The limits of covert action: SAS operations during ‘Confrontation’, 1964–66

This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy.     

On the contribution of defense innovation to China’s economic growth

As the most knowledge-intensive industrial sectors, China’s defense industries are developing very fast. The present paper will explore the contribution of China’s defense innovation to its economic growth. Cobb–Douglas production function, integrating defense and non-defense stock in knowledge, is applied during the course. In addition, an input–output analysis of defense equipment procurement was done. Positive effect of China’s defense innovation on economic growth has been revealed by comparing the results from the two methods. And some suggestions are made to strengthen the effect.     

The financial performance of aircraft manufacturers during world war II: the vicissitudes of war

Controversy has long surrounded the role and profitability of US defense contractors. From a financial perspective the question becomes whether defense contractors earn greater profits and investor returns than other companies during military conflicts. We explore this question by examining the accounting profitability and investor returns of US aircraft manufacturers before, during, and after World War II and compare them to a sample of non-defense firms. We also examine the reactions of aircraft stock prices to important political and military events of the time. We find that (1) aircraft stocks exhibited positive abnormal returns around events associated with defense buildups and outbreaks of hostile action and negative returns around events signaling an end to hostilities, (2) the company’s accounting returns improved during the war but these higher accounting returns did not translate into higher stock returns for the shareholders, and (3) investors could have earned higher stock returns had they switched out of aircraft stocks after Pearl Harbor and reinvested the proceeds in the overall market.     

Motivation or capabilities? Israeli counterterrorism against Palestinian suicide bombings and violence

Scholars have expressed doubts about the ability of counterterrorism to cope with suicide bombings, resulting in tit-for-tat or loop-like and repetitive violence and counter-violence without meaningful, let alone decisive results for the stronger side. Such skepticism may explain why so much of the recent literature on terrorism and insurgency is focused on the factors motivating the challenger rather than upon the insurgent's capabilities. This article demonstrates the extent to which Israeli offensive measures have reduced considerably the impact of Palestinian violence on the Israeli protagonist corroborating research that counterterrorism should adopt an offensive escalating strategy against the insurgent.     

Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution

The surprising ‘Arab Spring’ raises the question as to what would enable national intelligence to provide high quality warnings prior to the eruption of popular revolutions. This article uses new sources of evidence to trace and explain Israel's success in comparison to US failure at correctly estimating the course of the Iranian Revolution in 1977–79. In explaining this variance, the article shows that it was mainly the result of the intimate acquaintance of Israel's representatives in Iran with the local language, history and culture, as well as the ability to communicate with locals – tools which the Americans completely lacked.     

Livelihood systems of enlisted Ugandan Army soldiers: honour and reform of the UPDF

This article explores the livelihood pathways of serving Ugandan Army soldiers and traces their methods and motivations for enlistment. All were from areas of northern Uganda affected by nearly two decades of violent instability. With the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) increasing recruitment eligibility requirements and taking other measures to improve professionalism, some soldiers enlisted using false credentials and names, travelled to skirt unofficial ethnic quotas, and joined against their family's wishes. The Army's defence reform process was intended to preclude such problems. The article concludes with reflections on what strategic deception (by both recruits and the Army) may imply for warriors' honour.     

Turkish commanders discuss counterterrorism strategies and lessons learned from 25 years of fighting the PKK

This article is an extended book review of the Turkish book Commanders' Front (Komutanlar Cephesi, Istanbul: Detay Publishing, 2007), written by prominent Turkish journalist Fikret Bila, who compiled a series of interviews with retired Turkish military commanders and two former presidents. It provides a foreign perspective on counterinsurgency/terrorism strategies and lessons learned from Turkey's small war against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The interviews reveal the generals' views on Turkey's long-standing fight with the PKK, discussing topics ranging from the social aspect of the PKK problem to mistakes made in arming local militia. In addition, it presents the Turkish perspective on US policy in Iraq.     

‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’sStrategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict

‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.     

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Nonproliferation policies to prevent biological and chemical weapons use are important, but insufficient, particularly in view of the rise of global terrorism. Given the history of developing and using these weapons, it is crucial that governments properly prepare for biological and chemical threats, whether naturally occurring or man-made, such as by developing and managing effective healthcare infrastructure to mitigate widespread illness and injuries resulting from pandemics or terrorist attacks. Although the Middle East is one of the most sensitive and complex areas in the world—especially regarding regional arms control efforts and prevention—coordinating preparedness strategies among states in the region may be possible. Cooperatively addressing biological and chemical threats could lead to constructive progress towards the otherwise elusive goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.     

PART II: CONTINUING TO QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Responding to Derrin Culp's critique, the author argues that distinguished nuclear theorists may be wrong because groups of experts have been wrong in the past, that city attacks are central to nuclear deterrence theory because killing civilians en masse is what nuclear weapons do best, and that understanding how effective city attacks would be in war is crucial to understanding how well they would work as threats. Moreover, while it is undeniable that nuclear deterrence works some of the time, this simply is not good enough. Because any failure of nuclear deterrence could end in catastrophic nuclear war, nuclear deterrence must be perfect or almost perfect. This is a very difficult standard to reach.