The BWC protocol mandate for failure

The stage may be set for what could be a historic turning point in America's reliance on nuclear weapons to meet its fundamental national security interests. Proponents of a refurbished nuclear stockpile and infrastructure are convinced that nuclear weapons will remain central to U.S. security interests, yet they admit that there is no national consensus on the need for and role of nuclear weapons. Nuclear opponents are gravely concerned that to the extent nuclear refurbishment creates a global perception that nuclear weapons remain essential instruments, it will eviscerate nuclear nonproliferation measures precisely at a time when nuclear ambitions are growing. Moreover, opponents see deterrence through advanced conventional weapons as decisively more credible than any nuclear alternative. With hopes of elevating discourse to the national level, this article examines the key current arguments pro and con within the specialist community and forecasts changes in the U.S. nuclear arsenal over the next decade. It concludes with a brief prognosis on prospects for complete nuclear disarmament.     

PREVENTIVE ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND THE “SUCCESS” AT OSIRAQ

Advocates of the preventive use of force against emerging nuclear, biological, or chemical programs often look to the allegedly successful 1981 Israeli airstrike against Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osiraq. According to the conventional wisdom, this attack may have prevented Iraq from going nuclear before Operation Desert Storm in 1991. This article assesses the claim that the 1981 attack substantially delayed Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons, both by revisiting older debates and by introducing new evidence from Iraqi scientists. The article casts doubt on the conclusion that the attack was successful for three reasons: (1) the reactor itself was not well equipped to generate plutonium for a nuclear weapon; (2) illegal plutonium production would likely have caused a cutoff in the supply of nuclear fuel and an end to weapons activities; and (3) the attack may have actually increased Saddam's commitment to acquiring weapons. These conclusions have implications for the Bush Doctrine, as the lack of success in 1981 casts doubt on the possible success of future attacks against nuclear programs.     

The Battle of Mirbat: turning point in the Omani Dhofar rebellion

On 19 July 1972, the pivotal battle of the Dhofar rebellion occurred when over 250 communist guerillas, called adoos,1 ?1. ‘Enemy’ in Arabic. attacked the coastal garrison town of Mirbat2 ?2. Sometimes spelled Marbat. where nine men of the British 22nd Special Air Service Regiment were stationed. Their decisive defense of Mirbat led to decorations three years after the battle, the beginning of the end of the rebellion, and calls for the awarding of Britain's highest honor, the Victoria Cross. The Battle of Mirbat, let alone the Dhofar rebellion are little known outside the UK due3 ?3. Other than papers written for military staff colleges, there is no American written account of the battle. to the covert nature of the SAS deployment, the then Labour government's obsession with secrecy, and the remoteness of the area of operations. Nonetheless, of all the proxy wars of the Cold War this one had the most significance, because had the communist adoos won, Oman and its Musandam Peninsula, which sticks out like a dagger into the Straits of Hormuz and abuts the United Arab Emirates, would have fallen into the communist orbit; threatening the West's oil supply. This is the story of the pivotal battle that was won by Britain and Oman against a communist insurgency.     

Germany’s Answer to Standard Oil: The Continental Oil Company and Nazi Grand Strategy, 1940–1942

German grand strategy during World War II included making Europe independent of oil imported from sources controlled by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR. The first step was to wrest control of oilfields. Producing and distributing the oil, however, required the creation of a company capable of replacing the evicted British, American, and Soviet suppliers. Therefore, in 1941, the Third Reich established the Continental Oil Company. Analysis of the company’s foundation and operations sheds light on the objectives of the Third Reich, including the postwar economic development of Axis Europe and the extension of German hegemony beyond the USSR into the Middle East.     

针对国家导弹防御系统突防措施研究

美国为了追求绝对的安全,不顾国际社会的反对,贸然发展其国家弹道导弹防御系统。为了追求世界的制衡,必须研究如何突破弹道导弹防御系统。简述了NMD的发展演变,在分析了美国的国家导弹防御系统构成的基础上,针对其使用的拦截手段,重点分析了弹道导弹突破NMD的7种可能措施。     

巨型计算机的前端工作站的设计(软件部分)

巨型计算机的前端工作站是巨型计算机系统的重要组成部分,它实现了主处理机与前端处理机的互联。文章从功能与结构两个方面阐述了前端工作站的设计,并且简要地介绍了通讯协议。前端工作站已研制成功并正式投入了使用。     

Contents and Author Index,Volume 19, 2012

The U.S. Congress, charged with overseeing U.S. nuclear weapons policy and programs, usually addresses such policies and programs through the annual authorization and appropriations process, focusing mostly on questions of how many and what types of weapons the United States should deploy, with little attention paid to questions about nuclear weapons strategy, doctrine, and policy. The oversight process has brought about some significant changes in the plans for U.S. nuclear weapons, including the elimination of funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study and the shift of that funding into a study of the Reliable Replacement Warhead. But with the focus on authorizations and appropriations, along with the divided jurisdiction over nuclear weapons policy and programs in congressional committees, Congress has not, either recently or during the Cold War and post–Cold War eras, conducted a more comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, policy, or force structure. Changes in committee jurisdictions could affect the oversight process, but as long as nuclear weapons policy and programs remain a relatively low priority for most members of Congress, and the country at large, it is unlikely that Congress will pursue such a comprehensive debate.     

STRATEGY FOR A NEW NUCLEAR AGE

Current U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, force structure, and doctrine contribute to the threat of nuclear terrorism in several ways. First, the U.S. nuclear stockpile presents opportunities for nuclear terrorists to seize the materials they need. Second, U.S. nuclear forces remain a key justification for Russia's maintenance of similar nuclear forces that are less well protected. Third, America's continued embrace of nuclear weapons encourages and legitimizes other states to seek nuclear weapons that they will have difficulty securing from terrorists. The national security interests of the United States would be better served by a strategy to shrink the global footprint of nuclear weapons and provide the highest possible levels of security for the most minimal possible deterrent forces. Given the inability to secure nuclear weapons and materials perfectly or to eliminate terrorism in the foreseeable future, reducing the global inventory of nuclear weapons and materials is the most reliable way to reduce the chances of nuclear terrorism.     

SOCIAL PREFERENCES FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE AND POLICE ENFORCEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

We study the determinants of social preferences for national defence and for police and law enforcement. For this task, we estimate a bivariate ordered probit model for a set of European countries (France, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) in 2006. Determinants of spending decisions for defence and police are found to be linked but are of significantly different magnitudes. Besides, measures against terrorist threats are positively linked to police and defence spending increases, while the subjective perception of fiscal pressure has no influence. Finally, no significant differences are found between Northern and Southern Europe.     

Unemployed youth: ‘time bombs’ or engines for growth?

While popular narratives about success in South Africa focus on individual effort, accidents of birth continue to determine life prospects. Inequalities in early childhood development, health, and education narrow the range of possibilities that young people have available to them, and this impacts on their risk appetite, including, through the workings of the maturing brain, a propensity to violence, substance abuse, and unsafe sex. New technology offers young people an unprecedented ability to organise and network. This fact, combined with high levels of youth dissatisfaction, unemployment, and marginalisation, leads many to worry that the young are “ticking time bombs”. While there certainly are risks, great unused pools of youth labour also present an opportunity for engaging them in social advancement programmes. Structured youth service is a tried and tested policy option that, when implemented as part of an integrated youth development strategy, can enlist thousands of young people in devoting their considerable energies to leadership for the public good.