Space,the New Domain: Space Operations and Chinese Military Reforms

ABSTRACT

The Chinese military has embarked on a series of organizational and doctrinal reforms intended to better enable it to fight modern war. Prominent among these reforms is the growing emphasis on space to enable long-range precisions strikes and on counterspace to deny space capabilities to an adversary. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has officially designated space as a new domain and established an organization to command space forces. With this increased focus on space, the PLA may begin to develop a doctrine to govern the use of space in military operations. The higher priority given to space, especially space control, by the PLA coincides with similar actions by the US military, increasing the possibility of warfare in space and the risks of escalation.     

Reclaiming the Party’s Control of the Gun: Bringing Civilian Authority Back in China’s Civil-Military Relations

ABSTRACT

Since emerging as China’s top leader following the 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping has moved swiftly to consolidate his formal authority as Central Military Commission chairman over the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In redressing the civil-military imbalance wrought by Dengist economic reforms, the commander-in-chief has combined institutional mechanisms with the use of fear to impose authoritative civilian control over the military. This paper proposes that a combination of changes to the Chinese strategic environment has contributed to Xi’s utility of the anti-corruption campaign to purge the regime’s coercive forces of its previous underpinnings, and advances that the war on military malfeasance has given rise to a new set of dynamics in civil-military relations in post-Reform China.     

Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands

ABSTRACT

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is halfway through a multi-decade modernization process. It has begun a major restructuring effort as it shifts its focus from a traditional continental defensive posture to a more maritime-oriented emphasis. In order to create more balanced joint force, it has adjusted the structure of its highest command organization, the Central Military Commission; abolished the former four General Departments and seven Military Regions; created five new joint Theater Commands and service-level commands for the Army and Rocket Force; and is reducing the size of its active duty force by 300,000 personnel. While seeking to overcome numerous internal obstacles, the PLA continues to develop and improve its capabilities to conduct integrated joint operations to deter a variety of threats to China’s sovereignty and territory and, if deterrence fails, to win informationized local war.     

Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.     

Military expenditures,economic growth and spatial spillovers

The relationship between economic growth and military expenditure has been the subject of a large literature in defence economics. This study analyses the influence of military expenditures on economic growth in a global perspective for the time period 2000–2010 taking spatial dimension into account. The augmented Solow model is employed to investigate the defence-growth nexus using the cross-sectional data relating to 128 countries. Following a traditional regression analysis, spatial variations in the relationships are examined utilizing different spatial econometric specifications estimated by maximum likelihood. The regressions are compared with each other via likelihood ratio tests, and the spatial Durbin model is found to be the most appropriate one suggesting that the typical least-squares model is misspecified. Empirical evidence indicates that military expenditure has a positive effect on economic growth with a significant spatial dependence for the time period under consideration.     

Military Spending and Growth: The Role of Institutions

Recent literature on whether military spending affects economic growth argues that the relationship may be a conditional one. We add to this literature by considering the role that ‘good institutions’ play in the effect of military spending on growth. Using data from a sample of over 100 countries from 1988 to 2010, our analysis suggests that the effect of military spending on growth is generally negative or zero at best, and this effect is mitigated in the presence of good economic and political institutions.     

Military spending and growth: a small open economy stochastic growth model

The paper analyzes the effects of military spending on economic growth in a small open stochastic endogenous growth model involving the supply-side and demand-side effects produced by military spending. We show that a rise in the military spending affects economic growth through four channels, including the crowding-out effect, the spin-off effect, the resource mobilization effect, and the portfolio effect. The net effect which depends on these four channels is ambiguous. Hence, we demonstrate that there exists an optimal defense burden that maximizes the economic growth rate.     

Does Military Spending Explode External Debt in Pakistan?

This paper investigates the effect of military spending on external debt in case of Pakistan for the period of 1973–2009. For this purpose, the autoregressive distributed lag bounds testing approach to cointegration is used to examine cointegration among the variables. The ADF, P-P, and ADF-GLS unit root tests are applied to test the integrating order of the variables. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and error correction method regressions are used to investigate the marginal impact of military spending on external debt in the long and short run. Our findings indicate the existence of cointegration that confirms the presence of a long-run relationship among military spending, external debt, economic growth, and investment. Further, our results reveal that a rise in military spending increases the stock of external debt; an increase in investment also increases external debt; however, there is an inverse effect of economic growth on external debt. An implication of the findings reported herein is that there is a need to formulate a comprehensive economic policy for curtailing external debt in case of Pakistan.     

Small footprint,small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance

After 15 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many now see ‘small-footprint’ security force assistance (SFA) – training, advising and equipping allied militaries – as an alternative to large US ground-force commitments. Yet, its actual military efficacy has been little studied. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We find important limitations on SFA’s military utility, stemming from agency problems arising from systematic interest misalignment between the US and its typical partners. SFA’s achievable upper bound is modest and attainable only if US policy is intrusive and conditional, which it rarely is. For SFA, small footprints will usually mean small payoffs.     

Implementing sustainable mission command in the Hellenic Army

The modern Mission Command philosophy in military operations originated with the German concept of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics). It emphasizes in general terms the exercise of disciplined initiatives by subordinates during the execution of mission-type orders in the course of military operations that are conducted within the overall intent of a commander. The present paper contains an overview of the historical evolution of the mission command concept and its application. The paper compares the mission command concept with the detailed or linear method of command. This paper focuses on the relevance of the mission command concept for the Hellenic Land Forces (HLF) in Greece. The paper provides a historical account on when and where mission command was successfully exercised by the Hellenic Armed Forces in the modern military history of Greece. The authors support the premise that the mission command concept is essential for safeguarding Greek national security in the current environment of evolving symmetric and asymmetric threats, and in meeting operational challenges in a diverse and difficult terrain. The paper examines the cultural reasons that have impeded the adoption of the mission command concept within the HLF and recommends a three-phase model for its permanent implementation.