Defence industrial policy – a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy?

This article explores whether it makes sense for national governments to employ defence industrial policies – such as offsets and discriminatory procurement practices – to support their domestic defence industries. This question has so far primarily been discussed by economists, who have argued strongly against the use of defence industrial policies. This article maintains that these economists fail to address the often complex motivation behind the introduction of these policies. It illustrates these shortcomings by contrasting their arguments against a case study of Norway, which accounts for the country’s use of defence industrial polices from the early post-Second World War era up until today. The article concludes that, depending on their objectives, defence industrial policies can be seen as either a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy.     

Strategic and Budgetary Necessity,or Decision-making ‘Along the Grain’? The Royal Navy and the 1981 Defence Review

The 1981 Defence Review undertaken by John Nott as Secretary of State for Defence controversially and dramatically cut the capabilities of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet. Many of those involved in these decisions have emphasised the budgetary and politico-strategic drivers for these reductions in capability, and the first generation of academic analysis has broadly followed this position. However, recently released government and private archival sources demonstrate that Nott’s review was initially much more severe than thought, and that this was due as much to the presumptions and assumptions of the key decision makers as to any strategic or budgetary factors.     

基于BP神经网络的装备故障诊断专家系统研究

分析了神经网络和专家系统的特点,提出了基于BP神经网络与专家系统结合的某装备的故障诊断方法,构造了BP神经网络的装备故障诊断专家系统的诊断模型,克服了传统专家系统在知识获取和表达的薄弱环节,并用了某型装备的故障实际数据进行了验证,结果表明了神经网络与专家系统结合是一种有效的诊断方法。     

化工火灾引发环境污染的分析及预防——由吉林石化分公司爆炸火灾引发的思考

介绍了中石油吉林石化分公司双苯厂“11·13”爆炸事故和松花江水污染事件的基本情况。分析了这起典型污染事件的成因,提出预防火灾爆炸事故造成环境污染的对策。     

Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009

During their 60 years within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Denmark and Norway have experienced both high and low standings within the alliance, which can be attributed to both external and internal factors influencing their alliance strategies. During the ‘first’ Cold War and Détente, 1949–79, Danish and Norwegian alliance strategy aimed to simultaneously deter and reassure the Soviet Union. During the ‘second’ Cold War, 1979–89, Danish alliance policy became driven by domestic politics, and the Danish government was forced to formally dissociate the country from NATO's policies. Norway was not uncritical, but held a much lower profile. After the Cold War this situation shifted. Denmark successfully rehabilitated itself as a loyal and dependable ally by responding to the call for focusing on out-of-area operations. Meanwhile, Norway's continued focus on the lingering Russian Threat made the country seem out-of-touch with priorities in the post-Cold War alliance, and domestic politics prevented a more active out-of-area engagement.     

Book reviews

The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, Alex Mintz (ed), London and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp x, 334; ISBN 0–415–07595–5

Penser La Guerre, Penser L'Economie, Christian Schmidt, (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1991), 350p.

Military Production and Innovation in Spain, Jordi Molas‐Gallart, Chur (CH): Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. vii, 212; ISBN 3–7186–5280–3     

Country survey VI: Australia

Australia is a geographically large country, with the world's longest national coastline to defend, but a relatively small economy of some 17.5 million people. Since World War II, Australia has faced the dilemma of how to structure defence policy in the absence of an identifiable threat. Its policy of self‐reliance aims to permit Australia to conduct defensive operations in the event of low/medium level threats without depending immediately on its allies. This is to be achieved through the technological sophistication of defence equipment, a highly professional but small defence force and local industry support.

The burden of defence, measured as the share of defence outlay in GDP declined from about 3% in 1971–72 to about 2.3% in 1993–94. It has been the Government's policy to encourage the development of local defence‐related industry, in particular in areas such as: electronics/optics; communications and information technology; aerospace; shipbuilding and repair, munitions; and land vehicles. However, defence procurement has a small impact on the Australian economy as a whole.     

Optimal versus required defence expenditure: The case of the Greek-Turkish arms race

The aim of this paper is to indicate the extent to which the arms race against Turkey, in which Greece and Cyprus have been entangled, imposes a defence expenditure burden that is tough for the two allies to bear. To do so we have resorted to evaluating the optimal military expenditure for the two countries, allied in the context of the Integrated Defence Doctrine, which is compatible with the constraints imposed by the resources of their economies. All experiments and scenarios examined lead to the conclusion that the current defence burden of the two allies seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity limits. The fact remains, however, that under the circumstances, a one-sided disarmament policy like the one currently followed by Greece, is a risky choice given that the long-term armament programmes pursued by Turkey, whose role in this arms race has been proven as leading, leave very small room to the Greek and Cypriot sides to reduce their own defence expenditure.     

Budgetary trade-offs of security expenditures in Turkey

This paper investigates the budgetary trade-off structure of security (defence+internal security) expenditures in Turkey for the period 1983-1998. A modified version of Todaro's distributive share index of social welfare is used to quantify the impacts on the growth of primary budget expenditures of Security, Education, Health, General Administration, Infrastructure, and Social Services. We find that defence expenditures dominate overall security expenditures and are less affected in times of bottlenecks in the economy. A systematic pattern of negative budgetary trade-offs of security expenditures in terms of other components is not identified. We also analyse the expenditures of the Defence Industry Support Fund in an attempt to find the cost of the modernisation program to the economy.     

Country survey XVI the defence sector in the economy of a declining superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001

The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia.