Trading coups for civil war

This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While ‘coup-proofing’ practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of ‘coup-proofing’ counterweights significantly worsens a state's civil conflict prospects. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to – or can even potentially benefit from – the existence of an insurgency.     

对公安边防工作执法为民的思考

本文对当前公安边防部队执勤执法中存在的问题及原因进行了剖析,提出要全面理解执法为民在公安边防工作中的具体内涵和要求,牢固树立“四个意识”,以求真务实的态度和勇于开拓的精神狠抓队伍建设,围绕“三个有利于”,找准公安边防工作的着力点,加强勤务规范化建设和执勤执法监督以及落实从优待警措施,不断改进公安边防工作,使执法为民的宗旨真正落到实处。     

Reassessing private military and security company (PMSC) ‘competition‘ in civil war: lessons from Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT

This paper challenges recent claims that competitive market dynamics incentivize Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to fully commit to providing effective services, thereby reducing the duration of civil war. Our assessment of a most-likely case scenario for this argument – Sierra Leone – reveals four critical problems. First, there is rarely direct competition, even if numerous companies are present. Second, the presence of multiple PMSCs usually represents a collaboration among subsidiaries providing distinct services, often under the same corporate umbrella. Third, data aggregation obfuscates the overlap of PMSC presence, inflating the amount of perceived competition. Finally, we raise concerns regarding how quantitative analyses can conflate conflict intensity with conflict termination.