积极心理学及其对军校大学生心理健康教育的启示

传统的心理健康教育过分关注心理疾病的评估与矫治,忽视了对个体积极的品质、情绪体验等的关注和培养。积极心理学的诞生,为传统的心理健康教育提供了新的视野,主张教育者用一种更加开放的、欣赏的眼光去看待学生的潜能、动机和能力。军校大学生作为一个特殊的大学生群体,除了繁重的学业、环境的适应等普通大学生面临的挑战外,紧张的军事训练、严格的日常管理、单一的校园生活使他们更容易出现心理问题。积极心理学提示我们,军校大学生的心理健康教育应从个体的积极因素入手,不断地激发、挖掘、关注个体内在的积极力量和优秀品质,注意培养和鼓励他们多用积极的应对方式解决生活中遇到的问题。     

利用FFT算法模拟联合变换相关器

由于联合变换相关器结构灵活,易于实现相关运算,目前在诸多领域得到了广泛的应用。实际应用中,联合变换相关器的光学系统带来的噪声会对识别效果产生较大的影响。采用快速傅里叶变换算法,由计算机模拟光学联合变换相关器可消除光学系统带来的噪声,达到理想的识别效果。通过实验验证了该方法的可行性。     

小波变换在过零调制信号检测中的应用研究

将小波分析理论应用于配电网络过零调制信号的检测中,解决了在强噪声、低信噪比的配电网络中通信误码率高的难题,提高了系统的信噪比。给出了小波变换Mallat算法的分解和重构公式。信号仿真表明,应用该方法可以很好地从复杂环境下提取有用信号的特征。     

二值化联合变换相关器识别复杂背景目标时的阈值选取

讨论了利用二值化联合变换相关器对复杂背景目标进行相关识别的阈值选取问题。由于不同阈值对二值化联合变换相关器识别结果有很大的影响,阈值过高,会损失过多的联合变换功率谱中的有效成份,使相关峰减弱;阈值过低,会使联合功率谱中的噪声放大,相关峰可能被淹没在噪声之中。因而存在一个最佳阈值。实验表明,最佳阈值位于联合功率谱最大灰度值的40%～50%之间,在此阈值范围内,相关峰值较高,噪声也得到有效抑制。     

基于AM-LFM和IRT的旋转微动目标成像算法

在雷达成像中,基于CS的方法因其压缩采样的特性而在高分辨雷达成像中得到广泛应用。然而由于其是一种基于参数化的成像方法,对观测位置误差特别敏感。在实际中,一般无法知道精确的观测位置。观测位置的误差会造成成像结果位置的偏离、散焦以及无法聚焦。针对基于压缩感知的成像算法存在的观测位置依赖性问题,提出了一种基于调幅-线性调频(AM-LFM)分解和逆Radon变换(IRT)的微动目标成像算法。该方法根据分解后信号调频率分离目标微动信号与主体信号,再进行IRT成像。仿真及实验结果验证了算法的可行性和有效性。     

Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel–Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF

This article highlights a pattern of military adaptation and tactical problem-solving utilized by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) while engaged in protracted conflict with the Lebanese militant group Hizballah. It discusses the IDF’s recent attempts to institutionalize their historically intuitive process of ad-hoc learning by developing a formal tactical-level mechanism for ‘knowledge management’. The diffusion of this battlefield lesson-learning system that originated at lower-levels of the organization is examined, as well as its implementation and effectiveness during the 2006 Lebanon War. A nuanced analysis of IDF adaptation illustrates the dynamic interplay between both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes of military innovation.     

Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia

In recent years, headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget have raised concerns that India’s on-going military modernization threatens to upset the delicate conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Such an eventuality is taken as justification for Islamabad’s pursuit of tactical-nuclear weapons and other actions that have worrisome implications for strategic stability on the subcontinent. This article examines the prospects for Pakistan’s conventional deterrence in the near to medium term, and concludes that it is much better than the pessimists allege. A host of factors, including terrain, the favorable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the most likely conflict scenarios, will mitigate whatever advantages India may be gaining through military modernization. Despite a growing technological edge in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure.     

Country survey: military expenditure and defence policy in Norway 1970–2013

This article examines military expenditure and defence policy in Norway from 1970 to 2013. Until 1990 Norwegian military expenditure remained between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite constant GDP shares, the military expenditure could not sustain a large and properly armed mobilization army. The constant nominal defence budgets of the 1990s accentuated the Norwegian Armed Forces' underlying imbalance between tasks, structure and budget. Around year 2000, large organizational reforms were effectuated, in which costs, the number of man-years, and underlying imbalances between tasks, structure and budget were reduced. Military expenditure increased in nominal terms between 2003 and 2013, while real military expenditure remained practically constant.     

Military deployment and international terrorism: do location and mission type matter?

Extant literature documents a relationship between military deployment and the risk of an international terrorist attack against citizens of the deploying country. It appears that deployment significantly increases the possibility of terrorist actions in the home country. In particular, if country A decides to send troops to nation B, then citizens of the former country are more likely to fall victim of an attack carried out by a terrorist organisation originating from the latter country. Contributing to this line of literature, we further refine this relationship by distinguishing between regions where the troops are sent as well as by introducing differences between types of deployment. Our results indicate that missions to Asia and the Middle East are more dangerous than missions to other regions as reflected by the terrorist threat in the home country. Robustness tests do however show that the significance of the location variable Asia is predominantly attributed to the mission to Afghanistan. As for types of deployment, only ad hoc missions seem to increase the risk of an attack, whereas no significant results are found for other missions such as operations under UN and NATO flag. Leaving out the missions to Iraq and Afghanistan however also increases the danger resulting from missions by fixed coalitions. Our results find however no evidence that ‘wearing a blue helmet’ increases the probability of a terrorist attack at home.     

“Effing” the military: a political misunderstanding of management

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.