基于CPN建模的行动方案开发与分析系统设计

协助和支持军事计划人员制订和分析作战计划的建模与仿真能力是军方的现行需求,而行动方案的开发与分析则是作战计划建模与仿真的重点。针对作战计划过程期间开发的军事任务的排序与调度问题,设计了一个行动方案开发与分析系统,系统采用客户机-服务器体系结构,运用基于有色Petri网建模的军事计划领域的概念表示法,并使用状态空间分析技术完成军事任务的自动化排序与调度。军事计划人员通过图形用户界面使用系统,在面对紧急突发事件时,可以快速及时地开发出适当可行的COA,并对COA进行逻辑可行性分析。     

联合作战通信的完备性指标的建模分析与计算

从联合作战用户对通信需求的实际出发,探讨了完备性指标的定义及数学描述,并根据通信节点和通信链路所受破坏的不同情况研究了完备性指标的几种分析方法,最后结合实例,采用其中一种全代数化的算法,并对其进行了改进来实现联合作战通信的完备性指标的计算.     

On the optimal detection of an underwater intruder in a channel using unmanned underwater vehicles

Given a number of patrollers that are required to detect an intruder in a channel, the channel patrol problem consists of determining the periodic trajectories that the patrollers must trace out so as to maximized the probability of detection of the intruder. We formulate this problem as an optimal control problem. We assume that the patrollers' sensors are imperfect and that their motions are subject to turn‐rate constraints, and that the intruder travels straight down a channel with constant speed. Using discretization of time and space, we approximate the optimal control problem with a large‐scale nonlinear programming problem which we solve to obtain an approximately stationary solution and a corresponding optimized trajectory for each patroller. In numerical tests for one, two, and three underwater patrollers, an underwater intruder, different trajectory constraints, several intruder speeds and other specific parameter choices, we obtain new insight—not easily obtained using simply geometric calculations—into efficient patrol trajectory design under certain conditions for multiple patrollers in a narrow channel where interaction between the patrollers is unavoidable due to their limited turn rate.© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Vicarious warfare: The counterproductive consequences of modern American military practice

This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm.     

基于大数据的战区联合作战装备保障决策

大数据技术在决策领域的不断应用,将给装备保障决策方式带来重大变革。本文研究基于大数据的战区联合作战装备保障决策问题,提升信息化条件下装备保障准确、高效的决策方式等方面发挥重大作用。阐述了大数据的基本内涵,在决策领域的应用价值。通过系统推理的方法对战区联合作战装备保障决策的分析,提出基于大数据的战区联合作战装备保障决策基本构想,画出科学决策过程示意图,构建大数据战区联合作战装备保障辅助决策系统。结合研究大数据在战区联合作战装备保障决策领域的现实情况,提出相对应的措施建议。     

联合国维和行动的发展及其面临的主要挑战

第二代维和行动维和行动数量剧增,规模变大;维和行动战略从“维持”和平向“建设”和平发展;维和行动由主要处理国与国之间的冲突转为主要处理国内各派别的冲突;维和行动职能由单一转向多元;维和行动部署方式由过去的“线性”变为“非线性”;维和行动的主体增加,维和行动组成日趋混杂。联合国维和行动面临着“强力”维和挑战传统原则;维和行动资源严重短缺;维和人员所承担的安全风险越来越大;维和行动的有效性难有质的提高;单边主义妨碍联合国发挥作用。     

利用动态综合作战能力指数筹划海战兵力需求

针对目前海军作战兵力需求问题,建立了海军作战的物理模型,并提出了用动态综合作战能力指数筹划海战兵力需求的数学模型和算法,采用战例统计法和专家打分法计算出战斗力系数.并且以航空兵空中争夺为例进行了因素分析、参数选取、效能计算并得出了明确结论.计算结果表明,采用动态综合作战能力指数作为海战兵力需求指标是可行的;信息作战能力在现代海战中具有极其重要的作用.     

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.     

The prospects of combined action: Lessons from Vietnam

Military commanders, policymakers, and analysts have recently embraced the concept of combined action as a powerful tool to improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in the fight against the Taliban. In doing so, they explicitly draw inspiration from the Combined Action Program employed by US Marines during the Vietnam War. This program is widely considered to have greatly improved the effectiveness of South Vietnamese government forces and contributed to increased population security in its area of operations and is considered a model worthy of emulation. This study finds that the success of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program was more qualified than contemporary proponents argue. It argues that successes were tempered, and conditioned, by the choice of junior commanders, the level of operational control enjoyed by the US Marines, and the way the local forces were recruited and deployed. These conditions offer valuable lessons for those seeking to employ combined action not only in present-day Afghanistan, but also in future counterinsurgency campaigns.     

The NATO Response Force: A qualified failure no more?

With much fanfare, NATO declared its rapid reaction force—the NATO Response Force (NRF)—an Initial Operational Capability in 2004. This article addresses four questions: Where did the NRF come from? What does it look like in 2017? What have been the major obstacles for the NRF fulfilling its promises? And where is the NRF likely to go? The article holds two main arguments. First, due to inadequate fill-rates and disagreements as to the force’s operational role, the NRF was for many years a “qualified failure.” The force failed to become the operational tool envisioned by the allies in 2002. While not without effect, it fell hostage to the harsh reality of the expeditionary wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the NRF is off to a fresh beginning and will likely be considered at least a partial success by the allies in the years to come.