埋入式抗滑桩支护边坡稳定性分析

为研究埋入式抗滑桩在滑坡治理中的适用性,总结前人经验并经大量现场调查研究,提出埋入式抗滑桩支护的3种失效模式,即桩后滑体整体失稳、桩顶滑体越顶失稳和桩前滑体滑移失稳;并从失效模式入手,简化埋入式抗滑桩支护边坡稳定性分析模型。结合定点剪出的破坏假定,用传递系数法分别验算桩周3部分土体即桩后土体、桩顶土体和桩前土体的稳定性。最后在埋入式抗滑桩支护边坡稳定性分析模型的基础上,围绕滑体几何形态、滑面倾角、滑带及滑体力学性质等关键因素,对埋入式抗滑桩的适用条件进行探讨。研究表明:埋入式抗滑桩置于平缓段有利于其阻隔作用的发挥,保证桩前滑体的稳定性;置于滑体强度大于滑带强度的滑坡,有利于利用滑体较高的土工参数;置于坡面平缓的滑坡,有利于桩顶滑体的稳定。     

北斗系统星载原子钟周期性波动的频谱分析校正方法

在建立卫星导航系统星座自主守时时间基准时,必须消除星载原子钟钟差数据中包含的周期性波动,以免将其引入系统时间。针对这一问题,基于国际卫星导航服务组织(International GNSS Service, IGS)提供的北斗系统星载原子钟钟差产品,提出了一种基于频谱分析的星载原子钟周期性波动校正方法。通过比较校正前后钟差数据的频率稳定度性能差异,确认该方法能够消除由环境因素引起的钟差数据周期性波动。北斗系统各类卫星星载原子钟的性能在校正后都得到了提升。地球同步轨道卫星星载原子钟的万秒频率稳定度提升50%左右,中轨道地球卫星星载原子钟的万秒频率稳定度提升23%左右,倾斜地球同步轨道卫星星载原子钟的万秒频率稳定度提升15%左右。经过校正,北斗二号和北斗三号系统中的星载原子钟普遍达到了地面站铯钟的频率稳定度性能,为完全基于星载原子钟的星座自主守时提供了基础。     

Acrimony,asymmetry, and the Sino-Indian nuclear relationship

ABSTRACT

While most contemporary analyses of South Asian nuclear dynamics acknowledge the presence of a strategic triangle between the region’s three nuclear players, the primary focus usually remains on the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Discussions of Sino-Indian relations remain limited. This is likely attributed to the stability in the two countries’ relations, yet it is worth asking why this stability exists and whether it is likely to continue in the future. Although China and India have an acrimonious relationship, their asymmetric nuclear capabilities and threat perceptions mitigate the danger of a traditional security dilemma. India may perceive China’s nuclear aggrandizement to be a security threat, but the same is not true of China, which has a vastly superior nuclear force and is largely shaping its nuclear-force structure in response to the threat it perceives from the United States. This dynamic makes a serious conventional or nuclear conflict highly unlikely.     

Chinese views of the nuclear endgame in North Korea

ABSTRACT

This article examines Chinese views of North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program during the Donald J. Trump administration. It shows that China has portrayed itself as a responsible country that promotes regional stability, unlike the United States, which has engaged in military brinkmanship with North Korea. Some Chinese foreign-policy experts have asserted that Beijing should back Pyongyang in the event of war because of their shared history of humiliation by great powers, while others have favored working with other regional partners. Another theme in Chinese discourse about North Korea is that Pyongyang is an impetuous, ungrateful regime that impedes Beijing’s ability to attain its core interests of regional stability, economic development, and heightened global influence. This negative assessment of North Korea drove Beijing’s endorsement of stricter UN sanctions in 2017. While Beijing has punished Pyongyang for its wayward policies, China responded favorably to North Korea’s decision in April 2018 to stop nuclear tests and partake in international dialogue. Beijing seeks to help Pyongyang gradually disarm and develop its economy within a Chinese-led East Asian order. The article concludes by explaining how Beijing’s recent, more positive view of Pyongyang is likely to affect its support for American efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program.