排序方式: 共有123条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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借鉴美国国防部体系结构框架思想(Department of Defense Architecture Framework,DoDAF),从核心体系结构实体、体系结构建模集和建模步骤几方面研究了以数据为中心的体系结建模方法,针对天基预警系统的特点和在反导中的应用,采用体系结构工具System Architect(SA)从系统层面建立了典型的天基预警系统的系统视图模型,对理解天基预警系统体系结构、开展天基预警系统顶层设计研究具有一定的参考价值。 相似文献
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Louise Stanton 《Defense & Security Analysis》2012,28(4):288-302
Countries with a federalist system of government have different arrangements for providing national security. US national security is provided by national and State defense forces. The quintessential national function – national defense – experienced some changes that enhanced the role of the States. Policy changes in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (2008 NDAA) introduced new roles for the Governors and the State defense forces, or the National Guard. This article explores how the interests of Congress and States aligned in the 2008 NDAA such that the national defense function changed. This article finds that the national government continues to have the central coordinating role, but that the politics and provisions of the 2008 NDAA changed the national–State relationship in mission, decision-making, and command and control so that US federalism in the national defense function is evolving in unexpected ways. 相似文献
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高超声速武器具有飞行速度快、精确毁伤和高效突防等特点,具有重要的战略威慑和实战应用价值,它能够大幅改变未来战争的态势,已成为大国打破战略平衡、打赢未来战争的新型“杀手锏”。随着高超声速武器逐步走向战场,世界各主要国家的反导防御体系将向更高预警维度、更快反应速度和更大打击力度的天地一体联合防御方向发展。本文分析了高超声速武器作战优势及其对未来战争的影响和威胁,阐述了美军现有反导预警能力的基本架构与能力缺陷,对其未来反高超声速武器的预警能力建设及发展态势进行了研判与预测。美军“优先发展天基反导作战体系,发挥低轨卫星主体作用”的反高超声速武器发展思路对于军队反导反高超声速武器能力建设具有一定的启示和借鉴作用。 相似文献
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Sylvain Moura 《Defence and Peace Economics》2017,28(6):652-668
This paper employs an economic and statistical approach to get an overview of the defense industrial base (DIB) in France. It allows us to identify its main characteristics and to measure the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). An original data-set was built, thanks to the information from the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the French Customs Central and National Administration, the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and all the most relevant organizations specialized in the development, production or maintenance, repair, and overhaul of military goods in France. Overall, the DIB turns out as being composed of about 1800 enterprises in France (subcontractors included), of which three-third are SMEs. Along with high market concentration ratios, these enterprises are characterized by a significant military/civil duality, high labor productivity rates, and intensity in Research and Development. 相似文献
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Bence Nemeth 《Defense & Security Analysis》2016,32(4):321-335
Hungary, a former communist state, adapted a Western-style defense planning system during the 1990s and 2000s. Although on the surface the elements of this planning system were similar to the planning programming budgeting system (PPBS) developed by the US Department of Defense, strategic guidance for defense planning has not been properly developed until recently. Thus, albeit PPBS-based defense plans were developed in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (Hungarian MoD) regularly, they lacked both an expression of clear priorities and strategic focus. This article delineates the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian MoD concentrating on current developments, and introduces the newly elaborated analytical concepts and tools, which helped to create needed strategic guidance in Hungary. 相似文献
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Thomas-Durell Young 《战略研究杂志》2016,39(7):936-955
Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8 (Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, decisions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authorization and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article argues that reform of the Department of the Navy’s planning process is urgently needed. OPNAV’s weak planning and overly dominant programming practices are compared with those of the Departments of the Army and Air Force and are shown to be out of conformance with them. The article concludes with specific and detailed recommendations for reform of both the current planning and programming processes. 相似文献
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Carol Atkinson 《Defense & Security Analysis》2015,31(1):35-43
This article investigates how US national security planners have envisioned the emerging strategic environment during the early twenty-first century and evaluates how their perceptions of this strategic environment have changed during these years. This conceptual evolution can be seen in how defense planners define threats, identify defense priorities, and design security strategies. Five key strategic planning documents serve as the basis for this analysis and illustrate significant shifts in how the US government has envisioned its own security requirements as well as the context within which its strategic vision will need to be realized. These planning documents are: (1) Joint Vision 2020, (2) the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, (3) the Obama Administration's 2010 National Security Strategy, (4) US Strategic Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, and (5) the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020. 相似文献
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This paper analyzes defense spending preferences using ordered logit regression analysis of American National Election Survey data from 1980 through 2008. Our results indicate that as opposed to having the ideology of isolationism, political party identification towards the Republican Party or having economic stakes in defense spending always play a significant role in increased preference towards defense spending. Demographic groups such as Native Americans, Hispanics, and retired women, a demographic subgroup, display generally positive preferences towards defense spending. Somewhat surprisingly, another demographic subgroup, ‘security moms,’ do not show a preference. Our analysis also displays lower (higher) preference in the early 1990s (2000s) for defense spending compared to the year 2008. 相似文献