Building the sinews of power: India in the Second World War

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the military transformations that India underwent during the Second World War. It focuses on the institutional dimension of these changes and considers the longer-term changes wrought by the war in the composition of the army, the logistical and support infrastructure and the emergence of an indigenous military industrial base. Taken together, the article argues, these changes positioned India as a potential regional military power that was qualitatively different from the interwar period.     

从三次战役看《孙子兵法》在《三国演义》中的体现

《三国演义》是中国古代军事战争小说的经典之作,它深受《孙子兵法》的影响。文章以赤壁之战、智取荆州、彝陵之战为窗口,以期窥探《三国演义》中所体现的《孙子兵法》的军事思想。     

Population transfers in counter-insurgency: a recipe for success?

Since control over the population constitutes the most crucial determinant for victory in irregular warfare, how should a state authority isolate the insurgents (the “fish” in Maoist terms) from the population (the “sea” in which the “fish” thrive)? Should a state authority simply drain the “sea” by diverting its “water” elsewhere? Does the forcible transfer of the local people who support an insurgency truly work? This article studies how the royalist regime of Greece forcibly transferred thousands of villagers (over 10% of the total population) to counter the communist insurgency during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and shows whether and how these deportations could be crowned with success.     

Historical and Political Background to the Erosion of the Rule of Law and Human Rights During Sri Lanka’s Civil War and the Way Forward

The Sri Lankan Civil War (1983–2009) is regarded as a violent reflection of deepening divides along political and ethnic lines. During this civil war the Sri Lankan Government and its security forces have been implicated in unlawful killings carried out in a pervasive manner against civilians, whilst at the same time specifically targeting ethnic Tamils, humanitarian workers and journalists. The human rights of all citizens suffered as a result and ultimately led to the weakening of the rule of law. With the end of the civil war, the Sri Lankan Government has made little progress in providing accountability for wartime abuses. Its absence of and reluctance to ensure justice is seen as a logical culmination of decades of impunity. The importance of acknowledging historical behaviour and taking accountability for past violations will be discussed. In an analysis for paving the way to a new democracy in Sri Lanka, the main outcomes of this article are calls for accountability arising out of the government’s actions during the war; an investigation into the present state of human rights, the rule of law and finally; an examination into the political solution going forward to ensure a process of reconciliation and peaceful co-existence.     

Defensive weapons and star wars: a supergame with optimal punishments

We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if the latter are symmetric across countries, while asymmetric endowments of such weapons have clear-cut destabilising consequences.     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.     

浅析思维品质的谋略思想基础——《孙子兵法》对武警指挥员战术思维品质的启示

作为举世公认的兵学宝典,《孙子兵法》蕴涵着丰富的谋略思想,表现出高超的思维艺术,成为思维品质的基础性来源。武警指挥员战术思维品质的预见性、经验性、灵活性、辩证性、系统性,正是其谋略精华在新时期武警执勤作战中的运用和发展。     

On the roles of free play in army exercises and the Russians

The article outlines the essential role of free play elements in various types of exercises for the development of in-depth and practical military professionalism. It thereafter argues why such use of free play contradicts the military science founded Russian Way of War.     

Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India

How do countries transition from single service to joint operations? This article engages with the discussion on military innovation to argue that civil–military relations are the most important driver for jointness. In doing so it examines jointness in the Indian military. Relying on archival research and primary interviews this article sheds new light on the operations of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990, the 1999 Kargil War and the Post-Kargil defence reforms. The main argument is that the Indian military’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ primarily because of its prevailing model of civil-military relations. This model prevents civilians from interfering in the operational issues of the military, including on matters pertaining to jointness. It therefore recommends more forceful civilian intervention to overcome the prevailing single service approach.     

Strategy,theory, and history: Operation Husky 1943

In his 1987 work Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987), Edward Luttwak described strategy as a field of activity characterised not only by an innately complex relationship between designs, actions and outcomes, but so too by the frequent disparity between its theory and praxis. Similar observations on this subject have since been made by Richard K. Betts, Lawrence Freedman and Antulio Echevarria II. This article will use the Allied invasion of Sicily in July–August 1943 as a vehicle through which to test these theories against a signal event in the European theatre of the Second World War. It will illustrate how Operation Husky and its aftermath are a paradigm of the confusing and often illogical course of events associated with the process of formulating strategy and waging war. In so doing it demonstrates the benefits of using strategic theory to illuminate events and so move beyond the often insular focus of campaign histories, and simultaneously reinforces the importance of military history in informing a theoretical understanding of strategy.