aircraft. We illustrate our approach using United States Air Force KC‐135 tanker data. In demonstrating our approach, we find it will be optimal to replace the KC‐135 by the end of the decade.     

Specialization in defence forces

The choice between balanced and specialized defence forces depends on the technology of defence output (e.g. whether a force scope multiplier is present), the existence of scope and scale economies, the platform customization costs and, of course, the level of defence budgets. Minimum force element levels (thresholds), and scale economies facilitate specialization as opposed to scope economies (e.g. platform‐sharing), scale diseconomies and the force scope multiplier (e.g. defence weakest‐link technology). When a balanced force is not optimal, the option value of a non‐optimally maintained force element must also include the opportunity cost arising from suboptimal force elements. Shrinking defence budgets may produce two surprising phenomena. If some force elements are shut down as a result of thresholds, the surviving ones may increase in platform numbers as well as enjoying closer‐to‐most‐desirable platforms. Furthermore, if heritage force elements are shut down within the budget contraction environment, overall defence capability might rise.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

Guns for Butter? Empirical Evidence from China

Abstract

This study examines the causal nexus between defence spending and education expenditure in China using the bootstrap Granger full-sample causality test and sub-sample rolling window estimation. The full-sample result indicates that there is no causality between defence spending and education expenditure. By adopting a time-varying rolling window approach to revisit the dynamic causal relationships, this article identifies a negative unidirectional causality running from education expenditure to defence spending. The finding suggests that it is the education expenditure crowds out defence spending in China rather than reverse. No causality is demonstrated from defence spending to education expenditure, indicating that an increase in military spending will not crowd out expenditure on education. The results could be partly explained by that the education expenditure in China is below the requirement of corresponding economic growth, urging for more financial budget. Whereas the findings support a negative trade-off between defence and education expenditures, they refute the theory of ‘guns for butter’.     

Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?

Turkey has been investing in its national defence industrial base since the 1980s. As with other developing countries, Turkey’s motivations for investing in national defence industries can be boiled down to the pursuit of defence autarky, economic benefits and international prestige. However, after 40 years of investment, Turkey is unable to reach the primary goals of defence industrialisation. We argue that three factors are important to understanding Turkey’s persistence in these primary goals. First, Turkey believes that there is an overall improvement in its defence industrial capabilities and the goal of autarky is still reachable. Second, increased defence exports support the belief that Turkish defence industries have become sustainable and the trend will continue in the future. The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems for prestige and, therefore, garners broader support.     

弹道导弹防御系统效能分析与措施研究

简要介绍了弹道导弹防御系统的组成 ,提供了系统作战效能计算的主要思想、方法 ,给出了概率计算模型。根据分析结果 ,结合现代战争的作战方式和导弹防御系统的作战特点 ,提出了提高弹道导弹防御系统作战效能的技术和战术措施。     

潜艇结构强度研究的新近进展

本文从结构材料、结构形式、非线性分析、组合壳体和端盖强度以及结构的减振降噪等方面论述了潜艇结构强度研究的新近进展,并指出了今后的研究方向。