Conflict and fiscal capacity

We examine the role of war in retarding state fiscal capacity in developing countries, measured by tax revenue ratios to GDP. We build a simple theoretical model of a factionalized state, where patronage substitutes for common interest public goods, along with violent contestation over a rent or prize. Our dynamic panel empirical analysis applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980–2010, indicates that war, especially civil war, retards fiscal capacity, along with imperfect democracy, political repression, poor governance, and dependence on oil and macroeconomic mismanagement. High intensity conflict is particularly destructive of state capacity. In countries experiencing low intensity wars, other institutional factors may matter more than war. The diminution of fiscal capacity due to war appears less pronounced after the end of the cold war.     

Why internal conflict deteriorates state capacity? Evidence from Colombian municipalities

Previous work has documented a negative correlation between internal conflict and state capacity. We attempt to shed light on mechanisms that underlie this relationship, using data for Colombian municipalities. We rely on identifying heterogeneous effects of different types of violent events on state capacity, taking advantage of variability across municipalities in the prevalence of specific manifestations of conflict and their intensity. Our findings suggest that events making civilians feel targeted affect the state’s capacity to collect taxes, while those reflecting a stronger military capacity of illegal armies, in particular their large-scale attacks, affect the state’s capacity to provide public goods.     

Socioeconomic impact of conflict: state of emergency ruling in Turkey

Uprising tensions during 2010 in eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey provoked arguments about the necessity for a State of Emergency (SOE; ‘Ola?anüstü Hal’ in Turkish) declaration in those regions, with a belief of enduring political sustainability. The discussion is inflamed by a speech of the Nationalist Movement Party’s leader about the suggestion to announce a SOE ruling after the death of 24 Turkish soldiers in Hakkari (a city in the southeast of Turkey) in an attack of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) on the 19 October 2011. Although a new announcement of SOE did not take place, the discussion itself induced the idea behind this paper which is to provide a quantitative analysis of the SOE in Turkey. In fact, the SOE ruling is not a new concept for Turkey and it has been implemented in 13 cities in the eastern and southeastern regions from 1987 to 2002. Although there have been many discussions about the costs of these 15 years of the SOE ruling in terms of military expenditure and, thus, on the national budget, there is a lack of quantitative analytical examination of the economic and social costs of it. Difference-in-differences analysis reveals negative spillover impacts of the SOE, especially on the forced migration, unemployment, and educational investments. The results also show that SOE ruling is an important factor for the underdevelopment of the eastern and southeastern regions in Turkey and, thus, a new SOE will bring enormous inequalities, both economically and socially, and an intensification of the ethnic tensions in Turkey.     

基于改进支持向量机的航空装备维修安全评估

传统航空装备维修安全评估大多采用定性评估方法,针对传统评估中存在主观性、随意性过强,实践中缺乏可操作性等问题,提出了基于核密度估计的改进支持向量机。构建了航空装备维修安全评估指标体系,在利用层次分析法对其权重进行计算的基础上,通过改进支持向量机对某单位航空装备维修状况进行了全面评估,为航空装备维修安全评估提供了科学的方法,对确保航空装备维修安全具有较强的理论和现实意义。     

The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, 1892-1894

ABSTRACT

Between 1892 and 1894 the Force Publique of King Leopold II’s Congo Free State engaged in a series of little-known counter-insurgency operations against ivory and slave traders from Zanzibar, commonly referred to as Arabs. Without a particularly strong tradition of imperial service, this article argues that the predominantly Belgian officer corps borrowed and adapted methods used by more experienced colonial forces in the 19^th Century. Whether taken from existing literature or learned through experience, it reveals that the Force Publique’s counter-insurgency methods reflected many of the more recognisable aspects of traditional French and British approaches. It suggests that, despite the unique nature of each colonial campaign, basic principles could be adapted by whomsoever to overcome the military and political challenges of colonial conquest. The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, therefore, provide further evidence as to how some base theories could be universally applied.     

Currency Warfare and Just War: The Ethics of Targeting Currencies in War

ABSTRACT

Is Currency Warfare defined as, the use of monetary or military force directed against an enemy’s monetary power as part of a military campaign, a just way to fight a war? This article explores the ethics of waging currency warfare against the Just War Tradition’s principles of jus in bello (just conduct in war) and its criteria of discrimination and proportionality. The central argument is that currency warfare is inherently indiscriminate but may be proportionate when policy makers consider the nature of the threat confronted and the targeted currency's level of internationalization, that is, to what degree it is used in foreign transactions or used as a foreign currency reserve. I evaluate this argument against historical cases during the Second World War (1939–1945), the Gulf War (1990–1991), subsequent operations against Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s, and the ongoing campaign against ISIS.     

Institutional parameters that condition farmer–herder conflicts in Tivland of Benue State,Nigeria

ABSTRACT

This conceptual review examines institutional parameters that underpin farmer–herder conflicts in Tivland of Benue State, Nigeria. Anchored on the theory of New Institutionalism, it argues that tensions and conflicts between Tiv-farmers and the Fulani-herdsmen is occasioned largely by the disarticulation of the traditional institutional norms/rules of interaction by formal political institutions expressed in land use laws, West African sub-regional protocol, human rights provision of the Nigerian constitution and the Benue State law on anti-grazing. In these contrasting institutional forms, the formal political institution is prioritised by the state while farmers and herders are divided about the institutional basis of their coexistence. Farmers who host the herdsmen demonstrate preference for traditional norms of land ownership and control while the herdsmen incline towards new political/legal instruments which they interpret, purports to give them access to grazing lands and hence an alibi for rejecting institutions that contradict their claim to access spaces for pastoralism. Thus, persisting claims to the exercise of rights to freedom of movement and access to grazing land as opposed to claims to traditional rights of ownership and control of ancestral lands explain the origin and continuity of the farmer–herder conflicts in Benue state, Nigeria.