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针对当前干扰防空环境下的作战特点,通过对网络化作战需求的分析,建立了一种分布式的网络化指挥控制体系架构,并结合协同跟踪的具体作战运用,设计了基于此分布式体系的协同跟踪作战流程,并建立了效能验证模型。对比一般的集中式指挥控制体系,基于分布式的体系具有生存性强、作战使用效能高的特点。 相似文献
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Colin F. Jackson 《战略研究杂志》2016,39(5-6):820-846
ABSTRACTWhile many militaries have tried to capitalize on the potential of information operations in internal war, few have succeeded. I argue that military information campaigns fall short of expectations for two reasons. First, the theory of influence militaries generally embrace – communications as a non-lethal weapons system – is largely invalid. While treating information as a weapons system makes it easier to integrate it into the existing military planning system, this overstates the independent effects of communications on behavior and understates the importance of interactive effects of what commercial marketing theory refers to as the “marketing mix” – product, price, promotion, and placement. It would be more appropriate to treat military information operations as a form of marketing: a composite effort to induce a specific behavior in a target audience by applying a combination of material and ideational instruments. The marketing model suggests that the efficacy of information operations will depend not simply on the message and its delivery (promotion) but on the behavior the sender seeks to induce (the product), the costs of that behavior (the price), and the opportunities available for such behavior (the placement). 相似文献
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Phillips Payson O’Brien 《战略研究杂志》2019,42(7):971-991
ABSTRACTThe decision by the US government to drop the atomic bombs on Japan is one of the most heavily debated questions in history. This article examines one element of that debate, in many ways the most surprising. That was the different views of the top of the military hierarchy in the USA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was on the whole more sceptical about using atomic weaponry than the USA’s civilian leadership, for ethical and strategic reasons. As such they were willing to consider very different ways of ending the war. 相似文献
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分析了单星观测模式下的天基测控系统的可行性,并针对该观测模式下轨道确定中法矩阵的特点,提出了一种基于压缩估计的定轨方法,该方法对法矩阵进行变换,避免了法矩阵奇异造成的误差传递。证明了当满足一定条件时,该压缩方法的估计精度要高于传统的定轨方法。并结合单星观测的特殊性,提出了误差传递因子,设计了单星观测下的压缩估计定轨算法。最后以单星模式下的天基测控系统作为仿真背景进行了仿真试验。结果表明,该压缩估计可有效提高单星观测模式下的轨道确定精度。 相似文献
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为分析几何参数对螺栓法兰连接刚度的影响,用MSC.Patran软件的二次开发工具PCL(Patran Command Language)建立了螺栓法兰连接的参数化模型。研究了螺栓法兰连接刚度随连接结构几何参数的变化规律并进行了灵敏度分析。经分析可知,连接结构刚度对开孔位置比例参数最敏感,其次是上法兰厚度。当上部段长度大于某一数值时,连接结构刚度对上部段长度参数不敏感,这一结论能为连接结构动力学简化建模提供一定理论参考。 相似文献
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Tor Bukkvoll 《战略研究杂志》2015,38(5):602-625
Russian Special Forces saw significant changes to both organization and doctrine in the years after 2008. The special forces of the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate were reduced in number, the organization’s institutional autonomy and rationale were changed, and an entirely new Special Operations Command was established in March 2013. This article seeks to assess the nature, scope and purpose of these changes, and to explain them by drawing on scholarship on military innovation. In particular, the article looks at military innovation in the context of a non-democratic political regime. 相似文献
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Garrett Grochowski 《Defense & Security Analysis》2015,31(2):152-158
The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations. 相似文献
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