Asymmetric information and third-party intervention in civil wars

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. In a signaling game, I find that if the third party is unable to give a sufficiently high assistance to her ally, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the third party’s expected intervention causes her ally’s enemy to exert more effort than in the absence of third-party intervention; this worsens the conflict.     

考虑抗拉强度的含外倾结构面岩质边坡稳定性分析

当前工程设计都是将边坡失稳破坏看成整体的剪切破坏即M-C剪切破坏,基本不考虑岩土体本身抗拉强度.而岩质边坡真实的破坏应该是张拉-剪切复合破坏,不应是传统不考虑抗拉强度的单一剪切破坏模式.利用FLAC3D软件,基于张拉-剪切复合破坏准则对岩体和结构面强度参数同时进行强度折减,与只考虑抗剪强度的情况进行比较来研究抗拉强度对...     

侦察无人机作战效能评估准则研究*

在对有人驾驶飞机作战效能评估方法的分析研究基础上,提出了完整的侦察无人机作战效能评估指标体系。建立了作战效能的评估准则与数学模型,并对影响侦察效能的参数进行了分析。运用该方法对“全球鹰”和“捕食者”两种无人机的侦察效能指数进行了定量评估,结果验证了该评估准则的可用性。