基于Lambert算法的脉冲精确变轨策略

Lambert问题的求解多以二体假设为基础,从而对精确轨道控制带来不利影响.提出了一种脉冲修正策略,建立了考虑摄动影响的航天器轨道动力学计算模型,在Iambert算法基础上,通过拟牛顿法对变轨脉冲进行修正,消除终端状态误差,从而获得精确的变轨脉冲.将该修正策略用于固定时间精确变轨问题,建立了两层规划模型,并通过算例验证了算法的有效性.     

榴弹对行进中炮兵连射击的毁伤概率研究

炮兵实施机动是提高其生存能力与作战能力的重要手段之一,而从集结地域至待机阵地机动阶段由于距离对方近、暴露时间长,且对方毁伤火力种类最为丰富,是威胁最大的阶段.以机动自行和牵引炮兵连为研究对象,对该阶段榴弹攻击行进中炮兵连的毁伤概率进行了模拟分析.得到了对两者而言,当航路角<15°或>60°时,被毁伤概率都相对较小;当航路角在15°～60°之间时,被毁伤概率也都相对较大;而当航路角一定,被毁伤概率随速度的增大而减小,且当自行和牵引炮兵连的行军速度分别大于40 km/h和35 km/h,被毁伤概率的减小幅度趋于缓慢等结论.     

基于蚁群算法和禁忌搜索的部队机动路径选择

高技术条件下的现代战争对部队机动路径选择问题提出了新要求,一方面道路网的扩大使问题求解的规模大大增加,另一方面作战环境和任务的变化使得问题本身不得不从多角度进行综合评价.增加了问题的复杂性.针对问题建立了数学模型,引入信息熵理论作为目标评价准则,借助改进的蚁群算法、禁忌搜索算法相结合的启发式方法对问题进行求解,得到了令人满意的结果.仿真结果分析认为,算法是切实有效的,并且具有良好的稳定性.     

基于k短路径的兵力机动路线优化方法

由于传统Dijkstra算法只能求解最优路径,结合兵力机动路线选择的需要,将求解k短路径的实用算法引入到兵力机动路线优化问题中,给出了算法的数据结构和步骤。在道路权重的确定上,提出将路程、通行能力和安全性三项指标相结合的思想,并给出了综合权重的计算方法。仿真实验表明所提方法具有较强的实用性。     

战斗机指挥引导中的威力场模型

场在自然界是普遍存在的,战斗机之间也存在类似的相互作用.提出战斗机威力场概念,建立威力场的理论框架与模型.战斗机威力场产生两种势:斥力势与引力势.斥力势表示由战斗机产生的排斥其他物体接近的作用.引力势是指战斗机的各种威力对周围空间产生的影响.分别建立斥力势和引力势的计算模型.引力势模型由6个部分构成:方向、目标探测、攻击、到达、电子对抗和通信,我机产生的引力势为正,敌机为负.两种势在整个空间都具有可叠加性.应用威力场理论对战斗机安全距离控制、态势评估和战斗机引导控制等进行了分析.最后通过仿真算例来验证该理论.＃     

考虑空间几何关系的反交会规避机动方法

针对具有自主接近能力的航天器开展反交会规避机动方法研究。建立仅测角相对导航模型,对完全不可观测机动进行定义,基于空间几何关系推导并证明了完全不可观测机动是不存在的。以施加规避机动后追踪器对逃逸器的测量值与未机动时的差异为优化目标,利用矢量乘积原理设计目标函数,建立优化模型并对变量约束进行分析,随后采用遗传算法对最优规避机动方向进行优化。给出的仿真算例结果表明:提出的规避机动方向计算方法能够使目标函数值达到最小,从而提升追踪器对逃逸器的状态估计难度,降低其估计精度。这为规避机动问题研究提供了一种新的视角,可为以主动接近航天器为新对象进行的规避研究提供有益借鉴。     

战区导弹防御系统(TMD)对抗技术浅析

探讨了战区导弹防御系统(TMD)对抗技术的初步设想与实现方法,重点对TMD系统激光对抗技术和TMD系统红外对抗技术进行了可行性分析论证,介绍了一些具体的光电对抗措施。     

HLA数据回放及其可通用性问题研究

为了给HLA分布仿真系统提供运行数据的回放能力并解决各种回放策略都必须面对的数据完备、时序准确、运行高效及回放方法的可通用性等问题,对HLA联邦中的数据回放问题进行了研究,分析了HLA仿真中的回放需求以及HLA对回放实现技术的影响,指出回放方法的可通用性实质上是联邦独立性的概念,研究了将回放数据对象化处理的方法,针对成员式数据回放策略、基于对象序列化技术和成员自动生成技术提出了一种可通用的HLA数据回放实现方案,最后介绍了通用HLA数据回放工具的应用情况。     

‘Innovate or die’: Organizational culture and the origins of maneuver warfare in the United States Marine Corps

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, this article contributes to the understanding of the origins of maneuver warfare as the capstone doctrine of the Marine Corps. It does so by identifying a second source that fostered change in the Marine Corps – one in addition to disquiet about the conduct of the war in Vietnam – which stemmed from the challenges posed by the United States' post-Vietnam strategic and military reorientation. And second, this article examines the influence of organizational culture, or identity, on innovation in the Marine Corps. A critical strand in the growing literature on military innovation focuses on organizational culture and how it influences the behavior and responses of particular military organizations. This article contributes to this literature by analyzing the influence of the organizational culture of the Marine Corps in shaping what was deemed an appropriate response to the challenges it confronted in the 1970s.     

How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.