基于武器协同共用的无人机反潜作战效能研究

在一个暴露时间有限的反潜作战想定背景下,提出了评估该作战过程的效能指标,建立了相应的模型,并把武器协同共用条件下的作战结果与传统作战模式的结果作比较,结论表明,武器协同共用作战模式能够有效改善各项作战效能指标,是提高作战效能的有效手段。     

对陆军武器装备建设发展的思考

为全面落实我军军事战略方针和军队建设发展规划纲要,进一步确立我军的战略目标和战略任务,以及军队建设的总方向与目标,提出了陆军武器装备建设存在的主要问题和陆军武器装备建设依据、建设标准和建设目标,强调按一体化联合作战样式建设陆军武器装备,并提出了陆军武器装备建设的相应措施。     

等离子体销毁日本遗弃化学武器排放气体采集方法选择探讨

等离子体销毁日本化学武器是目前正在探索的新课题,销毁过程排放尾气采集方法是该课题中需研究的内容之一。在认真分析、综合比较的基础上,提出了适应等离子体销毁日本遗弃化学武器的排放尾气采集方法的看法及其须关注的问题。     

空腔噪声非线性数值模拟

将雷诺平均N-S方程与非线性噪声求解方法相结合,对M219空腔在Ma=0.6,Ma=0.85,Ma=1.35条件下进行了气动噪声分析。通过雷诺平均N-S方程求解空腔流场,得到包含空腔平均流场基本特征以及强制设定的湍流脉动统计描述的初始湍流统计平均解,采用非线性噪声求解方法重构噪声源并高精度模拟压力脉动的传播。通过与试验结果对比表明非线性噪声求解方法能够较好地捕捉空腔流动中的压强脉动及噪声水平。与分离涡模拟方法相比,非线性噪声求解方法在保持计算精度的同时大大减少计算网格,对内埋弹舱快速设计具有一定的参考意义。     

高功率微波武器攻击卫星有效载荷系统可行性分析

高功率微波武器是近几年发展起来的定向能武器之一,被认为是在未来制天权争夺的战场上对卫星有效载荷最大的威胁之一.首先对高功率微波武器的关键技术及技术途径进行了讨论,然后描述了高功率微波对目标损伤的机理和耦合途径,最后根据高功率微波的不同耦合途径对卫星有效载荷受到攻击的可行性进行了详细的分析,计算结果表明,高功率微波武器在高峰值功率或距离很近的情况下都会对未进行电磁加固的卫星有效载荷产生损害.     

The Odyssey of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

This study examines the failures of the William J. Clinton and Barack Obama administrations to secure ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It applies an integrated analytical framework for assessing treaty ratification that builds upon previous research in order to understand why the Clinton administration failed to achieve CTBT ratification in 1999 and why the Obama administration has so far failed to advance the treaty in the Senate. The study concludes that CTBT ratification, despite Obama administration pledges of support, remains highly unlikely. Finally, the study analyzes the common domestic political factors present in both cases and suggests areas for further research.     

舰载近区防卫武器综合运用

水面舰艇近区防卫武器的作战运用研究是舰载武器作战运用研究的新课题。在分析近区防卫目标特征、武器特点、作战方法的基础上,提出近区防卫武器综合运用一般原则,基于作战时域的连续性及效果的叠加性,构建近区防卫武器使用逻辑结构,建立武器运用的对策模型,可为近区防卫武器的科学使用提供理论参考。     

Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War

This article analyzes why US leaders did not use nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War. To date, there has been no systematic study of US decision-making on nuclear weapons during this war. This article offers an initial analysis, focusing on the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although US leaders did not come close to using nuclear weapons in the conflict, nuclear options received more attention than has previously been appreciated. Johnson's advisers raised the issue of nuclear weapons and threats on several occasions, and Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, looked into nuclear options to bring the war to an end. Ultimately, however, both administrations privately rejected such options. The conventional explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War – deterrence – is insufficient to explain the Vietnam case. This article analyzes the role of military, political and normative considerations in restraining US use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War. It argues that while military and political considerations, including escalation concerns, are part of the explanation, a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons played a critical role.     

The origins of the cancellation of Canada's Avro CF-105 arrow fighter program: A failure of strategy

The story of the demise of Canada's remarkable CF-105 Arrow jet-fighter interceptor has been told and retold by numerous Canadian writers. As told by most, it is a tragic tale. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, in an act as unforgivable as it was incomprehensible, not only destroyed a highly promising all-Canadian state-of-the-art aircraft but ruined all hopes of Canada ever being an important player in the North American defense industry. This article offers a contrasting interpretation — locating the problems leading to the aircraft's cancellation further back in history, and in particular in serious and determinative failures in strategic thinking and analysis by senior Canadian military officials at the time of the Arrow program's birth in 1953.     

GLOBALIZING REAGAN'S INF TREATY

When it was concluded more than a quarter century ago, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was hailed as a disarmament watershed, eliminating entire classes of nuclear missiles from the arsenals of the arms-racing Cold War superpowers. Over the intervening decades, there have been repeated calls to convert this legacy treaty into a new international norm against nuclear and missile proliferation by broadening it into a global prohibition on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Indeed, variations on this proposal have been knocking around for so long and with so little success that the entire concept has come to be dismissed by many knowledgeable insiders as something of a farce. Looking beyond its inauspicious pedigree, however, this viewpoint suggests that the time is opportune for Washington to give the idea a fresh look. Drawing on a detailed review of the history of “Global INF” and an analysis of the contemporary context, the author recommends that the Obama administration consider a simple declaratory approach that promises modest initial benefits, avoids previous and foreseeable pitfalls, and plausibly lays a solid foundation for achieving significant long-term progress.