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31.
President Barack Obama has pledged to secure the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was previously rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999. This article attempts to predict the potential implications of Washington's ratification for the treaty's future by analyzing the positions and options of the eight other essential holdouts. The authors conclude that without the United States to hide behind, facing domestic and international constraints, and lacking substantial strategic reasons to remain outside the treaty, most holdouts will move toward ratification. Nonetheless, the process is likely to be time consuming, and several of the key actors remain unpredictable. 相似文献
32.
Sundara Vadlamudi 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):199-223
In January 2004 U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), a bilateral initiative to expand cooperation in the areas of civilian space activities, civilian nuclear programs, and high-technology trade and to expand discussions on missile defense. Today, India and the United States view the NSSP initiative as a tool to transfer high-technology items to India without compromising U.S. nonproliferation goals. The success of this proposal depends on U.S. efforts to modify its nonproliferation regulations and India's efforts to implement stringent regulations to control the flow of sensitive technologies within its borders. This report examines the Indo-U.S. NSSP initiative and associated agreements, discusses the set of reciprocal steps agreed upon by India and the United States, reviews the extent of technology transfer permissible under existing U.S. nonproliferation regulations, and presents some preliminary conclusions on the NSSP agreement. 相似文献
33.
William C. Potter 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):343-354
U.S. nuclear export policy has undergone major transformations since 1945, and the most recent change, as expressed in the July 18, 2005, India-U.S. Joint Statement, represents an especially significant shift in policy. The document reverses more than a quarter century of U.S. declaratory policy, suggesting that the current U.S. administration regards nuclear proliferation to be both inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing. This article investigates this policy shift, looking at the history of U.S. nuclear export policy and the potential ramifications of the new policy on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The author also touches on the potential effects of the Joint Statement on Indian-Pakistani relations. Finally, it is suggested that it is not too late for India and the United States to change the new policy with more consideration for the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group Initiative. 相似文献
34.
Malcolm Mercer 《Arms and Armour》2018,15(1):1-21
During the first half of the 19th century substantial quantities of Oriental and Asiatic arms and armour first began to appear in Britain. On the one hand they certainly reflected the expansion of empire but their wider significance has yet to be discussed. This article seeks to address that omission by exploring the growth of interest in these objects within military circles, what they represented to the individuals who acquired them, and how they fitted into the wider collecting strategies of military officers as a group. 相似文献
35.
历史上,地缘因素对大国崛起起过重要的作用。地缘优势有利于大国的崛起,而地缘缺陷则制约着大国的崛起,导致其崛起失败或难以崛起。印度是正在崛起的新兴大国。然而,印度所处的地缘环境存在明显缺陷,这是制约印度崛起的重要因素。印度只有对自身的地缘缺陷进行合理改造,扬长避短,才能顺利实现崛起目标。 相似文献
36.
Zafar Khan 《Defense & Security Analysis》2013,29(1):30-41
This article focuses on Pakistan's policy option of “minimum deterrence” (MD) post-1998 nuclearization of South Asia and explores why “minimum” in reality is not the minimum. It states that the term “minimum” has not been fully defined yet due to which MD stays ambiguous. In addition, it endeavors to elaborate the rudimentary factors responsible for the non-existence of an MD, which, in turn, keeps the Pakistani stance on MD dynamic and evolving. 相似文献
37.
Namrata Goswami 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):28-56
Insurgencies in the Northeast of India have been a recurring phenomenon since India's independence in 1947. One of the most significant aspects of the multiple insurgencies has been the use of violence for political goals. By drawing upon three cases of insurgencies in Northeast India, the article offers a conceptual framework on escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies. The article argues that the most critical variables which have a direct bearing on the levels of insurgent violence are: popular support, loss of legitimacy and the state's counter-response. 相似文献
38.
Devin T. Hagerty 《The Nonproliferation Review》2014,21(3-4):295-315
This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime. 相似文献
39.
Ian Hall 《The Nonproliferation Review》2014,21(3-4):355-371
While recent history arguably demonstrates a high level of nuclear stability in South Asia, this article argues that this stability has historically been a function of India's relative weakness. It argues that, as India becomes stronger, attention must be paid to the technical and political requirements of nuclear stability: the reliability of weapons and command and control and the political conditions that underpin stable relations between nuclear-armed states. It concludes by recommending the United States aim to modify the perceptions of regional elites about their various intentions and decision-making processes and the role of the United States as crisis manager. 相似文献
40.
Manjeet S. Pardesi 《The Nonproliferation Review》2014,21(3-4):337-354
The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict. 相似文献