The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

In April 2012 a number of former rebels who had been integrated into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) mutinied and formed the Movement of March 23, better know as the M23 rebel group. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has been mediating between Kinshasa and the M23 rebel group since 2012, without much success. In August 2013, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) issued a communiqué after its 33rd Summit of Heads of State and Government, stating that while it commends the ICGLR efforts, the talks have become protracted and a deadline needs to be set. The summit also called for an urgent joint ICGLR–SADC summit to address the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In addition to this development, the chair of the ICGLR is to be rotated in December 2013, when President José Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola replaces President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. To date, the mediation has been headed by Uganda and this has raised concerns over the credibility of the ICGLR-led process, since Uganda has been accused of supporting the M23 rebellion in a report released in November 2012 by the United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC. One could question whether the Angolan leadership will bring anything new that could have an impact on the crisis. Many expect that the perceived neutrality that Dos Santos could bring to the negotiations may be a positive step towards reviving the talks that have all but stalled at this point. Another issue of interest is whether the joint ICGLR–SADC summit could instil new life into the mediation process.     

THE NPT

This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of “metrics” to each of the NPT's substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation, with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide a foundation for substantive exchanges—in this case, on progress toward their implementation—during the preparations for the 2015 conference.     

SDI,NATO, and the Social Composition Function

The strategic defense initiative (SDI) intends to renew the leadership of the USA on the western alliance. The initiative takes place in a period when a summation technology prevails for the aggregation of contributions of NATO allies. We investigate if SDI induces a shift in Hirshleifer’s social composition function. Panel data tests over the period 1970–1990 do not confirm any break toward a best-shot aggregator. SDI does not alter the core of deterrence. It is indeed a public good at the US level but not at the NATO level, where, it is one of the joint products of the alliance. We also investigate the lessons to be drawn for the current debates on ballistic defense.     

Meeting the growing safeguards burden

ABSTRACT

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) faces challenges in fulfilling its safeguards mandate as a result of an expanding safeguards burden and a relatively static budget. This dilemma has been exacerbated by the additional burdens of implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Iran, but would not go away if implementation of the JCPOA were to end. There are three main areas of opportunity for the Agency: (1) budgetary expansion tied to changes in staffing policies, (2) changes in safeguards approaches, and (3) technological innovation. Barriers and limitations are associated with each approach, and advancing any of them will face a difficult political environment in Vienna.     

“The major prize”: apartheid South Africa’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1988–91

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the final years of South Africa’s nuclear-weapon program, particularly on the decision-making process leading up to the signature of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the South African government in 1991. In August 1988, after two decades of defiance, negotiations between the apartheid government and the NPT depository powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) ensued at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Despite South Africa being the only state to give up its indigenously developed nuclear weapons and subsequently join the nonproliferation regime, little is known about how the national position on NPT accession and IAEA safeguards evolved. Research carried out in multiple archives using hitherto untapped primary sources and interviews with key actors from several countries show how domestic and regional political dynamics influenced Pretoria’s position on entering the nonproliferation regime. In the process, the F.W. de Klerk government managed to skillfully exploit international proliferation fears to advance its own agenda, thereby connecting South African NPT accession with that of the neighboring Frontline States coalition of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.