The African Peace and Security Architecture and its partners

This article presents survey data on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It focuses explicitly on two aspects: the internal constitution and achievements of the APSA; and coordination and cooperation with external actors, such as Regional Economic Communities, the United Nations and the European Union. The survey, conducted between October 2011 and December 2012, targeted 198 security experts in international organisations, think tanks, academia and non-governmental organisations. It reveals the APSA's current stage of development, achievements and challenges.     

基于OODA环的信息化战场信息安全保障SD建模分析?

为深入研究信息化战场信息安全保障,提高保障效能,利用OODA环理论对信息化战场信息安全保障过程进行了分析与研究,明确了观察、判断、决策和行动每个阶段的任务与事件,并运用系统动力学方法对基于OODA环的信息化战场信息安全保障过程进行建模分析和模拟仿真,仿真结果表明随着时间推移,保障方得到的信息增多,判断和决策的正确率也随之增加,OODA环周期开始减小,保障效能随之大幅提升。研究结果对于提升信息化战场信息安全保障效能具有一定的参考价值。     

Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In)

The information systems controlling our critical infrastructure are vulnerable to cyber attack. Cyber war is therefore inevitable unless we improve our cyber defenses. The only way to do this is by building security into systems at the design stage.     

From rivals to partners: AirSea Battle and the US air force–navy relationship

AirSea Battle (ASB) has generated significant publicity, controversy, and debate among scholars, analysts, commentators, and observers of US defense strategy. However, a research gap exists concerning formal analysis of the impact of the operational concept on the relationship between the US Air Force (USAF) and the US Navy (USN). The impact of the ASB operational concept on the USAF–USN relationship is examined across the issue areas of strategy, budgets, weapons procurement, and training. These four issue areas represent important areas of historical conflict and competition between the Air Force and Navy. The conclusion is that ASB is ushering in a new era of Air Force–Navy partnership that advances the inter-service dynamic from “jointness” toward integration. The emergent USAF–USN partnership therefore represents a significant development in US defense politics and defense strategy.     

Mimetic and normative isomorphism in the establishment and maintenance of independent air forces

Why do countries have air forces? Organizational alternatives, such as maintaining separate air arms for the army and navy, have become quite rare. The conventional narrative advanced by advocates of independent air forces stress that the primacy of airpower in modern warfare mandates centralized control of most military aviation. In this view, political–military uncertainty has driven mimetic isomorphism – pressure on national governments to organize as others organize so as to fight or deter war just as effectively. However, working from a set of 56 countries that were politically independent within a few years of the establishment of the first ever independent air force (the Royal Air Force) in 1918, and continuing through nearly the present, there is no clear pattern of external military pressure prompting this particular reorganization. Rather, from anecdotal evidence, the cause has more likely been normative isomorphism – a professional craving to look as others look to foster political or personal legitimacy. For whatever reason, though, choices of structures tend to lead to specific choices of policies. Thus, the result suggests that defense ministries looking for more effective or less costly organizational schemas may reasonably consider alternatives to the tripartite army–navy–air force structure.     

Colonizing military history: A millennial view on the economics of war

We briefly illustrate the application of fundamental principles of economics to three episodes of military history for the second millennium AD. The periods, principles, and cases examined are, first, the European Middle Ages (1000-1300; opportunity cost; siege warfare); second, the Enlightenment and the Age of Battle (1618-1814; expected marginal costs/benefits; the decision to engage in battle); and third, the Cold War (1945-1989; substitution; France's nuclear force de frappe).     

Soar在水面舰艇CGF防空决策行为模型构建中的应用

计算机生成兵力(CGF)的行为模型研究一直是人工智能技术应用于军事仿真的一个重要研究内容。基于综合认知架构Soar设计并实现了水面舰艇CGF的自动防空决策行为模型,并在海战CGF系统中实现了该模型,应用结果表名Soar在构建CGF行为模型的有效性和可行性。     

THE LAND IS THE ECONOMY

This article revisits Zimbabwe's land question from the vantage point of having been written five years after the ‘fast-track’ land redistribution programme was launched. Without belittling the accomplishments of land reform in the first 19 years of the country's independence, it is generally clear that the sweeping programme of 2000–2003, the most comprehensive of its kind, created a new paradigm. Clearly, the consequences will take many years to work themselves out through the country's political, economic and social fabric.

The article briefly defines what may be termed ‘old’ and ‘new’ versions of Zimbabwe's land question before outlining the salient aspects of the reform process itself. It then assesses the outcomes of the redistribution, the apparent lacuna between ‘land’ and ‘agrarian’ reform, and the debate that the reform process itself has kindled. Transforming land distribution into qualitative agrarian reform has proved an Achilles heel in the arguments put forward by the proponents of the fast-track programme. Finally, recommendations are provided as to what is necessary to secure land and agrarian reform in the short, medium and long term.     

VISIONS OF FISSION

For many years, non-nuclear weapons states have sought binding commitments from nuclear armed states that they would not be the victim of either the threat or use of nuclear weapons—so-called negative security assurances (NSAs). The nuclear weapon states have traditionally resisted granting such unconditional NSAs. Recent U.S. efforts to use nuclear deterrence against the acquisition and use by other states of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, however, have further exacerbated this divide. This article analyzes the historical development of NSAs and contrasts U.S. commitments not to use nuclear weapons with the empirical realities of current U.S. nuclear weapons employment doctrines. The authors conclude that NSAs are most likely to be issued as unilateral declarations and that such pledges are the worst possible manner in which to handle the issue of security assurance.     

Military Power: A Reply

This article argues that the prewar planning process for postwar Iraq was plagued by myriad problems, including a dysfunctional interagency process, overly optimistic assumptions, and a lack of contingency planning for alternative outcomes. These problems were compounded by a lack of civilian capacity during the occupation period, which led to a complicated and often uncoordinated relationship with the military authorities who found themselves taking the lead in many reconstruction activities. Taken together, these mistakes meant that US success on the battlefield was merely a prelude to a postwar insurgency whose outcome remains very much in doubt more than three years later.