任务驱动的一体化作战指挥信息系统高效协同技术

针对一体化网络中心战下各参与方作战指挥信息系统的异构性、自治性、多样性等特点给联合协同作战带来的问题,提出了任务驱动的一体化作战指挥信息系统高效协同技术。以作战目标为导向将各作战力量和资源按需聚合和自主协同,引入自主个体、虚拟任务共同体和虚拟任务执行体,构建一体化虚拟作战指挥环境,为各作战单位提供高效、协同、透明的一体化服务。分别从核心元素、系统框架分别介绍高效协同体系结构,结合陆军合成营指挥信息系统案例对高效协同技术各组成部分进行深入分析,验证该技术的可行性。     

NATO BENEFITS,BURDENS AND BORDERS: REPLY

This note implements the sensitivity analysis suggested by Sandler and re‐examines the robustness of the concordance between NATO benefits and burdens.     

NATO BENEFITS,BURDENS AND BORDERS: COMMENT

This note refutes criticism raised by Solomon about past tests used to ascertain the concordance between NATO benefits and burdens. In so doing, a case is made for keeping the benefit proxy based on exposed borders. Moreover, a truer sensitivity analysis than that offered by Solomon is suggested.     

South Africa and Peace Support Operations: Limitations,Options and Challenges

Abstract

Malawi's political transition from single-party rule to multiparty democracy in June 1994 raised expectations for sustainable peace in the country by, among others, passing a new legal framework that provided for conflict resolution mechanisms and good governance. However, political conflicts that have posed challenges to the foundations of peace and political stability have been a characteristic of the multiparty dispensation, leading to interventions by indigenous institutions whose aim is to build peace. This paper, which is based on field research, analyses the major political conflicts that have occurred on Malawi's political scene since the 1990s. Using the Public Affairs Committee as a case study, the paper illustrates the challenges facing the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. It also shows that despite the political transition, the socio-political environment still exhibits political behaviour and norms formed during the 30 years of single-party rule. There is a need for capacity-building and deliberate policy to enhance the indigenous-based mechanisms in order to promote sustainable peace in the country.     

INDISPENSABLE INTELLIGENCE AND INEVITABLE FAILURES

Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen. Stanford University Press, 2009. 300 pages, $35.     

Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906

This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain's Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany.     

The Iraq Survey Group: From Weapons of Mass Destruction to Counterinsurgency

The discovery and elimination of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a focal point of the Coalition's strategy and operations in the aftermath of Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’. Despite the failure of the WMD mission to meet expectations after almost two years of intensive operations, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was able to integrate multinational and multi-agency forces to provide detailed intelligence regarding the history of Iraq's WMD programs and to assist in the battle against insurgents. The ISG's experience raises the question of whether a standing intelligence force could become a key component in future counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts around the world.1 ¹The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Dept. of Defense, or the US Government. View all notes     

New terrorist threat to India's internal security: the danger from Pakistan's “Karachi Project”

The spectacular commando-style terrorist strike on Mumbai in November 2008 exposed India's lax internal security structure. As nearly all the security apparatus broke down during the long spell of attacks, massive public outrage flared up across the country calling for a firmer government response. Shockingly, India has done little to prevent a recurrence and a new security threat faces the country every single day not merely before but even after the Mumbai attacks. In contrast, Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence and the Lashkar-e-Taiba have successfully evaded pressures from both India and the international community and continue their terror campaign against India under the “Karachi Project” with the explicit intention to unsettle South Asia. Classified documents indicated that India is at the forefront of a cataclysmic “nuclear terrorism” threat from a “combination of Pakistan-based terrorists and homegrown radicals.” This article analyses the danger posed by the Indo-Pak radical groups targeting India and India's lack of preparedness to the new security threat from the “Karachi Project.”     

美军2010年联合作战构想

详细阐述了美军２０１０年联合作战构想的内容,应重视主宰机动、精确打击、全维保护、集中后勤等４个作战概念。     

单兵数字化系统外部通信研究——“数字化战场与单兵数字化系统”系列论文之六

讨论了单兵数字化系统外部通信的功能结构和实现途径，以及战场信息网的无线电网和地域网实现。重点研究了联合战术信息分布系统ＪＴＩＤＳ，包括其ＴＤＭＡ工作方式和多网工作原理。最后研究了单兵数字化系统通信的一个安全问题。