Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.     

An exact branch‐and‐price algorithm for multitasking scheduling on unrelated parallel machines

We consider the multitasking scheduling problem on unrelated parallel machines to minimize the total weighted completion time. In this problem, each machine processes a set of jobs, while the processing of a selected job on a machine may be interrupted by other available jobs scheduled on the same machine but unfinished. To solve this problem, we propose an exact branch‐and‐price algorithm, where the master problem at each search node is solved by a novel column generation scheme, called in‐out column generation, to maintain the stability of the dual variables. We use a greedy heuristic to obtain a set of initial columns to start the in‐out column generation, and a hybrid strategy combining a genetic algorithm and an exact dynamic programming algorithm to solve the pricing subproblems approximately and exactly, respectively. Using randomly generated data, we conduct numerical studies to evaluate the performance of the proposed solution approach. We also examine the effects of multitasking on the scheduling outcomes, with which the decision maker can justify making investments to adopt or avoid multitasking.     

Shortest path interdiction problem with arc improvement recourse: A multiobjective approach

We consider the shortest path interdiction problem involving two agents, a leader and a follower, playing a Stackelberg game. The leader seeks to maximize the follower's minimum costs by interdicting certain arcs, thus increasing the travel time of those arcs. The follower may improve the network after the interdiction by lowering the costs of some arcs, subject to a cardinality budget restriction on arc improvements. The leader and the follower are both aware of all problem data, with the exception that the leader is unaware of the follower's improvement budget. The effectiveness of an interdiction action is given by the length of a shortest path after arc costs are adjusted by both the interdiction and improvement. We propose a multiobjective optimization model for this problem, with each objective corresponding to a different possible improvement budget value. We provide mathematical optimization techniques to generate a complete set of strategies that are Pareto‐optimal. Additionally, for the special case of series‐parallel graphs, we provide a dynamic‐programming algorithm for generating all Pareto‐optimal solutions.     

Mixed rules in multi‐issue allocation situations

Multi‐issue allocation situations study problems where an estate must be divided among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present a two‐stage rule. First, we divide the estate among the issues following the constrained equal awards rule. Second, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents in proportion to their demands on this issue. We apply the rule to two real‐world problems: the distribution of natural resources between countries and the distribution of budget for education and research between universities.     

On a class of multiple failure mode systems

The primary objective of this work is to introduce and perform a detailed study of a class of multistate reliability structures in which no ordering in the levels of components' performances is necessary. In particular, the present paper develops the basic theory (exact reliability formulae, reliability bounds, asymptotic results) that will make it feasible to investigate systems whose components are allowed to experience m ≥ 2 kinds of failure (failure modes), and their breakdown is described by different families of cut sets in each mode. For illustration purposes, two classical (binary) systems are extended to analogous multiple failure mode structures, and their reliability performance (bounds and asymptotic behavior) is investigated by numerical experimentation. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 167–185, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10007     

When to commit in a serial supply chain with forecast updating

Negotiations between an end product manufacturer and a parts supplier often revolve around two main issues: the supplier's price and the length of time the manufacturer is contractually held to its order quantity, commonly termed the “commitment time frame.” Because actual demand is unknown, the specification of the commitment time frame determines how the demand risk is shared among the members of the supply chain. Casual observation indicates that most manufacturers prefer to delay commitments as long as possible while suppliers prefer early commitments. In this paper, we investigate whether these goals are always in the firm's best interest. In particular, we find that the manufacturer may sometimes be better off with a contract that requires an early commitment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources and the supplier may sometimes be better off with a delayed commitment. We also find that the preferred commitment time frame depends upon which member of the supply chain has the power to set their exchange price. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

The value of information sharing in a two‐stage supply chain with production capacity constraints

We consider a simple two‐stage supply chain with a single retailer facing i.i.d. demand and a single manufacturer with finite production capacity. We analyze the value of information sharing between the retailer and the manufacturer over a finite time horizon. In our model, the manufacturer receives demand information from the retailer even during time periods in which the retailer does not order. To analyze the impact of information sharing, we consider the following three strategies: (1) the retailer does not share demand information with the manufacturer; (2) the retailer does share demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses the optimal policy to schedule production; (3) the retailer shares demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses a greedy policy to schedule production. These strategies allow us to study the impact of information sharing on the manufacturer as a function of the production capacity, and the frequency and timing in which demand information is shared. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

New product introduction against a predator: A bilevel mixed‐integer programming approach

We consider a scenario with two firms determining which products to develop and introduce to the market. In this problem, there exists a finite set of potential products and market segments. Each market segment has a preference list of products and will buy its most preferred product among those available. The firms play a Stackelberg game in which the leader firm first introduces a set of products, and the follower responds with its own set of products. The leader's goal is to maximize its profit subject to a product introduction budget, assuming that the follower will attempt to minimize the leader's profit using a budget of its own. We formulate this problem as a multistage integer program amenable to decomposition techniques. Using this formulation, we develop three variations of an exact mathematical programming method for solving the multistage problem, along with a family of heuristic procedures for estimating the follower solution. The efficacy of our approaches is demonstrated on randomly generated test instances. This article contributes to the operations research literature a multistage algorithm that directly addresses difficulties posed by degeneracy, and contributes to the product variety literature an exact optimization algorithm for a novel competitive product introduction problem. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Free riding in a multi‐channel supply chain

Free riding in a multichannel supply chain occurs when one retail channel engages in the customer service activities necessary to sell a product, while another channel benefits from those activities by making the final sale. Although free riding is, in general, considered to have a negative impact on supply chain performance, certain recent industry practices suggest an opposite view: a manufacturer may purposely induce free riding by setting up a high‐cost, customer service‐oriented direct store to allow consumers to experience the product, anticipating their purchase at a retail store. This article examines how the free riding phenomenon affects a manufacturer's supply chain structure decision when there are fixed plus incremental variable costs for operating the direct store. We consider factors such as the effort required to find and buy the product at a retail store after visiting the direct store, the existence of competing products in the market, and the extent of consumer need to obtain direct‐store service. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Locational tying of complementary retail items

We study a selling practice that we refer to as locational tying (LT), which seems to be gaining wide popularity among retailers. Under this strategy, a retailer “locationally ties” two complementary items that we denote by “primary” and “secondary.” The retailer sells the primary item in an appropriate “department” of his or her store. To stimulate demand, the secondary item is offered in the primary item's department, where it is displayed in very close proximity to the primary item. We consider two variations of LT: In the multilocation tying strategy (LT‐M), the secondary item is offered in its appropriate department in addition to the primary item's department, whereas in the single‐location tying strategy (LT‐S), it is offered only in the primary item's location. We compare these LT strategies to the traditional independent components (IC) strategy, in which the two items are sold independently (each in its own department), but the pricing/inventory decisions can be centralized (IC‐C) or decentralized (IC‐D). Assuming ample inventory, we compare and provide a ranking of the optimal prices of the four strategies. The main insight from this comparison is that relative to IC‐D, LT decreases the price of the primary item and adjusts the price of the secondary item up or down depending on its popularity in the primary item's department. We also perform a comparative statics analysis on the effect of demand and cost parameters on the optimal prices of various strategies, and identify the conditions that favor one strategy over others in terms of profitability. Then we study inventory decisions in LT under exogenous pricing by developing a model that accounts for the effect of the primary item's stock‐outs on the secondary item's demand. We find that, relative to IC‐D, LT increases the inventory level of the primary item. We also link the profitability of different strategies to the trade‐off between the increase in demand volume of the secondary item as a result of LT and the potential increase in inventory costs due to decentralizing the inventory of the secondary item. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009