The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.     

Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency

Focusing on British involvement in the 1960s Yemen Civil War, this article examines the centralised mechanisms developed in Whitehall to coordinate covert action interdepartmentally. It therefore sheds new light on London's security and intelligence machine and its input into clandestine operations. Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews, it uncovers various important but secretive actors, which have been overlooked or misunderstood in the existing literature, and outlines their functions in the most detail yet available. In doing so, it considers how these bodies evolved in relation to competing threat assessments of the local situation and the impact they had on Britain's covert intervention in the theatre. This article assesses the utility of the system and argues that it provided an effective means to ensure that any covert action sanctioned was properly scrutinised so as to reduce risks and best meet national interests.     

Gas metal arc welding of high nitrogen stainless steel with Ar-N2-O2 ternary shielding gas

High nitrogen stainless steel with nitrogen content of 0.75％was welded by gas metal arc welding with Ar—N2-O2 ternary shielding gas. The effect of the ternary shielding gas on the retention and improvement of nitrogen content in the weld was identified. Surfacing test was conducted first to compare the ability of O2 and CO2 in prompting nitrogen dissolution. The nitrogen content of the surfacing metal with O2 is slightly higher than CO2. And then Ar—N2-O2 shielding gas was applied to weld high nitrogen stainless steel. After using N2-containing shielding gas, the nitrogen content of the weld was improved by 0.1 wt％. As N2 continued to increase, the increment of nitrogen content was not obvious, but the ferrite decreased from the top to the bottom. When the proportion of N2 reached 20％, a full austenitic weld was obtained and the tensile strength was improved by 8.7％. Combined with the results of surfacing test and welding test, it is concluded that the main effect of N2 is to inhibit the escape of nitrogen and suppress the ni-trogen diffusion from bottom to the top in the molten pool.     

Clash of counterterrorism-assistance-seeking states and their super power sponsors: Implications on the war against Boko Haram

ABSTRACT

Decade-long security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria have failed to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread. I argue that disconnects between counterterrorism-assistance seeking states and their superpower sponsors are implicated in the intractability of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria. Why is the U.S. counterterrorism intervention to individual MNJTF countries (i.e. troop contribution, military funding and intelligence support) ‘lopsided’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘unevenly distributed;’ and how are these implicated in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism? This has impacted negatively on MNJTF countries – lack of cooperation, divisiveness and individualism in coordinating and forging offensives against Boko Haram. These concerns interface several blind spots in the picture of external influences on military’s approach to Boko Haram. I elicit primary data from top military officers. I conclude by predicting the implications and consequences of these counterterrorism complexities, and their potency to defeat or encourage Boko Haram terror.     

Planning for the next Takur Ghar

The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations.     

美军信息体体系架构研究

分析了美军信息体体系架构提出的背景,从信体联合信息环境的总体构想、使命任务、能力视图、作战视图等4个方面介绍了美军信体信息体系架构的主要内容,提出了对未来信息服务体系建设的启示。     

论全资产可视性与通用装备保障创新

提出了多兵种合同作战和联合作战条件下 ,通用装备保障应实现“全谱支持”的新思路。结合对台军事斗争中对通用装备保障的需求 ,提出了必须在器材请领、储存处理、在运资产、战区内装备管理等四个领域达到联合全资产可视性的要求 ,并给出了联合全资产可视性建设的效益分析     

The ‘African COP’

The 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) had been anticipated as the ‘African COP’, not only due to the African venue but also due to the opportunity it would afford African countries – with South Africa at the helm – to steer the debate on a global climate change regime. With the conference now over, lobby groups, international organisations, negotiators, observers and commentators alike have been taking stock of its outcome. Despite the litany of developmental and security implications of climate change, COP17 got underway with little hope that much might actually be achieved. In light of the discouraging condition of the global economy, with leading developed economies suffering financially, states were hardly in a mood to be making concessions that would impact their fiscal health. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached. Questions remain, however, about the significance of the outcome of the African COP for the world at large, but ultimately also for Africa.     

自由漂浮空间机器人关节故障锁定位置辨识

针对自由漂浮空间机器人在关节故障情况下关节锁定位置的辨识问题,根据其线动量守恒和角动量守恒特性,建立了关节故障锁定位置辨识的误差模型,提出了利用混沌粒子群优化(CPSO)搜索关节故障位置的辨识算法。最后采用虚拟样机技术,建立了空间机器人系统的虚拟样机,对空间机器人系统进行动力学仿真,获取了运动数据,采用此数据对提出的关节故障位置辨识算法进行了有效性验证。     

JTIDS消息字还原模块的FPGA设计

根据公开的关于Link16数据链的信息标准并结合我军对战术数据链的具体要求,设计了一种JTIDS终端消息字还原模块,该模块包含CCSK码字解密,CCSK译码,解交织,RS译码等一系列基带数据处理过程。首先介绍了Link16数据链消息字还原模块的原理,对其各个子处理模块进行了设计并提出了硬件实现方案,然后在Quartus II环境下选择Cyclone II系列的EP2C8Q208C8 FPGA芯片进行了JTIDS消息字还原模块的系统级综合与仿真,并在该芯片的开发板上进行了验证,硬件成品可用于JTIDS终端功能测试与评估等多种场合。