加强坦克连岛上防御能力分析

首先利用综合战斗力指数法,通过对比分析我加强坦克连与敌战车营特遣队的战斗力,得出了我加强坦克连岛上阵地防御的作战能力.而后依据确定的防御优势标准,得出我加强坦克连岛上阵地防御作战任务,并对其可行性进行了定性分析.最后,利用战斗动力学原理具体分析了我加强坦克连岛上阵地防御时与敌对抗的能力,为战斗的组织与实施提供了一些具体可行的建议.     

基于效果的联合作战行动规划研究

联合作战行动规划是依据联合作战的使命和资源约束建立完成使命的最佳行动过程,通过对交战环境状态、交战主体的资源能力状态、行动、事件和效果的定义,结合人工智能领域解决"计划"问题的研究、军事领域基于效果的作战思想提出了联合作战行动规划模型及策略优选方法.模型结合了马尔可夫决策过程和贝叶斯网络技术来求解交战主体的最优策略,对联合作战设计具有适应性的行动策略做出的初步尝试.     

Becoming a disarmament champion: the Austrian crusade against nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT

The making of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has put Austria and its involvement in nuclear disarmament in the spotlight. This study highlights several factors that led Austria to become a prominent voice in nuclear-disarmament debates. First, its involvement dovetails with the emphasis on humanitarian disarmament it has promoted since the 1990s. Second, a strong antinuclear identity pervades Austrian society. This “nuclear allergy” combines antimilitarism inherited from the Cold War and, more broadly, an aversion to nuclear power, including for energy purposes. These two considerations form the background to the increased activism of the Austrian Foreign Ministry on nuclear disarmament in international fora. But, equally, Austria’s crusade for the TPNW can be attributed to the engagement of a small team of diplomats implementing personal as well as national preferences in favor of disarmament.     

“The major prize”: apartheid South Africa’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1988–91

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the final years of South Africa’s nuclear-weapon program, particularly on the decision-making process leading up to the signature of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the South African government in 1991. In August 1988, after two decades of defiance, negotiations between the apartheid government and the NPT depository powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) ensued at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Despite South Africa being the only state to give up its indigenously developed nuclear weapons and subsequently join the nonproliferation regime, little is known about how the national position on NPT accession and IAEA safeguards evolved. Research carried out in multiple archives using hitherto untapped primary sources and interviews with key actors from several countries show how domestic and regional political dynamics influenced Pretoria’s position on entering the nonproliferation regime. In the process, the F.W. de Klerk government managed to skillfully exploit international proliferation fears to advance its own agenda, thereby connecting South African NPT accession with that of the neighboring Frontline States coalition of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.