Specialization in defence forces

The choice between balanced and specialized defence forces depends on the technology of defence output (e.g. whether a force scope multiplier is present), the existence of scope and scale economies, the platform customization costs and, of course, the level of defence budgets. Minimum force element levels (thresholds), and scale economies facilitate specialization as opposed to scope economies (e.g. platform‐sharing), scale diseconomies and the force scope multiplier (e.g. defence weakest‐link technology). When a balanced force is not optimal, the option value of a non‐optimally maintained force element must also include the opportunity cost arising from suboptimal force elements. Shrinking defence budgets may produce two surprising phenomena. If some force elements are shut down as a result of thresholds, the surviving ones may increase in platform numbers as well as enjoying closer‐to‐most‐desirable platforms. Furthermore, if heritage force elements are shut down within the budget contraction environment, overall defence capability might rise.     

The defence industry supply chain: Linkage patterns in the south west of england 1

In this paper, new data from the south west of England are used to illustrate that defence dependent firms are likely to purchase more inputs locally than less defence‐dependent firms. The results confirm that the defence industry's supply chain has unusual characterises and that defence industrial restructuring is therefore, likely to produce different outcomes to previous rounds of manufacturing restructuring.     

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The African Union is preparing for its enhanced role in the maintenance of peace and security by establishing a Peace and Security Council that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace. To this end, the AU has recommended the development of a common security policy and, by 2010, the establishment of an African Standby Force capable of rapid deployment to keep, or enforce, the peace. The ASF would comprise of standby brigades in each of the five regions, and incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity. G8 leaders have pledged support for the AU proposal through funding, training, and enhanced co-ordination of activities. For its part, the AU will need to undertake a realistic assessment of member capabilities, to clearly articulate its needs, and to set realistic and achievable goals. The latest plan for establishing a rapidly deployable African peacekeeping force will require something that similar proposals have lacked: the political will to fund and implement a long list of recommendations. Success will ultimately be judged by the AU's future responses to situations of armed conflict. Even if such responses are largely symbolic in the short term, a sufficient display of political will among African leaders could inspire the confidence needed to galvanise international support.     

Don't stop with Joint Forces Command … cut AFRICOM too

Abstract

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been a military success but a strategic messaging failure. The United States’ relationships across Africa cannot be boiled down to military affairs. This paper argues that Africa has many more opportunities than challenges and thus requires a more balanced foreign policy solution from Washington DC than a new military command. For the military engagement that does need to take place, a more low-profile approach would benefit the United States in Africa.     

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EVOLVING ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN

In 2003, the “E3”—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—engaged Iran in talks over Tehran's nuclear program and were joined in negotiations the next year by the European Union (EU). Given the dim prospects of success for these talks, why did the E3/EU pursue nuclear negotiations with Iran? This article's three-track analysis attempts to answer that question by examining the emergence of the EU nonproliferation policy prior to the E3/EU-Iran talks, analyzing the European-Iranian relationship as it pertains to cooperation and negotiations over nonproliferation and other issues, and considering contemporary influences on the E3/EU. The European Union was ultimately unsuccessful in its negotiations with Tehran, but its efforts were worthwhile. In the future, the organization can play a vital nonproliferation role; today, the circumstances that hampered previous European efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear standoff have improved and could be capitalized on by the European Union and the international community.     

基于解析结构模型的网络空间信息防御能力分析

针对网络空间信息防御需求及特点,利用解析结构模型方法,分析网络空间信息防御能力的影响要素及其关系,建立网络空间信息防御能力影响要素的层次结构模型,并找出核心要素和关键环节,为网络空间信息防御能力建设提供决策支持。     

Goodbye to all that: On small wars and big choices

This article reflects on a decade of British counterinsurgency operations. Questioning the idea that lessons have been learnt, the paper challenges the assumptions that are being used to frame future strategic choice. Suggesting that defence engagement is primarily focused on optimising overseas interventions while avoiding a deeper strategic reassessment about whether the UK should be undertaking these sorts of activities, the article calls for a proper debate on Britain's national security interests.     

反导防御与反导条约

以美国国家导弹防御计划为背景对美、俄所签订的反导条约作了分析 ,其中包括条约要点、条约修改和发展 ,从“修约”到单方“退约”等 ,最后对美退出反导条约背景及影响作了结论     

日本现代国土防空系统探析

日本现代国土防空系统由预警与指挥控制系统及防空拦截武器系统两大部分组成,其中的预警与指挥控制系统由各种地面雷达、高速计算机及预警机组成。"巴其"系统的指挥控制则由数据处理设备、通信设备及显示设备等组成。而防空拦截武器系统主要包括歼击机、中远程防空导弹、各种近程防空导弹及防空高炮等。就日本现代国土防空系统的功能与特点、现状及发展趋势作一探讨与分析。