一种基于观测器的自修复飞行控制系统设计

故障检测与隔离(FDI)、控制律重构是自修复飞行控制系统设计的重要内容.在自修复飞行控制系统设计中,利用观测器,设计了针对传感器的故障进行检测的方法,可使检测效果在一定的条件下,对系统参数变化不敏感,具有较好的鲁棒性;此外,当飞机操纵机构发生故障时,利用观测器,设计了基于线性模型跟随控制进行飞行重构控制的方法,使得当状态变量不能测量时的控制系统得以物理实现.最后,给出了仿真实例,结果表明了该方法的可行性和有效性.     

Becoming a disarmament champion: the Austrian crusade against nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT

The making of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has put Austria and its involvement in nuclear disarmament in the spotlight. This study highlights several factors that led Austria to become a prominent voice in nuclear-disarmament debates. First, its involvement dovetails with the emphasis on humanitarian disarmament it has promoted since the 1990s. Second, a strong antinuclear identity pervades Austrian society. This “nuclear allergy” combines antimilitarism inherited from the Cold War and, more broadly, an aversion to nuclear power, including for energy purposes. These two considerations form the background to the increased activism of the Austrian Foreign Ministry on nuclear disarmament in international fora. But, equally, Austria’s crusade for the TPNW can be attributed to the engagement of a small team of diplomats implementing personal as well as national preferences in favor of disarmament.     

Legitimate Authority as a Jus Ad Bellum Condition: Defense of a Procedural Requirement in Just War Theory

ABSTRACT

Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war. Or, if it is necessary, it is said to be a trivial requirement, as mobilization for war requires some political authorization. Those who would retain the legitimacy requirement have differing views about who the proper authority is. I argue that, reasonably understood, legitimate authorization is necessary for jus ad bellum. Considerations of agency and consent in force combine with the social contract to commit us to deferring to recognized authorities. These obligations are strengthened by the epistemic reliability and pragmatic value conferred by governing institutions and procedures limiting recourse to war. These same rationales imply that the U.N. Security Council should regulate the international use of force. I qualify that if higher authorities fail to act, other subsidiary authorities may then authorize force. However, the move to each subsequent level of authorization must be justified. Understood in this way, the requirement that wars not be fought without legitimate authorization is a non-trivial, necessary procedural jus ad bellum condition.     

Guns and butter? Military expenditure and health spending on the eve of the Arab Spring

We examine the validity of the guns-versus-butter hypothesis in the pre-Arab Spring era. Using panel data from 1995 to 2011 – the eve of the Arab uprisings – we find no evidence that increased security needs as measured by the number of domestic terrorist attacks are complemented by increased military spending or more importantly ‘crowd out’ government expenditure on key public goods such as health care. This suggests that both expenditure decisions were determined by other considerations at the government level.