Smart Power and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces

Abstract

From Iraq to the Gulf of Aden and the South Pacific, this paper evaluates how far theoretical ideas about smart power manifest in operational missions of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). To function within a ‘smart’ power context, this paper suggests that JSDF operates in ‘assisting’ mode, rather than the ‘threatening’ behavior of ‘hard’ power. JSDF also deployed alongside other Japanese ‘soft’ power tools – diplomatic, cultural, developmental, and NGOs, using tailored programs for different cultural and geographical contexts. Given constitutional constraints and public sensitivity towards coercive force, JSDF missions could be integrated more into a ‘whole-of-government’ approach advancing foreign policy goals through ‘smart power’.     

Lines in the sand: the use and misuse of red lines

This article explores series of “red lines” issued over the years by the USA and Israel toward Iran and Syria. It argues that the effectiveness of inflexible “red lines” in an environment that is given to rapid change is doubtful. They provide an adversary with the ability to determine when the deterring party will act and when they will not, a situation that is often undesirable. Moreover, their inflexible nature on the one hand opens the doors for circumvention while technically staying within their parameters. On the other hand, a strategy of more ambiguous “red lines” that allow flexibility in choosing the time, intensity, and nature of the response could also achieve a considerable deterrent effect, provided that they do not remain mere bluffs.     

Planning for the next Takur Ghar

The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations.     

The national defense function and federalism: the importance of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act

Countries with a federalist system of government have different arrangements for providing national security. US national security is provided by national and State defense forces. The quintessential national function – national defense – experienced some changes that enhanced the role of the States. Policy changes in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (2008 NDAA) introduced new roles for the Governors and the State defense forces, or the National Guard. This article explores how the interests of Congress and States aligned in the 2008 NDAA such that the national defense function changed. This article finds that the national government continues to have the central coordinating role, but that the politics and provisions of the 2008 NDAA changed the national–State relationship in mission, decision-making, and command and control so that US federalism in the national defense function is evolving in unexpected ways.     

网络化防空导弹体系拦截联盟形成问题

拦截联盟形成是网络化防空导弹体系(NADMS)中的新问题,旨在确定目标、火力节点以及制导节点三者之间的最优匹配关系,使得NADMS整体作战效能最大。结合NADMS的分布式无中心节点体系结构,剖析了拦截联盟形成问题的本质,形式化定义了体系中出现的新型一体化作战能力;分别从运筹学与整数规划、组合优化以及经济学博弈问题角度对拦截联盟形成问题进行形式化描述,并深入探讨了集中式和分布式的拦截联盟形成方法。     

武警院校开设野外拓展课程探讨

对武警院校开展野外拓展课程的现状进行了深入细致地调查研究,归纳总结了野外拓展的概念和理论。对野外拓展在武警院校教学中的功能作用进行了探讨分析,并将野外拓展课程的开设和学员综合素质的培养有机结合起来,从理论和实证的基础上剖析了野外拓展对提高学员综合素质的作用。     

美军针对高超声速武器的反导预警能力发展态势分析

高超声速武器具有飞行速度快、精确毁伤和高效突防等特点,具有重要的战略威慑和实战应用价值,它能够大幅改变未来战争的态势,已成为大国打破战略平衡、打赢未来战争的新型“杀手锏”。随着高超声速武器逐步走向战场,世界各主要国家的反导防御体系将向更高预警维度、更快反应速度和更大打击力度的天地一体联合防御方向发展。本文分析了高超声速武器作战优势及其对未来战争的影响和威胁,阐述了美军现有反导预警能力的基本架构与能力缺陷,对其未来反高超声速武器的预警能力建设及发展态势进行了研判与预测。美军“优先发展天基反导作战体系,发挥低轨卫星主体作用”的反高超声速武器发展思路对于军队反导反高超声速武器能力建设具有一定的启示和借鉴作用。     

Performances of the defense industrial base in France: the role of small and medium enterprises

This paper employs an economic and statistical approach to get an overview of the defense industrial base (DIB) in France. It allows us to identify its main characteristics and to measure the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). An original data-set was built, thanks to the information from the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the French Customs Central and National Administration, the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and all the most relevant organizations specialized in the development, production or maintenance, repair, and overhaul of military goods in France. Overall, the DIB turns out as being composed of about 1800 enterprises in France (subcontractors included), of which three-third are SMEs. Along with high market concentration ratios, these enterprises are characterized by a significant military/civil duality, high labor productivity rates, and intensity in Research and Development.     

Israel’s relations with the Gulf states: Toward the emergence of a tacit security regime?

By drawing on the literature about security regimes, this article posits the idea that a particular type of regime, which can be termed a “tacit security regime” (TSR), has begun to emerge between Israel, on the one hand, and several Gulf Arab states, on the other. It is a regime which, unlike liberal institutional variants that attempt to privilege the promotion of collective norms, remains configured around perceptions of threats to be countered and strategic interests to be realized. By examining the development, scope, and scale of this nascent TSR, this article explores the extent to which Israel, mindful of Washington, DC’s regional retrenchment, sees the emergence of such a regime as redefining the political and strategic contours of Israel’s relations with much of the Middle East.