公共娱乐场所电气火灾成因分析和预防对策

公共娱乐场所在利用大量电气设备、设施为人们提供舒适环境的同时,也增大了电气火灾发生的危险性。分析了公共娱乐场所电气火灾的特点及成因,提出了预防公共娱乐场所电气火灾的消防安全管理对策。     

航天应用载荷的高精度时间同步与共用信息分发

应用载荷直接获取航天器平台的时间和公共测量信息,并不能完全满足载荷的高精度时间基准和共用信息使用需求。一些功能载荷具备向外输出高精度时间和状态测量信息的能力,但硬件接口资源有限。将功能载荷作为FC-AE-1553光纤网络的一个节点,在FC-AE-1553光纤网络中叠加IEEE 1588v2时间同步协议,功能载荷的高精度时钟源能同步给有需求的其他载荷。并在时间同步的前提下,将功能载荷的测量数据如定位数据、姿态数据和轨道数据等共用信息同步发送至网络上的其他载荷节点。通过时间同步与同步发送机制,解决了各载荷对高精度时间和共用信息的需求,弥补了专用信息硬件接口资源的不足。结果表明,与直接利用航天器平台的信息源相比较,当时钟源和共用信息来自功能载荷时,FC-AE-1553网络时间同步之后的时间基准精度和共用信息利用性能高出3个数量级,载荷获取的UTC时间精度达到百纳     

Defence industries adjusting to change 1

This paper analyses the impact of terrorist activity on international tourist flows. To this end, we have estimated a cross‐sectional gravity equation for tourism from the G‐7 countries to a sample of 134 destinations over the period 2001–2003. Within this framework, we evaluate the deviation from ‘normal’ tourist flows due to terrorist activity, which is considered as negative advertising for the affected country. The analysis suggests that both domestic victims and international attacks are relevant factors when foreign tourists make their choice. This result is robust under alternative specifications. Moreover, the impact of terrorism is more severe in developing countries.     

PREVENTING DIRTY BOMBS

Radioactive sealed sources have a long history and a much wider worldwide distribution than do weapons-usable fissile materials. This article compares the mechanisms for controlling radioactive sources with those of weapons-usable materials and makes the case for improved policy making on the safe and secure management of radioactive sources (often referred to simply as “sources”). Such sources have been widely distributed with commercial and government support to nearly every country, yet there are no legally binding, international agreements or regulations to control any aspect of their life cycle. This is problematic because some sources that are disused, abandoned, or otherwise fall out of regulatory control could be used in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb). An RDD could pose significant economic and psychological impacts with the potential for detrimental effects on public health. The lack of international measures to control sources is troubling for several reasons: creating an RDD is much easier than fashioning a nuclear weapon from scratch or from stolen fissile materials; given the many incidents involving diversion from regulatory control and the misuse of sources, an RDD attack would be one of the more likely scenarios; materials security for sources is generally weak and inconsistent; it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount of sources manufactured and distributed; used sources are frequently found uncontrolled and transiting borders, and penalties are light at best; the market-based supply and demand of sources facilitates their rapid and loosely regulated distribution; and the “peaceful uses” aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons along with norms that began developing around the time of Atoms for Peace have promoted the nearly unchecked global distribution of sources. Several immediate and long-term actions are suggested to reduce the threat posed by radiological sources.     

From the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region-led negotiation to the Intervention Brigade

The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been characterised by chaos and insecurity for a number of years, but the rise of the M23 rebellion in 2012 once again highlighted just how dire the humanitarian and security situation is. For most of 2012, the crisis was addressed through negotiations between M23 and Kinshasa, mediated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). However, 2013 marked the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement (PSC Framework), and the United Nations Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2098, which contains the mandate of the long-awaited Intervention Brigade (IB). The PSC Framework calls on Kinshasa to implement substantial political reforms while also urging the neighbours of the DRC to stop interfering in its internal affairs. The IB is mandated to carry out targeted operations against the so-called ‘negative forces’ that operate in the eastern DRC. For now, hope of resolving this ongoing crisis hinges on the continuing ICGLR negotiations, the implementation of the PSC Framework and the success of the IB. However, there are critical questions about all of these processes that need to be answered and understood, as the expectations for these processes – especially in the case of the IB – are extremely high. Will the ICGLR manage to negotiate a peace agreement and will the IB succeed, or will they go down in history as yet another failure to save the eastern DRC?     

Deferred verification: verifiable declarations of fissile-material stocks for disarmament purposes

ABSTRACT

Nuclear disarmament is often seen as eventually requiring access to nuclear warheads or to the warhead-dismantlement process to verify that a state has not hidden weapons or weapon-materials despite promising to disarm. This article suggests this view is misplaced, and that what is needed is a verification mechanism able to provide reliable assurances of the absence of fissile materials available for use in weapons after a state has disarmed. Such a mechanism will need an initial declaration of the amount of fissile materials held by a state for all purposes, military and civilian. In a state with a nuclear arsenal awaiting elimination, this declaration would have to include materials that may not be available for verification because they are in nuclear weapons or are in other classified or proliferation-sensitive forms. This article describes a verification arrangement that does not require access to materials in weapons and in sensitive forms while still allowing checks on the overall accuracy of the declaration. Verification of the completeness and correctness of the declaration is deferred to the time when the weapons-relevant material enters the disposition process, at which point it no longer has any sensitive attributes. By removing the focus on monitoring warheads and dismantlement, this new approach could provide a more manageable path to nuclear disarmament.     

The Importance of Safeguards Culture

International safeguards is the system of measures put in place by the International Atomic Energy Agency and states to ensure nuclear programs remain dedicated to peaceful purposes. This international safeguards system consists of agreements, inspections, and evaluations that have never considered the safeguards culture of a state or facility. Neither a common definition nor an understanding of safeguards culture is internationally recognized. This article provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the international safeguards community. The authors explore distinctions among safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and suggest possible indicators of safeguards culture and methods to promote a strong, positive safeguards culture.     

Estimating defence budget saving from disarmament: the United States’ case

Probing the technology in the production of US national defence by using a dynamic cost‐function model with adjustment costs, this paper evaluates the effect of reducing the level of national defence on the defence budget saving. Our inquiry involves estimating the defence production structure without output data for non‐market goods that are normally unavailable. Our findings include: (i) the United States behaves rationally to minimize cost in the production of national defence; (ii) the adjustment costs are larger in disarmament than in military build‐up; (iii) due to the adjustment costs peculiar to disarmament, the defence budget saving from disarmament appears small, but cutbacks allow great savings on the defence budget.     

Book reviews

Jurgen Brauer's comment presents what he calls a replication of an earlier study by Higgs and Kilduff (1993) and uses it to criticize the adequacy of the Higgs‐Kilduff model. In several respects, however, Brauer has not actually performed a replication: he uses different data, a different sample period, and arrives at different results. His criticisms rest on his own setup, not that of Higgs and Kilduff. Therefore they have no strict applicability to the latter. Moreover, Brauer's stepwise model has no bearing on the Higgs‐Kilduff model, as it violates that model's specification requirements.     

THE CASE FOR DEFENCE

What is the case for defence and is it a worthwhile investment? This question is addressed for two contrasting nations, namely, the UK and New Zealand. Economists have a set of standard analytical tools for addressing the question but they are difficult to operationalise. This paper provides policy‐relevant answers.