The impact of military spending and income inequality on economic growth in Turkey

An extensive literature on the effect of military expenditures on economic growth yields conflicting results. However, a crucial issue that has not been investigated in this context is the possible effect of inequality. The impact of military expenditures on economic growth in Turkey has also received substantial attention. Yet, the majority of these studies are not constructed based on a structural model, but rather examine the causality between the variables in question. Considering these two shortcomings in the literature and the lack of consistent results, this study attempts to provide further evidence for the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth for the case of Turkey by considering income inequality within an augmented Solow growth model. Our findings for the 1963–2008 period show that while income inequality has a positive impact on economic growth, military expenditures have no significant effect.     

Externalities in Military Spending and Growth: The Role of Natural Resources as a Channel through Conflict

This investigation re-examines the potential sources of positive externalities for the relationship between military spending and economic growth using recent advances in panel estimation methods and a large data-set on military expenditure. The investigation provides a new analysis on the relationship between conflict, corruption, natural resources and military expenditure and their direct and indirect effects on economic growth. The analysis finds that the impact of military expenditure on growth is generally negative as in the literature, but that it is not significantly detrimental for countries facing higher internal threats and for countries with large natural resource wealth once corruption levels are accounted for.     

A Nonlinear Model of Military Expenditure Convergence: Evidence From Estar Nonlinear Unit Root Test

The paper builds a model to empirically test military expenditure convergence in a nonlinear set up. We assert that country A chooses a military strategy of catching up with the military expenditure of its rivals, subject to public spending constraints on public investments, including health and education, leading to decrease in long-term economic welfare. This implies nonlinear convergence path: only when the military expenditure gap between countries reaches the threshold level, will it provide incentives to catch up with rival’s military expenditures. We test this nonlinear catching up hypothesis for 37 countries spanning from 1988 to 2012. Results from individual nonlinear cross-sectionally augmented Dickey–Fuller (NCADF) regression indicate that 53% of countries converge to world’s average military expenditure: where 39% of countries converge to Germany; 33% of countries converge to China; 22% of countries converge to the USA, and 11% of countries converge to Russia. Interestingly, USA does not exhibit nonlinear military expenditure convergence toward world’s average level. For panel NCADF regression, the result suggests that on average, there is evidence for countries converging to USA’s military expenditure at 10% significance level. For the convergence to the world’s average, the statistical significance is at the 1% significance level.     

Right Intention and the Ends of War

The jus ad bellum criterion of right intention (CRI) is a central guiding principle of just war theory. It asserts that a country’s resort to war is just only if that country resorts to war for the right reasons. However, there is significant confusion, and little consensus, about how to specify the CRI. We seek to clear up this confusion by evaluating several distinct ways of understanding the criterion. On one understanding, a state’s resort to war is just only if it plans to adhere to the principles of just war while achieving its just cause. We argue that the first understanding makes the CRI superfluous, because it can be subsumed under the probability of success criterion. On a second understanding, a resort to war is just only if a state’s motives, which explain its resort to war, are of the right kind. We argue that this second understanding of the CRI makes it a significant further obstacle to justifying war. However, this second understanding faces a possible infinite regress problem, which, left unresolved, leaves us without a plausible interpretation of the CRI. This constitutes a significant and novel reason for leaving the CRI out of the international law of armed conflict (LOAC).     

Beyond Just War: Military Strategy for the Common Good

The objective of this article is to move ethical discourse on military strategy beyond the confines of the established War Convention. This is achieved by utilising the common good, a concept found in political philosophy and theology. The common good acts as a positive organising concept for socio-political activity. With its focus on peace, development and the flourishing of the individual and community, the common good poses a significant challenge to strategy. This article constructs an approach to strategy that is compatible with the common good. Importantly, it does so whilst respecting the pursuit of victory as an indispensable component of strategy’s true nature. The theory presented in this article is then tested in relation to four different modes of strategy: regular war, irregular war, deterrence, and cyberwar.     

From Civil War Victor to Cold War Guard: Positional Warfare in Korea and the Transformation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 1951–1953

This article analyses the impact of the Korean War on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly the period of positional warfare from 1951 to 1953. In the war of movement between October 1950 and June 1951, the PLA relied on its civil war era weapons and experience, including the doctrine of ‘battle of annihilation’. Operations in early 1951 suggested that the civil war legacies of the PLA no longer applied to the realities of combat in Korea. Based on both Soviet aid and domestic mobilisation, the PLA managed to build the material foundation for positional warfare and rapidly improved its logistics. Operationally, on the defensive, the PLA developed combined operations integrating infantry, artillery, and armoured forces. The PLA learned the lessons of the Korean War and strengthened its ties with the Soviet armed forces in order to modernise itself. The Korean War thus transformed the PLA from Civil War victor to Cold War guard.     

‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces

The defection of a significant number of Sunni officers amidst the ongoing turmoil in Syria created a unique opportunity to get access to original data on the Syrian armed forces. This study draws on extensive fieldwork to probe the sectarian question in the Syrian officer corps. On the basis of a series of interviews conducted throughout the summer of 2014, I investigate the politics and consequences of sectarian stacking in the Syrian military as well as the root causes of Sunni officers’ grievances and alienation. My conclusions draw on an original database that compiles the sectarian affiliations of 81 prominent officers who occupied the most senior military positions under Bashar al-Asad.     

Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government – the Case of Russian Special Operations Forces

Russian Special Forces saw significant changes to both organization and doctrine in the years after 2008. The special forces of the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate were reduced in number, the organization’s institutional autonomy and rationale were changed, and an entirely new Special Operations Command was established in March 2013. This article seeks to assess the nature, scope and purpose of these changes, and to explain them by drawing on scholarship on military innovation. In particular, the article looks at military innovation in the context of a non-democratic political regime.     

以军事技术创新探索我军发展新模式

提出建立以军事技术创新为内在机制的新的军事发展模式,论述了这个发展模式的要点和特点以及为转向创新应注意解决的几个关键性问题.     

Military expenditure and economic growth in Middle Eastern countries and Turkey: a non-linear panel data approach

The economic growth effects of military expenditure have been the subject of a large literature in defence economics. Theories on the economic impacts of military expenditure greatly differ and include arguments that they either enhance economic growth or crowd out productive investments. Empirical literature on defence expenditure and economic growth nexus generally employs linear specifications to investigate the impact of defence expenditures on economic growth. Although it is now well established that many economic variables may have a non-linear data-generating mechanism, it seems that this reality has long been neglected in empirical work on defence–growth nexus. This paper attempts to fill this gap by employing non-linear panel data models to examine the effects of military expenditures on economic growth for Middle Eastern countries and Turkey, for the time period 1988–2012. Results show that the effect of military expenditure on economic growth is nonlinear such that the state of the economy actually determines the effect of the former on the latter. This is important not only in showing asymmetric relationship between these variables but also in revealing the reasons of mixed results of earlier literature.