Attributing Cyber Attacks

Who did it? Attribution is fundamental. Human lives and the security of the state may depend on ascribing agency to an agent. In the context of computer network intrusions, attribution is commonly seen as one of the most intractable technical problems, as either solvable or not solvable, and as dependent mainly on the available forensic evidence. But is it? Is this a productive understanding of attribution? — This article argues that attribution is what states make of it. To show how, we introduce the Q Model: designed to explain, guide, and improve the making of attribution. Matching an offender to an offence is an exercise in minimising uncertainty on three levels: tactically, attribution is an art as well as a science; operationally, attribution is a nuanced process not a black-and-white problem; and strategically, attribution is a function of what is at stake politically. Successful attribution requires a range of skills on all levels, careful management, time, leadership, stress-testing, prudent communication, and recognising limitations and challenges.     

Budget allocation,national security,military intelligence,and human capital: a dynamic model

This study develops a dynamic model that integrates military intelligence into the defense capability of the country and the optimal allocation of its government budget. We assert that the effectiveness of the country’s military intelligence is contingent on the quality of its human capital, which, in turn, implies a long-term positive relationship between the government’s various civilian expenditures and its capacity to achieve a cost-effective intelligence and, hence, military capability. This relationship is developed within a multiple-period arms race model between two rivals. Using this model and stylized data for the Israeli–Syrian arms race, we show that an appropriate budget shift from defense to civilian expenditures during the initial periods of the planning horizon will gradually (over a decade, say) increase the quality of human capital in the country and, thus, the effectiveness of its intelligence, which, in turn, will increase the country’s future security and welfare.     

The fertile ground of Hell’s carnival: Charles T. R. Bohannan and the US Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps’ investigations of war criminals,collaborators, and the Huk,in the Philippines 1945–1947

Insurgencies thrive in regions where government legitimacy is absent. In the post-war Philippines, Captain Charles T. R. Bohannan of the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps became actively aware of this dynamic. Bohannan is best known for his later work with Edward Lansdale and Ramon Magsaysay in defeating the Huk Rebellion (1950–1954). Here the author examines Bohannan’s early investigative work against Japanese war criminals, wartime Filipino collaborators, and the rising threat of communist subversion most associated with the Huk. All of these experiences fed into what would be the successful campaign against the Huk, chronicled in his seminal work, Counter Guerrilla Operations: The Philippines Experience, and offers lessons on the investigative (as opposed to tactical or psychological) nature of effective counter-insurgency work, as it relates to both legitimacy in governance and the rise of insurgencies.     

Investigating the Desirability of Navy Aircraft Service Life Extension Programs

Building on prior work on optimal replacement of aging aircraft, this paper presents three methodologies to evaluate prospective aviation Service Life Extension Programs (SLEPs) and applies these methodologies to US Navy F/A-18E/F data. While considerable uncertainty remains as to the values of key parameters (e.g. the cost of F/A-18E/F SLEPs), the preponderance of the evidence available at this juncture favors undertaking SLEPs on F/A-18E/Fs rather than replacing them with new Joint Strike Fighters.     

Intelligence and military doctrine: paradox or oxymoron?

This article examines the evolution of the current British military joint intelligence doctrine. We argue that military intelligence doctrine is dogged by an intrinsic tension between the ethos and expectations of military doctrine and those of the professional practice of intelligence. We further argue not only that prior iterations of UK joint intelligence doctrine failed to effectively deal with this intelligence doctrine dilemma, but also that measures in the current doctrine to address this problem directly created their own problems. Moreover, as a result, otherwise sound innovations in the current UK intelligence doctrine have proven unsuitable to wider diffusion in more recent intelligence doctrine such as the new NATO intelligence doctrine which, otherwise, draws extensively on its British precursor.     

THE F‐35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AS A SOURCE OF INNOVATIon AND EMPLOYMENT: SOME INTERIM RESULTS

The F‐35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme is important for innovation in the Dutch economy and also contributes to other programmes in the aerospace industry (spin‐off) and other industries (spillover). On top of the expected value of US$9.2 billion in development and production, based on interviews with 10 companies and research institutes, an expected spin‐off of US$1.1 billion and an expected spillover of US$120 million will result. In addition, over 23,000 man‐years are associated with the activities in the development and production of the JSF. This study excludes the large and labour‐intensive Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) activities. Further validation of data and an update of current results is planned for 2006.     

Covert Canucks: Intelligence Gathering and the 1924 Voyage of HMCS Thiepval in the North Pacific Ocean

In 1924, HMCS Thiepval provided logistical support to a British attempt to circumnavigate the world by air. But the ship had another secret mission. Concerned America and Japan were fortifying their north Pacific possessions in violation of the 1922 Washington Treaty, and fearing war might be inevitable, the Canadian navy sent the Thiepval to covertly spy upon American and Japanese facilities. No cheating was discovered, but in the longer run, Canadian concerns about hostilities in the north Pacific were ‘on the mark’ correct.     

‘Stay-Behind’ in France: Much ado about nothing?

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.     

With an eye to history: The origins and development of ‘Stay-Behind’ in Norway

Based on full access to Norwegian archives up to 1970, the article describes the origins and development of ‘stay-behind’– an organized preparedness, under the aegis of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, for intelligence and sabotage behind enemy lines in case of a Soviet occupation. Initiated by Defence Minister Jens Christian Hauge, wartime leader of the Norwegian military resistance, the set-up built on lessons learnt during the German occupation, when effective resistance was hampered by inexperience and improvisation. Secrecy and security, and national Norwegian control albeit with cooperative links with British and American secret services, were distinctive features of the networks that came into being from 1948 onwards. NATO began to take an interest from 1952, but SACEUR's main concern was for ‘retardation’– guerrilla and sabotage activities to delay Soviet forces even before entering NATO territory.     

CIVIL SOCIETY AND VIOLENCE—HOW TO MANAGE IN THE TOWNSHIPS WITHOUT THE ARMY

This article discusses the validity of national security threats in Botswana and whether they justified the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS), which has been controversial since its formation. Since its inception in 2008, the DISS has been accused of many human rights violations and politicisation. Without fully deliberating on the basis for its creation, some discourses have focused on the politicised operations without relation to what the DISS is supposed to be doing. The author works under the assumption that debates should be shaped by whether it was necessary to create the DISS, and, if so, how we can shape and steer debates on its oversight, management, reform and operations. This article argues that despite the politicisation of the DISS, Botswana's national security threats are both real and imagined; and that domestic threats to national security have moved from the conceptual ‘imagined’ category to the ‘real’. However, that in itself did not warrant the design and mandate of the DISS, and the article argues that it was external threats that really warranted the creation of a civilian intelligence agency. The article concludes that Botswana faces a plethora of external security threats – traditional and non-traditional – that warranted the creation and continuance of the DISS.