网格技术在战术防空系统网络化作战中的应用

“网络中心战”是适应信息化战争发展的军队建设和联合作战的指导思想,网格技术是实现“网络中心战”的基础,利用网格技术在战术防空系统中实现“网络中心战”是信息时代防空作战的必然要求。     

JTIDS数据链在部分频带干扰下的性能分析

联合战术信息分发系统(Joint Tactical Information Distribution System,简称JTIDS)采用组合调制体制和多层编码体系保证报文传输的可靠性。分析了JTIDS数据链在莱斯衰落信道环境下的抗干扰性能,并通过仿真分析了该系统在部分频带干扰下的符号误码率和报文丢失率。仿真结果显示,由于JTIDS系统将RS编码、交织等多种编码技术和DS/FFH MSK调制技术相结合,使其在复杂信道环境下保持较低的符号误码率及报文丢失率,满足数据链报文传输可靠性的要求。     

任务驱动的一体化作战指挥信息系统高效协同技术

针对一体化网络中心战下各参与方作战指挥信息系统的异构性、自治性、多样性等特点给联合协同作战带来的问题,提出了任务驱动的一体化作战指挥信息系统高效协同技术。以作战目标为导向将各作战力量和资源按需聚合和自主协同,引入自主个体、虚拟任务共同体和虚拟任务执行体,构建一体化虚拟作战指挥环境,为各作战单位提供高效、协同、透明的一体化服务。分别从核心元素、系统框架分别介绍高效协同体系结构,结合陆军合成营指挥信息系统案例对高效协同技术各组成部分进行深入分析,验证该技术的可行性。     

NATO BENEFITS,BURDENS AND BORDERS: REPLY

This note implements the sensitivity analysis suggested by Sandler and re‐examines the robustness of the concordance between NATO benefits and burdens.     

NATO BENEFITS,BURDENS AND BORDERS: COMMENT

This note refutes criticism raised by Solomon about past tests used to ascertain the concordance between NATO benefits and burdens. In so doing, a case is made for keeping the benefit proxy based on exposed borders. Moreover, a truer sensitivity analysis than that offered by Solomon is suggested.     

美军2010年联合作战构想

详细阐述了美军２０１０年联合作战构想的内容,应重视主宰机动、精确打击、全维保护、集中后勤等４个作战概念。     

单兵数字化系统外部通信研究——“数字化战场与单兵数字化系统”系列论文之六

讨论了单兵数字化系统外部通信的功能结构和实现途径，以及战场信息网的无线电网和地域网实现。重点研究了联合战术信息分布系统ＪＴＩＤＳ，包括其ＴＤＭＡ工作方式和多网工作原理。最后研究了单兵数字化系统通信的一个安全问题。     

Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.     

Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands

ABSTRACT

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is halfway through a multi-decade modernization process. It has begun a major restructuring effort as it shifts its focus from a traditional continental defensive posture to a more maritime-oriented emphasis. In order to create more balanced joint force, it has adjusted the structure of its highest command organization, the Central Military Commission; abolished the former four General Departments and seven Military Regions; created five new joint Theater Commands and service-level commands for the Army and Rocket Force; and is reducing the size of its active duty force by 300,000 personnel. While seeking to overcome numerous internal obstacles, the PLA continues to develop and improve its capabilities to conduct integrated joint operations to deter a variety of threats to China’s sovereignty and territory and, if deterrence fails, to win informationized local war.     

从美国三大主力战斗机发展看战斗机的发展动向

以美国 2 1世纪列装的三大主力战斗机为背景 ,介绍了主力战斗机的研制情况 ,并对战斗机发展动向作了分析 ,指出以战斗机为主的飞机机群仍将是防空体系的主要威胁之一。