水域无人系统平台自主航行及协同控制研究进展

水域无人系统平台是指可通过远程遥控、无人驾驶、自主航行等方式达成任务的一类平台,涵盖无人船艇及其所配备的无人机、自主水下机器人等.自主航行及协同控制理论技术水平是水域无人系统平台的核心所在,已成为船舶与海洋工程及水上交通等领域的热点研究方向.为掌握水域无人系统平台的自主航行及协同控制方面的发展动态和趋势,综述了水域无人...     

防空布势模式的系统动力学模型研究

制空权在现代战争中的地位和作用十分重要,防空兵力的布势模式是防空方夺取制空权的重要条件。明确了要地防空与区域防空的基本概念,基于系统动力学理论,建立了防空布势模式的简化系统动力学模型,通过不同模拟结果的比较,印证了区域防空理论的先进性,并作出了相应的对策分析。     

区域防空兵力需求优化模型研究

区域防空兵力需求是防空作战保障部门实施高效保障的基本依据,也是进行区域防空作战布势的前提和基础。讨论了地面防空兵器和空袭兵器作战效能指数的计算方法,建立了地空对抗条件下的兰切斯特动态方程,得出了满足一定作战效能指标的区域防空各型防空火力单元的数量与规模。     

The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy and Europe’s ‘Anti-access’ Challenge

Over the last two decades, a number of countries (most notably China, Russia and Iran) have been developing so-called anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive cyber-weapons, electronic warfare, etc. The development of A2/AD capabilities by non-Western countries undermines the foundations of US power projection and global military-technological supremacy. In order to overcome, or at least mitigate, the impending A2/AD challenge, the US Department of Defense (DoD) began to roll out its so-called ‘third’ offset strategy in late 2014. The strategy aims to bring about innovative operational concepts and technologies and spur new doctrinal and organisational debates. This article assesses which of the operational concepts and capabilities informing current US discussions on offset may be relevant in the context of the A2/AD challenges Europeans face on their eastern ‘flank‘ and in their ‘extended southern neighbourhood‘, and which may not. Europeans must grapple with the same conceptual puzzle as the US: how to strike the right balance between defeating A2/AD capabilities and hedging against them, i.e. through alternative strategies that are less dependent on unhindered access and resort to asymmetric forms of warfare. However, they must take into account the geographical features of their eastern flank and extended southern neighbourhood, the level of technological maturity of their challengers, and their own military-technological prowess and political limitations. This suggests a somewhat different approach to offsetting A2/AD than that adopted by the US.