The limits of covert action: SAS operations during ‘Confrontation’, 1964–66

This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy.     

Filibustering from Africa to the Americas: non-state actors and empire

This article looks at dominant definitions of empire, in particular those emphasizing large polities as the sole agents of imperial expansion. By doing so, it draws attention to the overlooked role of filibusters: private, non-state actors who initiate unauthorized military endeavours, either in an attempt to carve out empires for themselves or for their home state. It demonstrates that filibustering is not a practice unique only to the Americas or to the nineteenth century as so much of the literature suggests. Lastly, it scrutinizes the cultural and historical impact of the phenomenon. In terms of the former, it argues that filibustering had an important literary and filmic influence. Regarding the latter, it advocates that it frequently led to further violent intercessions in many of the countries occupied and influenced a particular style of proto-fascistic and charismatic militarism.     

从美国无人机的发展来看无人机在未来战争中的应用前景

从军事需求和技术推动出发,全面论述了美国无人机的发展情况,并对实战使用情况、新的无人机系列以及无人机在战争中应用的广泛前景作了分析。     

以军事技术创新探索我军发展新模式

提出建立以军事技术创新为内在机制的新的军事发展模式,论述了这个发展模式的要点和特点以及为转向创新应注意解决的几个关键性问题.     

Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern Wars – A Reply to Jones and Smith

In light of present day calls for increased levels of cultural understanding on the part of Western forces engaged in conflict, this article assesses the utility of such knowledge in light of the British experience of the North-West Frontier of India 1901–1945. By using the British concept of the Political Officer as an example, it proposes that while cultural understanding is of genuine importance when operating in such a challenging environment, possession of it does not necessarily aid either the design or implementation of successful policy. As the British experience on the Frontier during this period illustrates, cultural awareness and understanding may be possessed in abundance, and the mechanisms for achieving such a state of understanding may be advanced, but traditional factors such as a cultural bias on the part of policy-makers, conservatism, underfunding, local resistance to unfamiliar concepts and a fractured civil-military relationship will dominate such awareness and overshadow the benefits that it may provide.     

Contracting Out Security

Private security companies (PSCs) currently receive a great deal of attention in the news media, in sensationalist reporting, and increasingly in scholarly books and articles. While the scholarly books and articles make significant contributions to our understanding of this global phenomenon, there are several impediments to analysis that must be recognized and overcome if analysis is to be improved. Three of these impediments are reviewed in this article. The author suggests that US government material is currently available to minimize impediments and offers a framework to make analytical sense of it. Since contracting out is based on contracts, and unless the complexities of awarding and managing contracts are understood, recommendations made to reform the process of contracting out security are unrealistic.     

China's Military Procurement and Its Operational Implications: A Response to Yoram Evron

This article is a response to Evron's argument, offering readers another perspective to assess China's military modernization and war fighting capabilities, using the same framework and methodology. It examines three topics: China's national security and military strategy, the PLA's procurement decision-making process, and China's military support and mobilization system. It concludes that, China's military modernization is to fight and win local wars under the conditions of informatization, but if required the PLA can reliably supply large numbers of sophisticated weapons and spare parts, to wage a complex and prolonged conflict.     

NATO's Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences and the War in Afghanistan

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has since the turn of the new century experienced a double transformation gap: between global and regionally oriented allies and between allies emulating new military practices defined by the United States and allies resisting radical change. This article takes stock of these gaps in light of a decade's worth of collective and national adjustments and in light of counter-insurgency lessons provided by Afghanistan. It argues first of all that the latter transatlantic gap is receding in importance because the United States has adjusted its transformation approach and because some European allies have significantly invested in technological, doctrinal, and organizational reform. The other transformation gap is deepening, however, pitching battle-hardened and expeditionary allies against allies focused on regional tasks of stabilization and deterrence. There is a definite potential for broad transformation, our survey of officers' opinion shows, but NATO's official approach to transformation, being broad and vague, provides neither political nor military guidance. If NATO is to move forward and bridge the gap, it must clarify the lessons of Afghanistan and embed them in its new Strategic Concept.