排序方式： 共有196条查询结果，搜索用时 0 毫秒
41.
With much fanfare, NATO declared its rapid reaction force—the NATO Response Force (NRF)—an Initial Operational Capability in 2004. This article addresses four questions: Where did the NRF come from? What does it look like in 2017? What have been the major obstacles for the NRF fulfilling its promises? And where is the NRF likely to go? The article holds two main arguments. First, due to inadequate fill-rates and disagreements as to the force’s operational role, the NRF was for many years a “qualified failure.” The force failed to become the operational tool envisioned by the allies in 2002. While not without effect, it fell hostage to the harsh reality of the expeditionary wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the NRF is off to a fresh beginning and will likely be considered at least a partial success by the allies in the years to come. 相似文献
42.
Richard A.I. Johnson 《Defence and Peace Economics》2017,28(3):272-297
Arms transfers provide exporters an avenue to provide security to other states while gaining economic benefits. Arms transfers provide importers an avenue to gain security without having to rely on alliances. Past research uses aggregate measures of the monetary or security value of major weapon system transfers without accounting for strategic differences in possible use in interstate and civil conflict. This article presents a data set on interstate transfers of major weapon systems between 1950 and 2010 building upon Stockholm Peach Research Institute’s Arms Trade Register with several improvements. First, it disaggregates land weapons and air weapons into categories reflecting their strategic capabilities. Second, model level characteristics (e.g. age, speed, and range) are drawn from Jane’s Defence sources. Additionally, the data set covers a larger range of time and states than previous data sets categorizing arms. To demonstrate the usefulness, this article first presents summary statistics of the data set and then replicates an earlier test to show that the effect of human rights and regime types on United States transfers differs across the categories of arms compared to alternative measures of arms transfers. 相似文献
43.
Stephen Biddle 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(3):453-469
This article argues that the prewar planning process for postwar Iraq was plagued by myriad problems, including a dysfunctional interagency process, overly optimistic assumptions, and a lack of contingency planning for alternative outcomes. These problems were compounded by a lack of civilian capacity during the occupation period, which led to a complicated and often uncoordinated relationship with the military authorities who found themselves taking the lead in many reconstruction activities. Taken together, these mistakes meant that US success on the battlefield was merely a prelude to a postwar insurgency whose outcome remains very much in doubt more than three years later. 相似文献
44.
Svetlana V Savranskaya 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(2):233-259
Drawing on evidence collected from eyewitness interviews, new Russian secondary sources, as well as recently declassified documents from both sides, the author significantly widens the academic understanding of the maritime dimension of this gravest crisis of the Cold War. Most significant is her conclusion that Soviet commanders were led by complex and challenging tactical circumstances, including unreliable communications and malfunctioning equipment, which might have prompted them to contemplate a resort to tactical nuclear weapons on more than one occasion. Almost as disturbing is the revelation that US forces were not aware of this particular threat. This research reveals how a chain of inadvertent developments at sea could have precipitated global nuclear war, underlining the extreme danger of the crisis. 相似文献
45.
Roger Arditti 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5):764-789
It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency. 相似文献
46.
Stephanie G. Neuman 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(1):105-134
The global defense‐industrial sector reflects the hierarchy of power in the post‐Cold War world. As in the larger international system, the United States plays the dominant role in the defense sector as well. It is a comparative advantage often used by US policymakers to influence the foreign policy behavior of other states. Curiously, the radical concentration of the world’s defense industrial sector, as described here, has received relatively little scrutiny from either academia or the media, even though it not only reflects the international order but provides the United States with considerable leverage in it. 相似文献
47.
48.
姜中元 《中国人民武装警察部队学院学报》2014,(5):75-77
遂行非战争军事行动训练是公安现役部队教育训练的重要内容。近年来其训练效果在公安现役部队履职实践中得到了良好的体现。但面对日益复杂的斗争形势,公安现役部队在进行常规训练的同时,应更加突出应急训练、联合训练和心理训练,以更好地完成党和人民赋予的神圣使命。 相似文献
49.
龙汉荣 《武警工程学院学报》2010,(5):1-3
推进武警部队现代化装备建设跨越发展,需要认清现状、更新观念、明确目标,确立没有科技创新就没有真正意义上的现代化装备建设的观念。武警装备科技创新,应在注重装备理论研究、加强非致命武器研发、拓展特种器材研制上实现新的突破和跨越;要在创新科技人才建设机制、完善装备科研管理机制、建立装备研发保障机制上增强科技创新能力,发挥科技创新引领的作用。 相似文献
50.
王甲琛 《武警工程学院学报》2011,(2):28-30
为解决武警有线综合业务网海量信息的存储与管理问题,本文在论述了目前比较流行的网络存储技术的基础上,结合武警有线综合业务网的特点,提出了适应武警有线综合业务网存储需要的网络存储技术方案。 相似文献