基于SuperMap的战区油料保障系统设计与实现

通过对SuperMap与战区油料保障的结合,研究了基于SuperMap的战区油料保障系统,充分利用信息时代的成果提高油料保障的效能。分析了建立基于GIS的战区油料保障系统的必要性,全面构建了基于SuperMap的战区油料保障任务的数学模型,提出了未来信息化油料保障的可能途径,系统的设计并实现了基于SuperMap的战区油料保障系统,从而达到优化油料保障环节,缩短油料保障时间,提高油料保障透明度的目标。     

Humanitarian response to hurricane disasters: Coordinating flood‐risk mitigation with fundraising and relief operations

To alleviate flooding, caused by hurricanes, governments build structural barriers called levees. In addition, relief providers such as the nongovernmental organizations and charities raise funds, and procure and deliver supplies (food, water, and medicines) for humanitarian relief. The strategy for managing disasters must, therefore, weigh the costs and benefits of building levees as well as procuring and delivering supplies. We use a three‐stage decision making framework to study how the investment in levee capacity can be integrated with supply procurements, fundraising, and rapid response. One of our major findings is that a large fundraising cost discourages postdisaster funding, implying relatively large investments in levee and prepositioned supplies. That notwithstanding, a large social value (of saving life) can tilt the balance in favor of postdisaster funding. If the levee capacity increases, funding for predisaster procurement is reduced without affecting postdisaster funding. For a sufficiently large increase in capacity, however, postdisaster response becomes superfluous. We also find that hurricane uncertainty motivates levees with large capacity. In contrast, levee‐failures motivate levees with small capacity.     

少数民族教育的经济学分析

少数民族教育是我国教育的重要组成部分。发展少数民族教育,提高民族素质具有重要意义。本文从经济学中的效率与公平、供给与需求、成本与效益三个方面理论来分析我国的少数民族教育,从而更好地发展少数民族教育。     

装备研发与制造一体化物资供应支持系统研究

首先分析了研发与制造一体化技术是适应武器装备柔性化制造需求的先进制造技术,然后介绍了装备研发与制造一体化技术的涵义和体系结构,分为以研发为中心的研发与制造一体化技术和以制造为中心的研发与制造一体化技术。最后详细研究了其中的物资供应支持系统及其体系结构。     

Optimal search for a moving target with the option to wait

We investigate the problem in which an agent has to find an object that moves between two locations according to a discrete Markov process (Pollock, Operat Res 18 (1970) 883–903). At every period, the agent has three options: searching left, searching right, and waiting. We assume that waiting is costless whereas searching is costly. Moreover, when the agent searches the location that contains the object, he finds it with probability 1 (i.e. there is no overlooking). Waiting can be useful because it could induce a more favorable probability distribution over the two locations next period. We find an essentially unique (nearly) optimal strategy, and prove that it is characterized by two thresholds (as conjectured by Weber, J Appl Probab 23 (1986) 708–717). We show, moreover, that it can never be optimal to search the location with the lower probability of containing the object. The latter result is far from obvious and is in clear contrast with the example in Ross (1983) for the model without waiting. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Technical note: Reexamination of all‐or‐none inspection policies in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all‐or‐none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if the supplier's share of the damage cost is larger than a threshold; otherwise, the manufacturer should inspect a fraction of a batch. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

基于电容式噪声传感器的信号调理电路设计

在航空航天的飞行器遥测试验中,大推力火箭和导弹飞行时,由燃气射流引起的噪声会对飞行器的结构以及载荷造成巨大的危害。电容式噪声传感器由于其频率响应范围宽,被广泛应用于飞行试验中。电容式传感器工作时需要用恒压源供电,且其采集的信号受到外界干扰较大,输出电压值不满足大多数模数芯片转换要求。针对以上问题,设计了恒压源供电模块和隔直分压电路、低通滤波电路等调理模块,使其最终输出电压范围在0~2.5 V,满足模数转换芯片的要求。该噪声传感器的信号调理电路可靠性高,已经成功应用于飞行器发射试验中。