坦克柴油机比油耗实车测试的研究

针对实车检测坦克柴油机比油耗的原理和方法作了探讨,对12150L柴油机进行了实车比油耗测试,认为用无负荷方法实车测定柴油机有效功率,同时用涡轮流量计测量燃油消耗量是实车测量发动机比油耗可行的方法。     

双桨船左右主机工况不一致的危害分析

本文定量地分析了从多台主机为动力的舰船左右主机转速不一致时,对主机寿命与舰船性能造成的危害,并提出了改进措施和舰船实用中的注意事项。     

内燃机电站联轴器配合松动故障的诊断方法

通过对联轴器在正常与故障情况下振动信号数据的分析处理,找出联轴器的配合状态特征——振动信号在频域中的能量分布关系,提出了故障判断方法。     

舰用监控装置的最新技术-MCS-5监控系统

对德国MTU公司新近推出的MCS－5监控系统进行了分析,并同MCS－4监控系统进行了比较．对MCS－5监控系统在组成、原理和性能诸方面的特点作了说明．     

神经模糊控制及其在舰船动力系统中的应用

介绍了神经模糊控制的原理与方法,考虑了其在舰船动力系统中的应用．     

大型动力装置运行状态监测系统硬件实现

针对大型动力装置分布广、运行状态参数多以及结构复杂等特点,本文提出了一套实用的大型动力装置运行状态监测系统硬件实现方案。该系统按主从分布式结构设计,采用前置放大、滤波、隔离等先进技术,有效地抑制了各种噪声、干扰,达到了信号提纯的目的,为后续状态监测及故障的深层诊断提供了可信的原始数据。     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

‘Innovate or die’: Organizational culture and the origins of maneuver warfare in the United States Marine Corps

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, this article contributes to the understanding of the origins of maneuver warfare as the capstone doctrine of the Marine Corps. It does so by identifying a second source that fostered change in the Marine Corps – one in addition to disquiet about the conduct of the war in Vietnam – which stemmed from the challenges posed by the United States' post-Vietnam strategic and military reorientation. And second, this article examines the influence of organizational culture, or identity, on innovation in the Marine Corps. A critical strand in the growing literature on military innovation focuses on organizational culture and how it influences the behavior and responses of particular military organizations. This article contributes to this literature by analyzing the influence of the organizational culture of the Marine Corps in shaping what was deemed an appropriate response to the challenges it confronted in the 1970s.     

Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights from Malaya 1948–1960

This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference to the Malayan Emergency, in which the British and Commonwealth forces employed dispersed and decentralised small-unit formations to great effect. The article teases out the conditions that allowed DO to succeed in Malaya, and comments on the requirements and implications for the use of DO today in the prosecution of the ‘Long War’.     

Did the Panamanian Defense Forces conduct infiltration operations at the Arraijan Tank Farm in 1988?

This article reviews the circumstances surrounding a relatively obscure and almost forgotten US Marine Corps and Army security enhancement operation undertaken in Panama that commenced in early April of 1988. Marines were sent to Panama to protect oil and ammunition storage facilities from potential saboteurs. By April 1989 they had reported sighting armed, uniformed intruders on at least 43 occasions and receiving gunfire or discharging their own weapons during 16 incidents. Yet despite the repeated barrages of small arms fire over the course of a year, they failed to recover enemy ammunition, bodies or body parts and their own equipment and positions displayed no signs of suffering from hostile fire. This article analyzes the events from the point of view of a veteran of the operation and highlights the role that psychological operations may have played in generating the situation.