Croatia's bitter harvest: Total National Defence's role in the Croatian War of Independence

Croatia's successful bid for independence was one of the defining moments of the immediate post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, the means that Croatia used to obtain independence remains relatively unexamined by academics. This article focuses on the early period of Croatia's bid for secession, and specifically the role that Yugoslavia's policy of Total National Defence played in facilitating its independence. Unlike in Slovenia, where the legacies of Total National Defence facilitated Slovenia's bid for secession, in Croatia the decision of its political leaders meant that the country largely neglected its positive legacies, resulting in a protracted four-year struggle.     

中学学习型教师团队建设探索——以华山中学为例

学习型组织具有五个要素,即自我超越、改善心智模式、建立共同愿景、团队学习、系统思考,学习型教师团队同样要符合这些特征。为此,华山中学开展了积极探索,提出创建学习型教师团队的关键是:建立共同愿景,提升生命力;改变学习方式,增强学习力;变革管理模式,培养创造力。初步营造出了凝心聚力实现又好又快发展的良好教育氛围,促进了学校教育实践的全面开展。     

从王安石变法看政策执行的必备要素

政策的执行是一项系统性工作,其中领导者的综合素质、直达基层的领导骨干、及时高效的反馈机制、牢靠的群众基础以及周密配套的实施方案,都是政策执行的必备要素。讨论政策执行的必备要素,对于政策的执行乃至当前的改革,都具有非常重要的现实意义。     

孙子“慎战”思想对武警部队履行职能的启示

“慎战”是孙子军事思想中层次最高的战争决策思想,其理论主要包括不战思想、重战思想、善战思想和善后思想。在以和平与发展为主题的时代,孙子的“慎战”思想启示我们：要牢固树立“兵者,国之大事”的观念,加强部队现代化建设步伐,制定正确决策,“先为不可胜”;要以“非危不战”为原则,遏制犯罪,维护稳定,努力创造和平稳定的社会环境;要依据“胜于无形”,认真处理国内民族及其他矛盾,保持和谐稳定的社会环境。     

浅析思维品质的谋略思想基础——《孙子兵法》对武警指挥员战术思维品质的启示

作为举世公认的兵学宝典,《孙子兵法》蕴涵着丰富的谋略思想,表现出高超的思维艺术,成为思维品质的基础性来源。武警指挥员战术思维品质的预见性、经验性、灵活性、辩证性、系统性,正是其谋略精华在新时期武警执勤作战中的运用和发展。     

The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia

Abstract

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia.     

Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age

While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.     

How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate

Many well-established explanations for war suggest that cyber weapons have a greater chance of being used offensively than other kinds of military technologies. This response article introduces a research agenda for the study of cyber war, and offers an example – principal-agent problems in cyber operations – to demonstrate how rigorous theoretical and empirical work may proceed.     

‘What Kind of War is This?’

This article explores the nature of the American war in Vietnam in an effort to determine whether it was a response to an indigenous uprising or an external effort by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to use a wide array of policies and programs to unite North Vietnam and South Vietnam under the party’s leadership. It argues that, although there initially were elements of the South Vietnamese population that rose against the southern leadership, the CPV gained control of their resistance and relegated it to a secondary role in the CPV war effort.     

The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War

This article analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the October 1973 War as key factors that determined its course. Following a background to the subject, we focus on the 9–13 October standstill stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals’ advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive. Effective Israeli intelligence collection about the coming attack, which was well used by the decision-makers, saved Israel from accepting an undesired ceasefire. The result was the 14 October failed Egyptian offensive that turned the tide of the war and led to Israeli military achievements at the war’s final stage