Country survey XVI the defence sector in the economy of a declining superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001

The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia.     

Optimal versus required defence expenditure: The case of the Greek-Turkish arms race

The aim of this paper is to indicate the extent to which the arms race against Turkey, in which Greece and Cyprus have been entangled, imposes a defence expenditure burden that is tough for the two allies to bear. To do so we have resorted to evaluating the optimal military expenditure for the two countries, allied in the context of the Integrated Defence Doctrine, which is compatible with the constraints imposed by the resources of their economies. All experiments and scenarios examined lead to the conclusion that the current defence burden of the two allies seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity limits. The fact remains, however, that under the circumstances, a one-sided disarmament policy like the one currently followed by Greece, is a risky choice given that the long-term armament programmes pursued by Turkey, whose role in this arms race has been proven as leading, leave very small room to the Greek and Cypriot sides to reduce their own defence expenditure.     

Domestic political and external security determinants of the demand for greek military expenditure

By European Union and NATO standards, Greece consistently allocates substantial human and material resources to defence. The Greek defence burden (i.e. military expenditure as a share of GDP) has invariably been appreciably higher than the EU and NATO averages. The paper applies an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) to present cointegrated estimates of the demand function for Greek military expenditure, in which domestic political factors and external security determinants are incorporated. Our empirical findings suggest that Greek defence spending over the period 1960-1998 has been influenced by both external security concerns, namely Turkey, as well as changes in the domestic political scene.     

The demand for military spending in the peripheral economies of Europe

Research on the factors that determine the level of military expenditure or military burden in countries, suggest that the dynamics of the determinants of military spending will be best understood by case studies of individual countries and studies of groups of relatively homogeneous countries. This paper provides a comparative analysis of three of the EU's peripheral economies - Greece, Portugal and Spain. A simple model based on a general theory of the demand for military spending provides the basis for an investigation of the relative importance of strategic and other social and economic factors for the three countries.     

Military expenditure and the profit rate in Greece

This paper examines the effect of military expenditure on the profitability of the Greek economy for the 1962-1994 period. In the theoretical debate on the role of military expenditures they have alternatively been viewed either as a "burden on growth" (i.e. an unproductive drain of resources) or as a stimulating factor for demand, profitability and economic performance. This distinction is reflected in the Marxist tradition as well where in different theories of crisis, military expenditures have been treated either as an unproductive burden or as a savior of the capitalist system, mainly through their effect on the rate of profit. Our empirical tests for the relationship between military expenditure, the general Marxian rate of profit and the net rate of profit indicate that those expenditures have had a contradictory effect on profitability, stimulating effective demand in the short run, but affecting negatively both rates of profit over the long run.     

LAND INEQUALITY AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Fiji's total debt stands at 65% of GDP. Domestic debt constitutes 55% of GDP. The goal of this paper is to investigate whether military expenditure has contributed to Fiji's exploding debt levels over the period 1970 to 2005. Our empirical analysis, conducted within a cointegration and vector error‐correction framework, suggests that, in the long‐run, military expenditure has had a statistically significant positive impact on both external debt and domestic debt, while income has had a statistically significant positive impact on domestic debt and a statistically significant negative impact on external debt. We explain the reasons behind this finding and draw some policy implications.     

Optimal defence structure for a small country

Small countries may not be able to afford all force elements (army, navy, air-force) operated by larger countries and certainly cannot afford all sub-elements (aircraft carriers, submarines, etc). This paper provides a framework for a small country to analyse its force structure, examining the influence of objectives, international co-operation, funding and technological constraints, and uncertainty. We analyse when a small country may choose to retain a balanced structure (with each force element) and when it may choose to drop one or more elements. The issues are illustrated with the decision by the New Zealand government over whether to retain a strike aircraft capacity.