The impact of military spending and income inequality on economic growth in Turkey

An extensive literature on the effect of military expenditures on economic growth yields conflicting results. However, a crucial issue that has not been investigated in this context is the possible effect of inequality. The impact of military expenditures on economic growth in Turkey has also received substantial attention. Yet, the majority of these studies are not constructed based on a structural model, but rather examine the causality between the variables in question. Considering these two shortcomings in the literature and the lack of consistent results, this study attempts to provide further evidence for the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth for the case of Turkey by considering income inequality within an augmented Solow growth model. Our findings for the 1963–2008 period show that while income inequality has a positive impact on economic growth, military expenditures have no significant effect.     

Beyond Just War: Military Strategy for the Common Good

The objective of this article is to move ethical discourse on military strategy beyond the confines of the established War Convention. This is achieved by utilising the common good, a concept found in political philosophy and theology. The common good acts as a positive organising concept for socio-political activity. With its focus on peace, development and the flourishing of the individual and community, the common good poses a significant challenge to strategy. This article constructs an approach to strategy that is compatible with the common good. Importantly, it does so whilst respecting the pursuit of victory as an indispensable component of strategy’s true nature. The theory presented in this article is then tested in relation to four different modes of strategy: regular war, irregular war, deterrence, and cyberwar.     

The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012

This article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.     

美军航母战斗群空袭火力对地攻击效能分析

以美军航母战斗大队标准编成为例,简要分析了美军航母战斗群的空袭火力构成。进而分别建立了机载普通对地攻击弹药和巡航导弹、空地导弹对地面目标的毁伤能力的模型。然后以此为基础,从空袭兵器的突防概率、对目标的发现概率、对各类目标的毁伤概率和空袭某一目标所需的兵力4个方面,对航母战斗群空袭火力体系的对地攻击效能进行了深入研究,并建立相应的数学模型。最后根据在历次战争中得到的经验数据,对美军航母战斗群空袭火力对地攻击效能进行了计算,并分析了计算结果,为科学判断敌情提供了依据。     

美军"毒刺"便携式防空导弹训练模拟系统

随着计算机技术快速发展和现代化装备军事训练的实际需求,新技术的应用和发展对更新和改进军事训练手段起到了推动作用,虚拟现实技术在军事训练模拟器研制和开发中的应用日益广泛.介绍了虚拟现实系统的概念和主要模块,以及美国典型的便携式防空导弹训练模拟器的软硬件组成,阐述了计算机虚拟现实技术在军事训练模拟器中的应用.最后展望了未来便携式防空导弹训练模拟器的发展方向.     

未来战争模式及对策浅议

未来战争呈现大纵深、立体化作战空间,快速到达、全天候的作战行动,高度发达的信息获取、控制、使用技术使战场趋于透明化,自动化、网络化、智能化的指挥系统,屈人而不夺人的军事胜利的基本特征;针对新一代战争提出了对策建议。     

区域防空兵力需求优化模型研究

区域防空兵力需求是防空作战保障部门实施高效保障的基本依据,也是进行区域防空作战布势的前提和基础。讨论了地面防空兵器和空袭兵器作战效能指数的计算方法,建立了地空对抗条件下的兰切斯特动态方程,得出了满足一定作战效能指标的区域防空各型防空火力单元的数量与规模。     

Innovation Inhibitors in War: Overcoming Obstacles in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness

What explains the pace at which militaries adopt new technology? We argue that the hierarchical structure and unique expertise requirements of military organizations combine to empower select individuals as ‘gatekeepers’ of innovation. These individuals acquire beliefs throughout their military careers regarding the nature and means of warfare that act to shape their attitudes towards new military innovations. By filtering, sidelining, and ignoring competing sources of advice and information, these officers actively inhibit the adoption of new, often advantageous, innovations. We develop this argument through the analysis of two cases: the delayed acquisition of breech-loading and repeating rifles by the Union Army during the American Civil War, and the failure of the US Army to adopt an adequate heavy-type tank in World War II.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.