A non‐linear defence‐growth nexus? evidence from the US economy

The defense‐growth nexus is investigated empirically using time series data for the US and allowing the effect of defense spending on growth to be non‐linear. Using recently developed econometric methods involving threshold regressions, evidence of a level‐dependent effect of military expenditure on GDP growth is found: the positive externality effect of defense spending prevails for relatively lower levels of defense spending (with respect to the history of defense spending in the US) and reverts its influence for higher levels.     

The future of European defence policy: An economic perspective

European defence policy has been dominated by politics. This paper shows how economic principles can be used to derive guidelines for the formulation of European defence policy. The inefficiencies of the EU's existing defence arrangements are identified. It is shown that there is scope for efficiency improvements in the EU's Armed Forces and its defence industries.     

Chalk vs Guns: Some economic consequences of an announced French scenario 1

This paper explores whether defense contractors' manufacturing technology advantages over purely commercial firms might be associated with differences in their workforce and organizational practices. It uses unique original data collected specifically to test workforce and organizational complementarities in implementation of advanced manufacturing technology in small manufacturers. Findings are that defense contractors: (1) have higher and deeper rates of advanced manufacturing technology use; (2) have greater perceived success in achieving manufacturing goals; (3) are more likely practitioners across a diverse spectrum of advanced workforce and organizational practices. Then, (4) econometrically, the defense contractors' higher reported levels of achievement in implementing advanced manufacturing technologies are positively associated with those organizational and workforce practice differences.     

An analysis of the Washington naval agreements and the economic provisions of arms control theory

During the Cold War, two contending hypotheses dominated theories concerning the economic impact of anus control. The first suggested that when certain prerequisites were fulfilled, arms control agreements served to promote lasting reduction in military spending. The second asserted that instead of promoting savings, arms control encouraged diversion of resources to more advanced and expensive weapons, thus driving defense spending higher. Through the examination of the impact of the Washington Naval Agreements on naval expenditure during the 1920s, this paper provides empirical evidence to support the latter of these competing hypotheses. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan all realized economic savings after signing the Washington Naval Agreements. However, these savings soon eroded as the powers developed more advanced weapons‐systems.     

Rent‐seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation*

This paper experimentally tests a number of hypotheses that follow from models of international competition that are based on Tullock style rent‐seeking models. Specifically, we designed and performed experiments to see how variations in the degree of publicness in the prize as well as changes in the values assigned to the prize affect alliances in terms of individual nation contributions, total contributions, burden sharing, and the likelihood of winning the prize. While there was substantial variation in individual behavior, the results of the experiments generally conform to the theoretical predictions of the rent‐seeking model of international competition and alliances.     

GLOBALIZING REAGAN'S INF TREATY

When it was concluded more than a quarter century ago, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was hailed as a disarmament watershed, eliminating entire classes of nuclear missiles from the arsenals of the arms-racing Cold War superpowers. Over the intervening decades, there have been repeated calls to convert this legacy treaty into a new international norm against nuclear and missile proliferation by broadening it into a global prohibition on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Indeed, variations on this proposal have been knocking around for so long and with so little success that the entire concept has come to be dismissed by many knowledgeable insiders as something of a farce. Looking beyond its inauspicious pedigree, however, this viewpoint suggests that the time is opportune for Washington to give the idea a fresh look. Drawing on a detailed review of the history of “Global INF” and an analysis of the contemporary context, the author recommends that the Obama administration consider a simple declaratory approach that promises modest initial benefits, avoids previous and foreseeable pitfalls, and plausibly lays a solid foundation for achieving significant long-term progress.     

FROM PROLIFERATION TO PEACE

Despite both regional and international efforts to establish a weapons of mass destruction–free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, regional support beyond mere rhetoric seems unattainable. The lack of commitment to WMD disarmament results from the complexity of regional security dynamics, which are characterized by a high level of weaponization and crosscutting conflicts. This article examines a strategy for WMD disarmament in the Middle East. First, such a strategy must reflect the motives underlying a state's WMD aspirations. Security and prestige may be identified as two motives that affect the acquisition, and thus also the abandonment, of WMD. Second, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Syria are important actors because their reasons for desiring WMD cannot be considered apart from each other, and progress will consequently depend on the inclusion of all these actors. In this regard, we recommend the establishment of a parallel process between efforts to establish a WMDFZ and peaceful relations in the Middle East. Solving central problems, like the lack of political determination and security cooperation, is vital to create consensus on the final framework of a zone. This study suggests a way forward by analyzing the central causes of conflict in the region and recommending ways to resolve them in order to establish a WMDFZ.     

On the utility of security fences along international borders

States confronting cross-border intrusions of terrorism, illegal immigration, and/or drug trafficking weigh the costs of such intrusions against the costs of imposing barriers to prevent or curb the intrusions. In such situations, the degree of national security afforded a state depends, in large measure, upon the degree of border openness the state chooses. Depending upon the intensity and frequency of the intrusions – expressed in terms of opportunity-cost functions – a state might have little choice but to pursue a border policy of zero openness. It is this relationship of border openness to national security that explains why many states choose to construct security fences. In the 49 cases of security fences examined, many – among them Israel vis-à-vis the West Bank, India vis-à-vis Pakistan, Turkey vis-à-vis Greece in Cyprus – the construction of security fences becomes more complicated by their placement on lands whose sovereignties are disputed.     

‘Blackmailing the army’ – ‘Strategic Military Refusal’ as policy and doctrine enforcement: the formation of a new security agent

The study shows how ‘strategic military refusal’ in Israel developed as a rational and institutional means to influence security policies. As opposed to the perspective that sees military refusal as a spontaneous individual act, the study illustrates how organizations operate to distribute military refusal in order to pressure decision-makers to change their military policies. This strategy has proven to be effective when the military is involved with groups that threaten it with refusal – which threatens the military's operational ability and its official and apolitical image. These include soldiers whose civilian authorities, rather than their military commanders, are perceived as an epistemic authority regarding security issues. The case study refers to the impact of strategic military refusal in Israel on security policies and the military doctrine. This was influenced by leftist groups, which, although they belonged to the parliamentary opposition, had dominant presence in the military ranks. Furthermore, the study examines the effect of the use of strategic military refusal on the model of military recruitment.