主战飞机维修保障效能评估方法

针对空军主战飞机维修保障效能难以评估的问题,首次提出了主战飞机维修保障效能评估方法。分析了飞机维修保障系统运行过程,按照"投入-产出"的原则,建立了主战飞机维修保障效能评估指标体系,运用信息熵理论和灰色系统理论,构建出了基于熵权和灰色聚类的评估指标赋权模型。结合实例验证了方法的正确性和合理性。     

高超声速反舰导弹作战效能指标体系研究

分析了包括高超声速反舰导弹在内的高超声速武器的发展现状,明确了高超声速反舰导弹的基本定义和不同的分类方式,以及高超声速反舰导弹飞行弹道分段标准和分段名称,概括总结了高超声速反舰导弹主动段、惯性段、再入滑翔段和下压段等四个弹道阶段的任务和特点,建立了以射击精度等四项效能指标为一级指标的作战效能指标体系,并对效能指标的具体含义及分析方法进行了说明。     

空空协同作战指挥控制系统

论述了研究与发展空空协同作战指挥系统的必要性 ,探讨了空空协同作战指挥系统的概念及系统的建模、结构模式 ,指挥决策的制定与优化、人机关系的处理、作战效能的评估与通讯共享集等几个问题     

无人机保障条件下的炮兵C4ISR系统作战效能评估

针对无人机保障条件下的炮兵指挥自动化(C4ISR)系统的作战运用特点,运用模糊理论探索其作战效能评估的有效方法.综合运用模糊综合评判和层次分析法(AHP)两种决策方法对无人机保障条件下的炮兵C4ISR系统的作战效能进行了评估,评估结果表明,无人机保障条件下的炮兵C4ISR系统的作战效能水平为正常.通过对影响炮兵C4ISR系统作战效能发挥的各个因素进行定量分析比较,认为当用无人机来保障炮兵C4ISR系统时,应当把确保系统的稳定性和提高无人机与炮兵C4ISR系统之间的通信控制能力作为重要环节来抓.     

基于多属性决策方法的防空C3I系统效能评估

介绍了防空C3I系统效能的定义及效能评估的一般处理过程.针对效能指标的多样性,提出了基于多属性决策(MADM)的效能评估方法,并通过一个示例给出MADM方法的处理过程,有效地解决了防空C3I系统效能评估这一复杂而困难的问题,仿真结果证明了方法的可行性.     

精确制导武器系统作战效能的LMBP神经网络评估

着眼于武器系统的作战使用,介绍了一种基于LMBP神经网络的精确制导武器系统作战效能综合评估方法.首先,从总体上综合地加以动态权衡,确立了评估的指标体系,其次在阐述BP神经网络相关原理的基础上,对LMBP算法进行了描述,建立了基于该网络的精确制导武器系统作战效能评估模型,最后介绍了该方法的实际应用,并利用MATLAB神经网络工具箱进行仿真,实例证明此方法与其他评估方法相比,基于LMBP神经网络的精确制导武器系统作战效能评估方法具有一定的优越性.     

Small footprint,small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance

After 15 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many now see ‘small-footprint’ security force assistance (SFA) – training, advising and equipping allied militaries – as an alternative to large US ground-force commitments. Yet, its actual military efficacy has been little studied. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We find important limitations on SFA’s military utility, stemming from agency problems arising from systematic interest misalignment between the US and its typical partners. SFA’s achievable upper bound is modest and attainable only if US policy is intrusive and conditional, which it rarely is. For SFA, small footprints will usually mean small payoffs.     

Command Coordination and Tactical Effectiveness in Counter-insurgency Operations: Lessons from the South Korean Campaign

This article analyzes the causes of combat effectiveness of the South Korean security forces through the course of its various counter-insurgency (COIN) operations from 1948 to 1953. We argue that improvements in two interrelated aspects ultimately resulted in higher operational and tactical level performance: unified operational command structure and the subsequent improvements in tactical efficiency under the guidance of the US advisory mission. Through an in-depth case study on how a nascent army improved its capacity in combating homegrown insurgencies, we demonstrate how the actual conduct of operations itself remains just as significant in the assessment of overall COIN outcomes.     

陆航部队直升机武器系统效能评估研究

陆航部队直升机武器系统效能评估是直升机研制和使用的重要依据,是联合作战指挥的重要参考。本文论述直升机武器系统效能评估的基本内涵和一般步骤,从武器系统、态势感知、指挥控制及HUMS系统等方面对直升机武器系统效能评估的对象和目的进行分析,研究构建效能指标体系的一般过程,总结直升机武器系统效能评估的方法。     

Effective in battle: conceptualizing soldiers’ combat effectiveness*

How do we understand combat effectiveness – soldiers’ performance in battle? Despite the broad consensus that understanding combat effectiveness is important both for scholars and policymakers, there is widespread disagreement about what combat effectiveness is. More specifically, studies of effectiveness tend to focus on either the skill of soldiers in battle, or their will to fight. Yet both skill and will are essential components of an effective fighting force. This article argues that understanding combat effectiveness requires understanding both of these key components of effectiveness. In other words, combat effectiveness requires both the skill and will to engage the enemy in an organized manner. It then demonstrates the usefulness of this conceptualization by applying it to the cases of British, Indian, and Australian forces fighting the Japanese during the Second World War. Only when scholars are talking about the same concept will our understanding of the conditions under which militaries are effective in battle progress. By comparing different units fighting the same opponent under the same material conditions, I demonstrate that units vary both in their combat skill and their will to fight, and that understanding their effectiveness in battle requires analyzing both of these key factors.