以十六大精神为统领 促进警卫队伍建设

警卫队伍建设必须以十六大精神为统领 ,抓好思想政治工作 ,加强文化育警 ,优化队伍的力量配备 ,明确防范重点 ,促进警卫队伍建设再上一个新台阶     

Bourdieu’s capital and insurgent group resilience:a field-theoretic approach to the polisario front

The conflict between the rebel group, the Polisario Front, and the Kingdom of Morocco is nearing its 43rd year. Though under-reported, the conflict itself garners attention for the resilience – some would say tenacity – of the ethnically Sahrawi Polisario Front. Despite shifting regional and international politics and the nearly 150,000 Sahrawi refugees waiting in nearby Algerian camps, the rebel group has survived. What explains its resilience? This article uses Bourdieu’s ‘forms of capital’ to understand the Polisario Front’s persistence. Based on field research in Algeria, Western Sahara, and the United States, it finds that social, cultural, symbolic, and economic capital may provide an explanation.     

国防工程智能信息系统效能评估研究

在简要介绍国防工程智能信息系统组成和功能的基础上,提出了系统效能评估指标体系,分别用BP神经网络和AHP法建立了国防工程智能信息系统效能评估模型,并对系统的设备监控管理能力进行了评估。仿真结果表明,BP神经网络法克服了传统评估方法精度低、模型复杂和计算量大的缺点,可将以往的专家经验知识进行分析学习,能够实现实时方便的在线评估;AHP法对多层次的指标体系具有较强的处理能力,但是存在指标权重确定主观性强,计算量大的问题。     

Operation ‘enduring freedom’: a victory for a conventional force fighting an unconventional war

The track record of the US military in unconventional wars has not been good and there were fears that Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ might suffer the same fate as previous campaigns. This contribution explores why the Taliban were defeated so easily by the US in 2001. It challenges the view that America's victory was due solely to changes in its modus operandi or that the outcome heralds a change in the fortunes of the US when fighting unconventional war. It also questions the idea that America's victory was a consequence of Taliban incompetence. Instead, it explains the defeat of the Taliban in terms of the prevailing political conditions within Afghanistan, which made them vulnerable to attack. The essay concludes that current political circumstances could, in the long run, permit the resurrection of the Taliban and undermine the US-led coalition's victory.     

基于生命周期理论的军事环境安全策略

探讨了军事环境安全概念,并运用生命周期理论对国家军事环境安全的保障措施和宏观策略进行了初步研讨。军事活动一般可分为计划规划、具体实施和事后评价3个阶段。为了在新形势下更加经济、高效地保障国家军事环境安全,首先要加大军事活动环境影响评价力度、采用对环境破坏小的战法并在军购中推行环境准入制,即尽量从源头上控制重大环境问题出现。考虑到战争的特殊性,需要在战前预先储备必要的生态环境修复技术。     

The Morale Maze: the German Army in Late 1918

The state of the German Army’s morale in 1918 is central to our understanding not only of the outcome of World War I, but also of the German Revolution and, indeed, through the pernicious ‘stab-in-the-back-myth’, on Weimar politics and the rise of the Nazis, too. This article presents new evidence from the German archives, blended with statistical analysis, to show that the morale of some units held up better than previously thought almost to the end, and thus to suggest three things. First, it proposes that some historians have placed too much reliance on English-language sources alone, such as British Army intelligence reports, which have various flaws as evidence. Second, it argues that, while historians have increasingly moved away from generalisations about German morale, this process has further to run. Third, it suggests that no single tipping point can be identified, and that morale alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for battlefield defeat. Indeed, much of the data can only be explained if the tactical realities of the war in late 1918 are clearly understood.     

U.S. policy on preventive war and preemption

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet.     

Strategic deficiencies in national liberation struggles: The case of fatah in the al-Aqsa Intifada

This study reports and explains a cluster of deviations from the basic rational criteria of national liberation strategy exhibited by ‘inside’ West Bank Fatah leaders during the al-Aqsa uprising, based on an analysis of public statements of three such leaders. The leaders fail to recognize that their attempt to deter Israeli offensives by threatening to reciprocate them with attacks inside the Green Line is sabotaged by Islamists independently attacking inside the Green Line; inadequately attend to the distinct possibility that attacks within the Green Line increase Israeli opposition to desired concessions on refugees and territory; and appear to occasionally get swept-up in the sentiment that reciprocating Israeli aggression is inherently just. The study elaborates and examines the possible roles in these strategic deficiencies of leader strategic desperation; rage and indignation; and the political need to satisfy widespread popular militancy. The study's logic complements existing asymmetric conflict research and can inform research beyond the Palestinian–Israeli case.