Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies

This article seeks to lay out a comprehensive framework by which those who utilize a campaign of strategic terrorism seek to attain their ends. It identifies a distinctive modus operandi: 1) disorientation: to alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population; 2) target response: to induce a target to respond in a manner that is favorable to the insurgent cause; 3) gaining legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message. By elucidating the strategy of terrorism, the analysis also reveals its inherent limitations. Resting on the premise that a militarily more powerful adversary will in some way feel restrained from bringing the full force of its military superiority to bear, the strategy relies exclusively on the exploitation of the psychological effects of armed action, thereby rendering it vulnerable to those who are willing to view the resolution of clashes of interest principally in terms of the tangibles of military power.     

MONEY IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLITICS

“Lack of money is the root of all evil”

George Bernard Shaw

In a environment where party financing, private funding in particular, is generally a laissez-faire business, as in most Southern African countries, there is the real risk that interest groups and wealthy individuals will buy influence in political parties and in so doing erode public confidence in the political system. Because they are neither open to public scrutiny nor subject to any legislative restraints, huge private donations can, and often do, come with strings attached. This lack of transparency and openness, as well as mechanisms to prevent it, provides ample ground for influence peddling, where those who pay the piper call the tune. Left unchecked, this party funding scenario will continue to be a serious indictment of the region's democratisation projects, crippling democracy and stunting economic development. This article consid     

How should modeling and simulation be used to support defense acquisition?

This paper investigates the potential for modeling and simulation to contribute to new defense system development, by increasing the productivity of traditional R&D in developing system‐specific technology. Building on a previous optimal control model of defense system R&D, it shows that (1) the optimal use of modeling is related in a natural way to that of traditional R&D, and (2) both have similar optimal profiles over time. Simulated results based on limited historical data suggest that optimal use of modeling could increase the rate of growth in system‐specific technology significantly.     

The Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach to Command and the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik)

The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. The paper examines the US command approach prior to the adoption of mission command. It argues that it was heavily influenced by corporate management practices which inherently contradict mission command approach. It continues and investigates how the US Army endeavored to emulate the approach in its doctrine and in major operations.

While it has officially incorporated mission command into its doctrine, it has been less successful in utilizing it in operational situations. This state of affairs has to do with the cultural legacy of the managerial approach to command that still persist. Despite the partial success, the US Army has recently reaffirmed its commitment to this approach.     

Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants

This article uses a novel database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks. In general, each biography provides data on the militant’s birthplace, education, recruitment, and training. The number of observations in this database is a full order of magnitude larger than those of previous databases assembled from militant biographies. While the sample of militants in this database is the product of multiple selection effects, analysis of the database undermines many common myths about Pakistani militants and casts doubt on current policy approaches to mitigating Islamist militancy in Pakistan.     

三相逆变器新型积分控制加状态反馈控制

三相逆变器在实际运行中,不平衡负载工况较为常见,原因是传统积分控制加状态反馈控制无法实现三相输出电压的对称性。针对该问题提出了不平衡负载条件下三相逆变器新型积分控制加状态反馈控制策略,并通过仿真和实验验证了该策略能有效降低不平衡负载时三相逆变器输出电压的不平衡度,从而获得对称的三相输出电压波形。     

《概论》课研讨式教学与学生非智力因素培养研究

以非智力因素与思想政治教育的关系为切入点,探讨《毛泽东思想和中国特色社会主义理论体系概论》课研讨式教学与学生非智力因素培养之间的内在关联,凸现非智力因素在思想政治教育过程中的价值,系统设计《概论》课研讨式教学,从而提高思想政治教育实效。     

基于奇偶矢量的多星座RAIM算法

随着GNSS接收机技术的不断发展,基于多星座下的GNSS接收机自主完好性监测(RAIM)算法也已被国内外学者广泛研究。首先介绍了接收机自主完好性监测奇偶矢量算法的原理,然后分别对单星座、多星座组合下的RAIM算法进行了研究和仿真,图形化和数据化的仿真结果充分证明了多星座组合下的完好性监测性能优于单星座下完好性监测性能。     

环管型燃烧室喷雾燃烧DES模拟

为研究燃气轮机燃烧室内复杂的两相三维湍流燃烧问题,采用基于Realizable k-ε模型的分离涡模拟(DES)方法对环管型燃烧室进行喷雾燃烧数值模拟.数值模拟结果表明:DES模拟在燃烧区发挥出大涡模拟(LES)的作用,能获取结构复杂的流场、温度场和涡量场,其对流场内涡结构的捕捉和分辨能力明显强于传统的RANS(雷诺时均N-S方法)模拟.与实验数据对比发现,DES模拟所得燃烧产物含量和燃烧室出口温度分布更符合.因此,DES方法可用于复杂形状燃烧室的燃烧数值模拟,能够避免RANS模型对湍流脉动进行平均处理导致耗散过大、抹平涡结构的缺点,从而可获取更准确的计算结果.     

Reconsidering American strategy in South Asia: destroying terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas

Over seven years after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, Afghanistan is again at the forefront of the headlines, faced with a brutal insurgency and a resurgent Taliban. Many scholars and policymakers attribute the instability in Afghanistan to a terrorist sanctuary in the neighboring Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan has attempted to eliminate this sanctuary through negotiation and armed force. This paper argues that Pakistani strategy has failed to achieve its desired results because of local tribal norms, the weak nature of previous agreements, military units ill-equipped for a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism role, as well as ideological fissures in the Pakistani establishment. Afterward, the paper argues that the United States and Coalition forces should pursue their strategy remaining cognizant of local tribal norms, step up training efforts for Pakistani forces, promote development of the tribal areas, and cultivate options for eliminating the FATA sanctuary through covert means.