‘Stay-Behind’ in France: Much ado about nothing?

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.     

With an eye to history: The origins and development of ‘Stay-Behind’ in Norway

Based on full access to Norwegian archives up to 1970, the article describes the origins and development of ‘stay-behind’– an organized preparedness, under the aegis of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, for intelligence and sabotage behind enemy lines in case of a Soviet occupation. Initiated by Defence Minister Jens Christian Hauge, wartime leader of the Norwegian military resistance, the set-up built on lessons learnt during the German occupation, when effective resistance was hampered by inexperience and improvisation. Secrecy and security, and national Norwegian control albeit with cooperative links with British and American secret services, were distinctive features of the networks that came into being from 1948 onwards. NATO began to take an interest from 1952, but SACEUR's main concern was for ‘retardation’– guerrilla and sabotage activities to delay Soviet forces even before entering NATO territory.     

Covert Canucks: Intelligence Gathering and the 1924 Voyage of HMCS Thiepval in the North Pacific Ocean

In 1924, HMCS Thiepval provided logistical support to a British attempt to circumnavigate the world by air. But the ship had another secret mission. Concerned America and Japan were fortifying their north Pacific possessions in violation of the 1922 Washington Treaty, and fearing war might be inevitable, the Canadian navy sent the Thiepval to covertly spy upon American and Japanese facilities. No cheating was discovered, but in the longer run, Canadian concerns about hostilities in the north Pacific were ‘on the mark’ correct.     

Investigating the Desirability of Navy Aircraft Service Life Extension Programs

Building on prior work on optimal replacement of aging aircraft, this paper presents three methodologies to evaluate prospective aviation Service Life Extension Programs (SLEPs) and applies these methodologies to US Navy F/A-18E/F data. While considerable uncertainty remains as to the values of key parameters (e.g. the cost of F/A-18E/F SLEPs), the preponderance of the evidence available at this juncture favors undertaking SLEPs on F/A-18E/Fs rather than replacing them with new Joint Strike Fighters.     

现有军用光电装备快速智能化手段

近年来,人工智能技术在图像处理领域取得了突破性进展,使得目标识别和目标检测算法的性能得到大幅提高,也为军用光电装备智能化创造了有利条件.本文从算法、数据和计算能力等人工智能三要素入手,分析了快速实现军用光电装备智能化的有效途径及过程中可能面临的问题,指出:现有的技术理论基本满足装备升级需求,智能化过程中还应重点加强实时...     

The Joint Chiefs of Staff,the atom bomb,the American Military Mind and the end of the Second World War

ABSTRACT

The decision by the US government to drop the atomic bombs on Japan is one of the most heavily debated questions in history. This article examines one element of that debate, in many ways the most surprising. That was the different views of the top of the military hierarchy in the USA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was on the whole more sceptical about using atomic weaponry than the USA’s civilian leadership, for ethical and strategic reasons. As such they were willing to consider very different ways of ending the war.     

Counter-Insurgency in Pakistan: The Role of Legitimacy

The Pakistani security forces have won their fight against the insurgency of the Pakistani Taliban, though terrorism will remain a serious problem for the foreseeable future. Victory was won not chiefly on the basis of new tactics, but of the recovery of legitimacy for the campaign among the population and the armed forces. This occurred when the war came to be seen as one waged not in the interests of the USA, but for the defence of Pakistan. In Balochistan, the nationalist insurgency has been different from and weaker than that of the Taliban—but may prove longer lasting. Military tactics in Balochistan have closely resembled those of the British Raj, and have been based with some success on fomenting tribal divisions and co-opting tribal elites.     

The NATO Response Force: A qualified failure no more?

With much fanfare, NATO declared its rapid reaction force—the NATO Response Force (NRF)—an Initial Operational Capability in 2004. This article addresses four questions: Where did the NRF come from? What does it look like in 2017? What have been the major obstacles for the NRF fulfilling its promises? And where is the NRF likely to go? The article holds two main arguments. First, due to inadequate fill-rates and disagreements as to the force’s operational role, the NRF was for many years a “qualified failure.” The force failed to become the operational tool envisioned by the allies in 2002. While not without effect, it fell hostage to the harsh reality of the expeditionary wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the NRF is off to a fresh beginning and will likely be considered at least a partial success by the allies in the years to come.     

The prospects of combined action: Lessons from Vietnam

Military commanders, policymakers, and analysts have recently embraced the concept of combined action as a powerful tool to improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in the fight against the Taliban. In doing so, they explicitly draw inspiration from the Combined Action Program employed by US Marines during the Vietnam War. This program is widely considered to have greatly improved the effectiveness of South Vietnamese government forces and contributed to increased population security in its area of operations and is considered a model worthy of emulation. This study finds that the success of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program was more qualified than contemporary proponents argue. It argues that successes were tempered, and conditioned, by the choice of junior commanders, the level of operational control enjoyed by the US Marines, and the way the local forces were recruited and deployed. These conditions offer valuable lessons for those seeking to employ combined action not only in present-day Afghanistan, but also in future counterinsurgency campaigns.     

联合作战目标武器弹药匹配模型

本文分析了联合作战目标—弹药匹配问题,从作战目的复杂性、武器弹药多样性、毁伤要求易变性、作战过程协同性四个方面提出了对联合作战目标—弹药匹配模型的军事需求,基于规划理论对问题进行描述并给出基本的数学模型,结合需求,对规划的目标和约束进一步细致的分析,对模型进行扩展,使其能体现联合作战的特点,方便了在不同军事上下文中有针对性地进行使用。